Bayan Muna v. Romulo (G.R. No. 159618; February 1, 2011)
CASE DIGEST: BAYAN MUNA v. ALBERTO ROMULO. G.R. No. 159618; February 1, 2011.FACTS: In 2000, the RP, through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is “subject to ratification, acceptance or approval” by the signatory states.
In 2003, via Exchange of Notes with the US government, the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, finalized a non-surrender agreement which aimed to protect certain persons of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in international tribunals.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.
ISSUE: [1] Did respondents abuse their discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in concluding the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement in contravention of the Rome Statute?
[2] Is the agreement valid, binding and effective without the concurrence by at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate?
HELD: The Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from, the Rome Statute. Far from going against each other, one complements the other. As a matter of fact, the principle of complementarity underpins the creation of the ICC. According to Art. 1 of the Statute, the jurisdiction of the ICC is to “be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions [of the signatory states].” the Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states, like the RP, over serious crimes committed within their respective borders, the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when the signatory states are unwilling or unable to prosecute.
Also, under international law, there is a considerable difference between a State-Party and a signatory to a treaty. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a signatory state is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty. The Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome Statute and not a State-Party for lack of ratification by the Senate. Thus, it is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Rome Statute. Any argument obliging the Philippines to follow any provision in the treaty would be premature. And even assuming that the Philippines is a State-Party, the Rome Statute still recognizes the primacy of international agreements entered into between States, even when one of the States is not a State-Party to the Rome Statute.
The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history, we have entered executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.
Executive agreements may be validly entered into without such concurrence. As the President wields vast powers and influence, her conduct in the external affairs of the nation is, as Bayan would put it, “executive altogether.” The right of the President to enter into or ratify binding executive agreements has been confirmed by long practice. DISMISSED.
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CASE DIGEST: BAYAN MUNA, as represented by Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN BELTRAN, and Rep. LIZA L. MAZA, Petitioner, vs. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Respondents. (G.R. No. 159618; February 1, 2011)
FACTS: Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. The serious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.
On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge d'Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms,is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition,only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process.The Philippines is not among the 92.
On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA and the RP.
ViaExchange of Notes No. BFO-028-03 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03, hereinafter), the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to and put in effect the Agreement with the US government.Inesse, theAgreementaims to protect what it refers to and defines aspersons of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in international tribunals.[8]It is reflective of the increasing pace of the strategic security and defense partnership between the two countries.As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral agreements have been effected by and between theUSand 33 other countries.
In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of the non-surrender agreement, Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of October 28, 2003 that the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a legally binding agreement under international law; and that, under US law, the said agreement did not require the advice and consent of the US Senate.
In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.
For their part, respondents question petitioners standing to maintain a suit and counter that the Agreement, being in the nature of an executive agreement, does not require Senate concurrence for its efficacy. And for reasons detailed in their comment, respondents assert the constitutionality of the Agreement.
ISSUES: [1] Was the Agreement contracted validly, which resolves itself into the question of whether or not respondents gravely abused their discretion in concluding it?
[2] Does the Agreement, which has not been submitted to the Senate for concurrence, contravene and undermine the Rome Statute and other treaties?
HELD: Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. Specifically, it is a party's personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the act being challenged, and calls for more than just a generalized grievance. The term interest refers to material interest, as distinguished from one that is merely incidental.The rationale for requiring a party who challenges the validity of a law or international agreement to allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Locus standi, however, is merely a matter of procedure and it has been recognized that, in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers, or voters who actually sue in the public interest.Consequently, in a catena of cases, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal stance on locus standi.
Going by the petition, petitioners representatives pursue the instant suit primarily as concerned citizens raising issues of transcendental importance, both for the Republic and the citizenry as a whole.
When suing as a citizen to question the validity of a law or other government action, a petitioner needs to meet certain specific requirements before he can be clothed with standing.Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.expounded on this requirement, thus:
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements have been met have been given standing by this Court.
When suing as acitizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
In the case at bar, petitioners representatives have complied with the qualifying conditions or specific requirements exacted under thelocus standirule.As citizens, their interest in the subject matter of the petition is direct and personal.At the very least, their assertions questioning theAgreementare made of a public right,i.e., to ascertain that theAgreementdid not go against established national policies, practices, and obligations bearing on the States obligation to the community of nations.
Petitioners initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold posture being that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot be a valid medium for concluding the Agreement.
Petitioners contention perhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized international doctrines, practices, and jargon is untenable. One of these is the doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, wherein the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law and international jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations.An exchange of notes falls into the category of inter-governmental agreements,which is an internationally accepted form of international agreement. The United Nations Treaty Collections (Treaty Reference Guide) defines the term as follows:
An exchange of notes is a record of a routine agreement, that has many similarities with the private law contract.The agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to record its assent.The signatories of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads.The technique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative approval.
