Republic v. Remman (G.R. No. 199310; February 19, 2014)

CASE DIGEST: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by RONNIE P. INOCENCIO. G.R. No. 199310; February 19, 2014.

FACTS: On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises, Inc. (respondent), filed an application with the RTC for judicial confirmation of title over two parcels of land, Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 situated in Barangay Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila.On December 13, 2001, the RTC granted respondent's application for registration. Thereafter, following the required publication and posting, a scheduled hearing was set. However, on May 30, 2002, only the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) appeared as oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an order of general default except LLDA, which was given 15 days to submit its comment/opposition to the respondent's application for registration.

On June 4, 2002, the LLDA filed its Opposition to the respondent's application for registration, asserting that the lots are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. On the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), on July 16, 2002, likewise filed its Opposition,alleging that the respondent failed to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Respondent's witnesses showed that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said parcels of land long before June 12, 1945. The respondent purchased Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 from Conrado Salvador (Salvador) and Bella Mijares (Mijares), respectively, in 1989. The subject properties were originally owned and possessed by Veronica Jaime (Jaime), who cultivated and planted different kinds of crops in the said lots, through her caretaker and hired farmers, since 1943. Sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the said parcels of land to Salvador and Mijares, who continued to cultivate the lots until the same were purchased by the respondent in 1989.

The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are within the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, as evidenced by the certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

On the other hand, the LLDA alleged that the respondent's application for registration should be denied since the subject parcels of land are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; it pointed out that pursuant to Section 41(11) of Republic Act No. 4850(R.A. No. 4850), lands, surrounding the Laguna de Bay, located at and below the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands which form part of the bed of the said lake. Engr. Magalonga, testifying for the oppositor LLDA, he found out that the elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are below 12.50 m. That upon actual area verification of the subject properties on September 25, 2002, Engr. Magalonga confirmed that the elevations of the subject properties range from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.

On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes, who claimed that, based on the actual topographic survey of the subject properties he conducted upon the request of the respondent, the elevations of the subject properties, contrary to LLDA's claim, are above 12.50 m.

The RTC granted the respondent's application for registration of title to the subject properties. The RTC found that the respondent was able to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.

The RTC opined that the elevations of the subject properties are very much higher than the reglementary elevation of 12.50 m and, thus, not part of the bed of Laguna Lake.

The RTC likewise found that the respondent was able to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject properties as early as 1943.

The petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA likewise pointed out that the respondent was able to present certifications issued by the DENR, attesting that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, which was not disputed by the petitioner. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: Did the CA err in affirming the RTC Decision which granted the application for registration filed by the respondent?

HELD: 
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to public land acquired under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, or the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073.Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish: first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the respondent presented two certifications issued by Calamno, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. However, the said certifications presented by the respondent are insufficient to prove that the subject properties are alienable and disposable.

In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 578 Phil. 441 (2008).The Court clarified that, in addition to the certification issued by the proper government agency that a parcel of land is alienable and disposable, applicants for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of public domain as alienable and disposable. They must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the records.

Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that the respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject properties since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Cerquena testified for the respondents that the subject properties were originally owned by Jaime who supposedly possessed and cultivated the same since 1943; that sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the subject properties to Salvador and Mijares who, in turn, sold the same to the respondent in 1989.

The foregoing are but unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions of the possession and occupation of the subject properties by the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest; they do not constitute the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence of possession and occupation of the subject properties required by Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529.

For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific acts of ownership must be presented to substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land subject of the application. Applicants for land registration cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property. Valiao v. Republic, G.R. No. 170757, November 28, 2011

"A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. For him, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the state. The possession of public land, however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the state, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years." Del Rosario v. Republic of the Philippines, 432 Phil. 824

Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the subject properties presented by the respondent were only for 2002. The respondent failed to explain why, despite its claim that it acquired the subject properties as early as 1989, and that its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property since 1943, it was only in 2002 that it started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. "While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership." Aide v. Bernal, G.R. No. 169336, March 18, 2010 GRANTED.

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