In another perspective, the terms exchange of notes and executive agreements have been used interchangeably, exchange of notes being considered a form of executive agreement that becomes binding through executive action. On the other hand, executive agreements concluded by the President sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated agreements or protocols. As former US High Commissioner to the Philippines Francis B. Sayre observed in his work,The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts:
The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements whether denominated executive agreements or exchange of notes or otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/NBFO-028-03be it viewed as the Non-Surrender Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance thereof or as consent to be bound is a recognized mode of concluding a legally binding international written contract among nations.
Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as an international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by international law,whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instrumentsand whatever its particular designation.International agreements may be in the form of (1) treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive ratification; or (2) executive agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they do not require legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a narrower range of subject matters than treaties.
Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding effects on the contracting states concerned,as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers.Neither,on the domestic sphere, can one be held valid if it violates the Constitution.Authorities are, however, agreed that one is distinct from another for accepted reasons apart from the concurrence-requirement aspect. As has been observed by US constitutional scholars, a treaty has greater dignity than an executive agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and the people;a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takes precedence over any prior statutory enactment.
Contrary to petitioners pretense, the Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from, the Rome Statute.Far from going against each other, one complements the other.As a matter of fact, the principle of complementarity underpins the creation of the ICC.As aptly pointed out by respondents and admitted by petitioners, the jurisdiction of the ICC is to be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions of the signatory states. Art. 1 of the Rome Statute pertinently provides:
Article 1: The Court
An International Crimininal Court(the Court) is hereby established.It x x x shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.The jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute.
Significantly, the sixth preambular paragraph of the Rome Statute declares that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.This provision indicates that primary jurisdiction over the so-called international crimes rests, at the first instance, with the state where the crime was committed; secondarily, with the ICC in appropriate situations contemplated under Art. 17, par. 1of the Rome Statute.
Of particular note is the application of the principle of ne bis in idemunder par. 3 of Art. 20, Rome Statute, which again underscores the primacy of the jurisdiction of a state vis-a-vis that of the ICC.As far as relevant, the provision states that no person who has been tried by another court for conduct [constituting crimes within its jurisdiction] shall be tried by the [International Criminal] Court with respect to the same conduct.
The foregoing provisions of the Rome Statute, taken collectively, argue against the idea of jurisdictional conflict between the Philippines, as party to the non-surrender agreement, and the ICC; or the idea of the Agreement substantially impairing the value of the RPs undertaking under the Rome Statute.Ignoring for a while the fact that the RP signed the Rome Statute ahead of the Agreement, it is abundantly clear to us that the Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states, like the RP, over serious crimes committed within their respective borders, the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when the signatory states are unwilling or unable to prosecute.
Given the above consideration, petitioners suggestion that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, violated its duty required by the imperatives of good faith and breached its commitment under the Vienna Conventionto refrain from performing any act tending to impair the value of a treaty, e.g., the Rome Statutehas to be rejected outright.For nothing in the provisions of the Agreement,in relation to the Rome Statute, tends to diminish the efficacy of the Statute, let alone defeats the purpose of the ICC.Lest it be overlooked, the Rome Statute contains a proviso that enjoins the ICC from seeking the surrender of an erring person, should the process require the requested state to perform an act that would violate some international agreement it has entered into.We refer to Art. 98(2) of the Rome Statute, which reads:
Article 98
Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to surrender
2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.
Moreover, under international law, there is a considerable difference between a State-Party and a signatory to a treaty. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a signatory state is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty;whereas a State-Party, on the other hand, is legally obliged to follow all the provisions of a treaty in good faith.In the instant case, it bears stressing that the Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome Statute and not a State-Party for lack of ratification by the Senate. Thus, it is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Rome Statute. Any argument obliging the Philippines to follow any provision in the treaty would be premature.
As a result, petitioners argument that State-Parties with non-surrender agreements are prevented from meeting their obligations under the Rome Statute, specifically Arts. 27, 86, 89 and 90, must fail. These articles are only legally binding upon State-Parties, not signatories.
Furthermore, a careful reading of said Art. 90 would show that the Agreement is not incompatible with the Rome Statute. Specifically, Art. 90(4) provides that if the requesting State is a State not Party to this Statute the requested State, if it is not under an international obligation to extradite the person to the requesting State, shall give priority to the request for surrender from the Court In applying the provision, certain undisputed facts should be pointed out:first, the US is neither a State-Party nor a signatory to the Rome Statute; and second, there is an international agreement between the US and the Philippines regarding extradition or surrender of persons, i.e., the Agreement. Clearly, even assuming that the Philippines is a State-Party, the Rome Statute still recognizes the primacy of international agreements entered into between States, even when one of the States is not a State-Party to the Rome Statute.
Petitioner next argues that the RP has, through the Agreement, abdicated its sovereignty by bargaining away the jurisdiction of the ICC to prosecute US nationals, government officials/employees or military personnel who commit serious crimes of international concerns in the Philippines.Formulating petitioners argument a bit differently, the RP,by entering into the Agreement, does thereby abdicate its sovereignty, abdication being done by its waiving or abandoning its right to seek recourse through the Rome Statute of the ICC for erring Americans committing international crimes in the country.
We are not persuaded.As it were, the Agreement is but a form of affirmance and confirmance of the Philippines national criminal jurisdiction.National criminal jurisdiction being primary, as explained above, it is always the responsibility and within the prerogative of the RP either to prosecute criminal offenses equally covered by the Rome Statute or to accede to the jurisdiction of the ICC.Thus, the Philippines may decide to try persons of theUS, as the term is understood in the Agreement, under our national criminal justice system.Or it may opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or over US persons committing high crimes in the country and defer to the secondary criminal jurisdiction of the ICC over them.As to persons of the US whom the Philippines refuses to prosecute, the country would, in effect, accord discretion to the US to exercise either its national criminal jurisdiction over the person concerned or to give its consent to the referral of the matter to the ICC for trial.In the same breath, the US must extend the same privilege to the Philippines with respect to persons of the RP committing high crimes within US territorial jurisdiction.
To be sure, the nullity of the subject non-surrender agreement cannot be predicated on the postulate that some of its provisions constitute a virtual abdication of its sovereignty.Almost every time a state enters into an international agreement, it voluntarily sheds off part of its sovereignty.The Constitution, as drafted, did not envision a reclusive Philippines isolated from the rest of the world.It even adheres, as earlier stated, to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.
By their nature, treaties and international agreements actually have a limiting effect on the otherwise encompassing and absolute nature of sovereignty.By their voluntary act, nations may decide to surrender or waive some aspects of their state power or agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise exclusive and absolute jurisdiction.The usual underlying consideration in this partial surrender may be the greater benefits derived from a pact or a reciprocal undertaking of one contracting party to grant the same privileges or immunities to the other.On the rationale that the Philippines has adopted the generally accepted principles of international law aspart of the law of the land, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution. Such waiver does not amount to an unconstitutional diminution or deprivation of jurisdiction of Philippine courts.
Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of international law.The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, leaves criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity; it precludes our country from delivering an American criminal to the ICC.
The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioner's earlier position, which, as already discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement,virtually abdicated its sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to international law principles.
The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor General, is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. The agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the country's judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and judiciously.
Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement would allow Filipinos and Americans committing high crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial and punishment.This is manifestly incorrect.Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statute have been met.For perspective, what the Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to international tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws.With the view we take of things, there is nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the Rome Statute.
Petitioners final point revolves around the necessity of the Senates concurrence in the Agreement.And without specifically saying so, petitioner would argue that the non-surrender agreement was executed by the President, thru the DFA Secretary, in grave abuse of discretion.
The Court need not delve on and belabor the first portion of the above posture of petitioner, the same having been discussed at length earlier on.As to the second portion, We wish to state that petitioner virtually faults the President for performing, through respondents, a task conferred the President by the Constitutionthe power to enter into international agreements.
By constitutional fiat and by the nature of his or her office, the President, as head of state and government, is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country. The Constitution vests in the President the power to enter into international agreements, subject, in appropriate cases, to the required concurrence votes of the Senate.But as earlier indicated, executive agreements may be validly entered into without such concurrence.As the President wields vast powers and influence, her conduct in the external affairs of the nation is, asBayanwould put it, executive altogether.The right of the President to enter into or ratify binding executive agreements has been confirmed by long practice.
In thus agreeing to conclude theAgreementthru E/N BFO-028-03, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, represented by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, acted within the scope of the authority and discretion vested in her by the Constitution.At the end of the day, the Presidentby ratifying, thru her deputies, the non-surrender agreement did nothing more than discharge a constitutional duty and exercise a prerogative that pertains to her office.
A view is advanced that the Agreement amends existing municipal laws on the States obligation in relation to grave crimes against the law of nations,i.e., genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.Relying on the above-quoted statutory proviso, the view posits that the Philippine is required to surrender to the proper international tribunal those persons accused of the grave crimes defined under RA 9851, if it does not exercise its primary jurisdiction to prosecute them.
The basic premise rests on the interpretation that if it does not decide to prosecute a foreign national for violations of RA 9851, the Philippines has only two options, to wit: (1) surrender the accused to the proper international tribunal; or (2) surrender the accused to another State if such surrender is pursuant to the applicable extradition laws and treaties.But the Philippines may exercise these options only in cases where another court or international tribunal is already conducting the investigation or undertaking the prosecution of such crime; otherwise, the Philippines must prosecute the crime before its own courts pursuant to RA 9851.
Posing the situation of a US national under prosecution by an international tribunal for any crime under RA 9851, the Philippines has the option to surrender such US national to the international tribunal if it decides not to prosecute such US national here.The view asserts that this option of the Philippines under Sec. 17 of RA 9851 is not subject to the consent of theUS, and any derogation of Sec. 17 of RA 9851, such as requiring the consent of the US before the Philippines can exercise such option, requires an amendatory law.In line with this scenario, the view strongly argues that theAgreementprevents thePhilippineswithout the consent of theUSfrom surrendering to any international tribunal US nationals accused of crimes covered by RA 9851, and, thus, in effect amends Sec. 17 of RA 9851.Consequently, the view is strongly impressed that the Agreement cannot be embodied in a simple executive agreement in the form of an exchange of notes but must be implemented through an extradition law or a treaty with the corresponding formalities.
Moreover, consonant with the foregoing view, citing Sec. 2, Art. II of the Constitution, where thePhilippinesadopts, as a national policy, the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, the Court is further impressed to perceivethe Rome Statute as declaratory of customary international law.In other words, the Statute embodies principles of law which constitute customary international law or custom and for which reason it assumes the status of an enforceable domestic law in the context of the aforecited constitutional provision.As a corollary, it is argued that any derogation from the Rome Statute principles cannot be undertaken via a mere executive agreement, which, as an exclusive act of the executive branch, can only implement, but cannot amend or repeal, an existing law.TheAgreement, so the argument goes, seeks to frustrate the objects of the principles of law or alters customary rules embodied in the Rome Statute.
Prescinding from the foregoing premises, the view thus advanced considers the Agreement inefficacious, unless it is embodied in a treaty duly ratified with the concurrence of the Senate, the theory being that a Senate- ratified treaty partakes of the nature of a municipal law that can amend or supersede another law, in this instance Sec. 17 of RA 9851 and the status of the Rome Statute as constitutive of enforceable domestic law under Sec. 2, Art. II of the Constitution.
We are unable to lend cogency to the view thus taken. For one, we find that the Agreement does not amend or is repugnant to RA 9851.For another, the view does not clearly state what precise principles of law, if any, the Agreement alters.And for a third, it does not demonstrate in the concrete how the Agreement seeks to frustrate the objectives of the principles of law subsumed in the Rome Statute.
Nonetheless, despite the lack of actual domestic legislation, the US notably follows the doctrine of incorporation.As early as 1900, the esteemed Justice Gray inThe Paquete Habana case already held international law as part of the law of theUS, to wit:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators who by years of labor, research, and experience have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for the trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.
Thus, a person can be tried in the US for an international crime despite the lack of domestic legislation.The cited ruling in U.S. v. Coolidge,which in turn is based on the holding inU.S. v. Hudson, only applies to common law and not to the law of nations or international law.Indeed, the Court inU.S. v. Hudson only considered the question, whether the Circuit Courts of the United States can exercise a common law jurisdiction in criminal cases.Stated otherwise, there is no common law crime in the US but this is considerably different from international law.
TheUSdoubtless recognizes international law as part of the law of the land, necessarily including international crimes, even without any local statute.In fact, years later, US courts would apply international law as a source of criminal liability despite the lack of a local statute criminalizing it as such. So it was that in Ex Parte Quir in the US Supreme Court noted that from the very beginning of its history this Court has recognized and applied the law of war as including that part of the law of nations which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy nations as well as of enemy individuals. It went on further to explain that Congress had not undertaken the task of codifying the specific offenses covered in the law of war, thus:
It is no objection that Congress in providing for the trial of such offenses has not itself undertaken to codify that branch of international law or to mark its precise boundaries, or to enumerate or define by statute all the acts which that law condemns. An Act of Congress punishing the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations is an appropriate exercise of its constitutional authority, Art. I, s 8, cl. 10, to define and punish the offense since it has adopted by reference the sufficiently precise definition of international law. Similarly by the reference in the 15th Article of War to offenders or offenses that by the law of war may be triable by such military commissions. Congress has incorporated by reference, as within the jurisdiction of military commissions, all offenses which are defined as such by the law of war, and which may constitutionally be included within that jurisdiction.
This rule finds an even stronger hold in the case of crimes against humanity. It has been held that genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity have attained the status of customary international law.Some even go so far as to state that these crimes have attained the status of jus cogens.
Customary international law or international custom is a source of international law as stated in the Statute of the ICJ. It is defined as the general and consistent practice of states recognized and followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.In order to establish the customary status of a particular norm, two elements must concur: State practice, the objective element; andopinio juris sive necessitates, the subjective element.
State practice refers to the continuous repetition of the same or similar kind of acts or norms by States.It is demonstrated upon the existence of the following elements: (1) generality; (2) uniformity and consistency; and (3) duration. While, opinio juris, the psychological element, requires that the state practice or norm be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.
The term jus cogens means the compelling law.Corollary, a jus cogens norm holds the highest hierarchical position among all other customary norms and principles.As a result, jus cogens norms are deemed peremptory and non-derogable. When applied to international crimes, jus cogens crimes have been deemed so fundamental to the existence of a just international legal order that states cannot derogate from them, even by agreement.
These jus cogens crimes relate to the principle of universal jurisdiction, i.e., any state may exercise jurisdiction over an individual who commits certain heinous and widely condemned offenses, even when no other recognized basis for jurisdiction exists.The rationale behind this principle is that the crime committed is so egregious that it is considered to be committed against all members of the international community and thus granting every State jurisdiction over the crime.
Therefore, even with the current lack of domestic legislation on the part of the US, it still has both the doctrine of incorporation and universal jurisdiction to try these crimes. DISMISSED.
HELD: Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. Specifically, it is a party's personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the act being challenged, and calls for more than just a generalized grievance. The term interest refers to material interest, as distinguished from one that is merely incidental.The rationale for requiring a party who challenges the validity of a law or international agreement to allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Locus standi, however, is merely a matter of procedure and it has been recognized that, in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers, or voters who actually sue in the public interest.Consequently, in a catena of cases, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal stance on locus standi.
Going by the petition, petitioners representatives pursue the instant suit primarily as concerned citizens raising issues of transcendental importance, both for the Republic and the citizenry as a whole.
When suing as a citizen to question the validity of a law or other government action, a petitioner needs to meet certain specific requirements before he can be clothed with standing.Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.expounded on this requirement, thus:
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements have been met have been given standing by this Court.
When suing as acitizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
In the case at bar, petitioners representatives have complied with the qualifying conditions or specific requirements exacted under thelocus standirule.As citizens, their interest in the subject matter of the petition is direct and personal.At the very least, their assertions questioning theAgreementare made of a public right,i.e., to ascertain that theAgreementdid not go against established national policies, practices, and obligations bearing on the States obligation to the community of nations.
Petitioners initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold posture being that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot be a valid medium for concluding the Agreement.
Petitioners contention perhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized international doctrines, practices, and jargon is untenable. One of these is the doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, wherein the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law and international jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations.An exchange of notes falls into the category of inter-governmental agreements,which is an internationally accepted form of international agreement. The United Nations Treaty Collections (Treaty Reference Guide) defines the term as follows:
An exchange of notes is a record of a routine agreement, that has many similarities with the private law contract.The agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to record its assent.The signatories of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads.The technique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative approval.
In another perspective, the terms exchange of notes and executive agreements have been used interchangeably, exchange of notes being considered a form of executive agreement that becomes binding through executive action. On the other hand, executive agreements concluded by the President sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated agreements or protocols. As former US High Commissioner to the Philippines Francis B. Sayre observed in his work,The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts:
The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements whether denominated executive agreements or exchange of notes or otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/NBFO-028-03be it viewed as the Non-Surrender Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance thereof or as consent to be bound is a recognized mode of concluding a legally binding international written contract among nations.
Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as an international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by international law,whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instrumentsand whatever its particular designation.International agreements may be in the form of (1) treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive ratification; or (2) executive agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they do not require legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a narrower range of subject matters than treaties.
Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding effects on the contracting states concerned,as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers.Neither,on the domestic sphere, can one be held valid if it violates the Constitution.Authorities are, however, agreed that one is distinct from another for accepted reasons apart from the concurrence-requirement aspect. As has been observed by US constitutional scholars, a treaty has greater dignity than an executive agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and the people;a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takes precedence over any prior statutory enactment.
Contrary to petitioners pretense, the Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from, the Rome Statute.Far from going against each other, one complements the other.As a matter of fact, the principle of complementarity underpins the creation of the ICC.As aptly pointed out by respondents and admitted by petitioners, the jurisdiction of the ICC is to be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions of the signatory states. Art. 1 of the Rome Statute pertinently provides:
Article 1: The Court
An International Crimininal Court(the Court) is hereby established.It x x x shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.The jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute.
Significantly, the sixth preambular paragraph of the Rome Statute declares that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.This provision indicates that primary jurisdiction over the so-called international crimes rests, at the first instance, with the state where the crime was committed; secondarily, with the ICC in appropriate situations contemplated under Art. 17, par. 1of the Rome Statute.
Of particular note is the application of the principle of ne bis in idemunder par. 3 of Art. 20, Rome Statute, which again underscores the primacy of the jurisdiction of a state vis-a-vis that of the ICC.As far as relevant, the provision states that no person who has been tried by another court for conduct [constituting crimes within its jurisdiction] shall be tried by the [International Criminal] Court with respect to the same conduct.
The foregoing provisions of the Rome Statute, taken collectively, argue against the idea of jurisdictional conflict between the Philippines, as party to the non-surrender agreement, and the ICC; or the idea of the Agreement substantially impairing the value of the RPs undertaking under the Rome Statute.Ignoring for a while the fact that the RP signed the Rome Statute ahead of the Agreement, it is abundantly clear to us that the Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states, like the RP, over serious crimes committed within their respective borders, the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when the signatory states are unwilling or unable to prosecute.
Given the above consideration, petitioners suggestion that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, violated its duty required by the imperatives of good faith and breached its commitment under the Vienna Conventionto refrain from performing any act tending to impair the value of a treaty, e.g., the Rome Statutehas to be rejected outright.For nothing in the provisions of the Agreement,in relation to the Rome Statute, tends to diminish the efficacy of the Statute, let alone defeats the purpose of the ICC.Lest it be overlooked, the Rome Statute contains a proviso that enjoins the ICC from seeking the surrender of an erring person, should the process require the requested state to perform an act that would violate some international agreement it has entered into.We refer to Art. 98(2) of the Rome Statute, which reads:
Article 98
Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to surrender
2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.
Moreover, under international law, there is a considerable difference between a State-Party and a signatory to a treaty. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a signatory state is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty;whereas a State-Party, on the other hand, is legally obliged to follow all the provisions of a treaty in good faith.In the instant case, it bears stressing that the Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome Statute and not a State-Party for lack of ratification by the Senate. Thus, it is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Rome Statute. Any argument obliging the Philippines to follow any provision in the treaty would be premature.
As a result, petitioners argument that State-Parties with non-surrender agreements are prevented from meeting their obligations under the Rome Statute, specifically Arts. 27, 86, 89 and 90, must fail. These articles are only legally binding upon State-Parties, not signatories.
Furthermore, a careful reading of said Art. 90 would show that the Agreement is not incompatible with the Rome Statute. Specifically, Art. 90(4) provides that if the requesting State is a State not Party to this Statute the requested State, if it is not under an international obligation to extradite the person to the requesting State, shall give priority to the request for surrender from the Court In applying the provision, certain undisputed facts should be pointed out:first, the US is neither a State-Party nor a signatory to the Rome Statute; and second, there is an international agreement between the US and the Philippines regarding extradition or surrender of persons, i.e., the Agreement. Clearly, even assuming that the Philippines is a State-Party, the Rome Statute still recognizes the primacy of international agreements entered into between States, even when one of the States is not a State-Party to the Rome Statute.
Petitioner next argues that the RP has, through the Agreement, abdicated its sovereignty by bargaining away the jurisdiction of the ICC to prosecute US nationals, government officials/employees or military personnel who commit serious crimes of international concerns in the Philippines.Formulating petitioners argument a bit differently, the RP,by entering into the Agreement, does thereby abdicate its sovereignty, abdication being done by its waiving or abandoning its right to seek recourse through the Rome Statute of the ICC for erring Americans committing international crimes in the country.
We are not persuaded.As it were, the Agreement is but a form of affirmance and confirmance of the Philippines national criminal jurisdiction.National criminal jurisdiction being primary, as explained above, it is always the responsibility and within the prerogative of the RP either to prosecute criminal offenses equally covered by the Rome Statute or to accede to the jurisdiction of the ICC.Thus, the Philippines may decide to try persons of theUS, as the term is understood in the Agreement, under our national criminal justice system.Or it may opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or over US persons committing high crimes in the country and defer to the secondary criminal jurisdiction of the ICC over them.As to persons of the US whom the Philippines refuses to prosecute, the country would, in effect, accord discretion to the US to exercise either its national criminal jurisdiction over the person concerned or to give its consent to the referral of the matter to the ICC for trial.In the same breath, the US must extend the same privilege to the Philippines with respect to persons of the RP committing high crimes within US territorial jurisdiction.
To be sure, the nullity of the subject non-surrender agreement cannot be predicated on the postulate that some of its provisions constitute a virtual abdication of its sovereignty.Almost every time a state enters into an international agreement, it voluntarily sheds off part of its sovereignty.The Constitution, as drafted, did not envision a reclusive Philippines isolated from the rest of the world.It even adheres, as earlier stated, to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.
By their nature, treaties and international agreements actually have a limiting effect on the otherwise encompassing and absolute nature of sovereignty.By their voluntary act, nations may decide to surrender or waive some aspects of their state power or agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise exclusive and absolute jurisdiction.The usual underlying consideration in this partial surrender may be the greater benefits derived from a pact or a reciprocal undertaking of one contracting party to grant the same privileges or immunities to the other.On the rationale that the Philippines has adopted the generally accepted principles of international law aspart of the law of the land, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution. Such waiver does not amount to an unconstitutional diminution or deprivation of jurisdiction of Philippine courts.
Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of international law.The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, leaves criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity; it precludes our country from delivering an American criminal to the ICC.
The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioner's earlier position, which, as already discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement,virtually abdicated its sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to international law principles.
The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor General, is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. The agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the country's judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and judiciously.
Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement would allow Filipinos and Americans committing high crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial and punishment.This is manifestly incorrect.Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statute have been met.For perspective, what the Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to international tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws.With the view we take of things, there is nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the Rome Statute.
Petitioners final point revolves around the necessity of the Senates concurrence in the Agreement.And without specifically saying so, petitioner would argue that the non-surrender agreement was executed by the President, thru the DFA Secretary, in grave abuse of discretion.
The Court need not delve on and belabor the first portion of the above posture of petitioner, the same having been discussed at length earlier on.As to the second portion, We wish to state that petitioner virtually faults the President for performing, through respondents, a task conferred the President by the Constitutionthe power to enter into international agreements.
By constitutional fiat and by the nature of his or her office, the President, as head of state and government, is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country. The Constitution vests in the President the power to enter into international agreements, subject, in appropriate cases, to the required concurrence votes of the Senate.But as earlier indicated, executive agreements may be validly entered into without such concurrence.As the President wields vast powers and influence, her conduct in the external affairs of the nation is, asBayanwould put it, executive altogether.The right of the President to enter into or ratify binding executive agreements has been confirmed by long practice.
In thus agreeing to conclude theAgreementthru E/N BFO-028-03, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, represented by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, acted within the scope of the authority and discretion vested in her by the Constitution.At the end of the day, the Presidentby ratifying, thru her deputies, the non-surrender agreement did nothing more than discharge a constitutional duty and exercise a prerogative that pertains to her office.
A view is advanced that the Agreement amends existing municipal laws on the States obligation in relation to grave crimes against the law of nations,i.e., genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.Relying on the above-quoted statutory proviso, the view posits that the Philippine is required to surrender to the proper international tribunal those persons accused of the grave crimes defined under RA 9851, if it does not exercise its primary jurisdiction to prosecute them.
The basic premise rests on the interpretation that if it does not decide to prosecute a foreign national for violations of RA 9851, the Philippines has only two options, to wit: (1) surrender the accused to the proper international tribunal; or (2) surrender the accused to another State if such surrender is pursuant to the applicable extradition laws and treaties.But the Philippines may exercise these options only in cases where another court or international tribunal is already conducting the investigation or undertaking the prosecution of such crime; otherwise, the Philippines must prosecute the crime before its own courts pursuant to RA 9851.
Posing the situation of a US national under prosecution by an international tribunal for any crime under RA 9851, the Philippines has the option to surrender such US national to the international tribunal if it decides not to prosecute such US national here.The view asserts that this option of the Philippines under Sec. 17 of RA 9851 is not subject to the consent of theUS, and any derogation of Sec. 17 of RA 9851, such as requiring the consent of the US before the Philippines can exercise such option, requires an amendatory law.In line with this scenario, the view strongly argues that theAgreementprevents thePhilippineswithout the consent of theUSfrom surrendering to any international tribunal US nationals accused of crimes covered by RA 9851, and, thus, in effect amends Sec. 17 of RA 9851.Consequently, the view is strongly impressed that the Agreement cannot be embodied in a simple executive agreement in the form of an exchange of notes but must be implemented through an extradition law or a treaty with the corresponding formalities.
Moreover, consonant with the foregoing view, citing Sec. 2, Art. II of the Constitution, where thePhilippinesadopts, as a national policy, the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, the Court is further impressed to perceivethe Rome Statute as declaratory of customary international law.In other words, the Statute embodies principles of law which constitute customary international law or custom and for which reason it assumes the status of an enforceable domestic law in the context of the aforecited constitutional provision.As a corollary, it is argued that any derogation from the Rome Statute principles cannot be undertaken via a mere executive agreement, which, as an exclusive act of the executive branch, can only implement, but cannot amend or repeal, an existing law.TheAgreement, so the argument goes, seeks to frustrate the objects of the principles of law or alters customary rules embodied in the Rome Statute.
Prescinding from the foregoing premises, the view thus advanced considers the Agreement inefficacious, unless it is embodied in a treaty duly ratified with the concurrence of the Senate, the theory being that a Senate- ratified treaty partakes of the nature of a municipal law that can amend or supersede another law, in this instance Sec. 17 of RA 9851 and the status of the Rome Statute as constitutive of enforceable domestic law under Sec. 2, Art. II of the Constitution.
We are unable to lend cogency to the view thus taken. For one, we find that the Agreement does not amend or is repugnant to RA 9851.For another, the view does not clearly state what precise principles of law, if any, the Agreement alters.And for a third, it does not demonstrate in the concrete how the Agreement seeks to frustrate the objectives of the principles of law subsumed in the Rome Statute.
Nonetheless, despite the lack of actual domestic legislation, the US notably follows the doctrine of incorporation.As early as 1900, the esteemed Justice Gray inThe Paquete Habana case already held international law as part of the law of theUS, to wit:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators who by years of labor, research, and experience have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for the trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.
Thus, a person can be tried in the US for an international crime despite the lack of domestic legislation.The cited ruling in U.S. v. Coolidge,which in turn is based on the holding inU.S. v. Hudson, only applies to common law and not to the law of nations or international law.Indeed, the Court inU.S. v. Hudson only considered the question, whether the Circuit Courts of the United States can exercise a common law jurisdiction in criminal cases.Stated otherwise, there is no common law crime in the US but this is considerably different from international law.
TheUSdoubtless recognizes international law as part of the law of the land, necessarily including international crimes, even without any local statute.In fact, years later, US courts would apply international law as a source of criminal liability despite the lack of a local statute criminalizing it as such. So it was that in Ex Parte Quir in the US Supreme Court noted that from the very beginning of its history this Court has recognized and applied the law of war as including that part of the law of nations which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy nations as well as of enemy individuals. It went on further to explain that Congress had not undertaken the task of codifying the specific offenses covered in the law of war, thus:
It is no objection that Congress in providing for the trial of such offenses has not itself undertaken to codify that branch of international law or to mark its precise boundaries, or to enumerate or define by statute all the acts which that law condemns. An Act of Congress punishing the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations is an appropriate exercise of its constitutional authority, Art. I, s 8, cl. 10, to define and punish the offense since it has adopted by reference the sufficiently precise definition of international law. Similarly by the reference in the 15th Article of War to offenders or offenses that by the law of war may be triable by such military commissions. Congress has incorporated by reference, as within the jurisdiction of military commissions, all offenses which are defined as such by the law of war, and which may constitutionally be included within that jurisdiction.
This rule finds an even stronger hold in the case of crimes against humanity. It has been held that genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity have attained the status of customary international law.Some even go so far as to state that these crimes have attained the status of jus cogens.
Customary international law or international custom is a source of international law as stated in the Statute of the ICJ. It is defined as the general and consistent practice of states recognized and followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.In order to establish the customary status of a particular norm, two elements must concur: State practice, the objective element; andopinio juris sive necessitates, the subjective element.
State practice refers to the continuous repetition of the same or similar kind of acts or norms by States.It is demonstrated upon the existence of the following elements: (1) generality; (2) uniformity and consistency; and (3) duration. While, opinio juris, the psychological element, requires that the state practice or norm be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.
The term jus cogens means the compelling law.Corollary, a jus cogens norm holds the highest hierarchical position among all other customary norms and principles.As a result, jus cogens norms are deemed peremptory and non-derogable. When applied to international crimes, jus cogens crimes have been deemed so fundamental to the existence of a just international legal order that states cannot derogate from them, even by agreement.
These jus cogens crimes relate to the principle of universal jurisdiction, i.e., any state may exercise jurisdiction over an individual who commits certain heinous and widely condemned offenses, even when no other recognized basis for jurisdiction exists.The rationale behind this principle is that the crime committed is so egregious that it is considered to be committed against all members of the international community and thus granting every State jurisdiction over the crime.
Therefore, even with the current lack of domestic legislation on the part of the US, it still has both the doctrine of incorporation and universal jurisdiction to try these crimes. DISMISSED.
