PROJECT JURISPRUDENCE

Act 386's Article 739. The following donations shall be void: (1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation; (2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in consideration thereof; (3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, by reason of his office. In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action. (n) However, De Leon & De Leon, Jr. (2011), Comments and Cases on Property, page 664, has expressed the view that, since the purpose of praiseworthy, good for all concerned, it should be considered valid. De Leon & De Leon, Jr. (2011) furthers that this is particularly true where X (donee) is a victim of deceit by X.

This Court has consistently ruled that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between the positive declarations of the prosecution witness and negative statements of the accused, the former deserves more credence. [G.R. No. 118770. December 6, 1996]

It is not to be lightly supposed that relatives of the deceased would callously violate their conscience to avenge the death of a dear one by blaming it on person whom they believe to be innocent thereof. Relationship per se does not give rise to a presumption of ulterior motive, nor does it ipso facto impair the credibility or tarnish the testimony of a witness. It has been correctly observed that the natural interest of witnesses who are relatives of the victims in securing the conviction of the guilty would deter them from implicating persons other than the culprits, for, otherwise, the latter would gain immunity. In the absence of ill-motive on the part of the witness, and none was shown, relationship between her and the victim does not undermine her credibility and so [her] testimony is entitled to full faith and credence. [G.R. No. 118770. December 6, 1996]

It has been held that affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open court declarations because the former are often executed when an affiant's mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has transpired. Further, affidavits are not complete reproductions of what the declarant has in mind because they are generally prepared by the administering officer and the affiant simply signs them after the same have been read to her. [G.R. No. 118770. December 6, 1996]

The inconsistency refers to minor details and has no bearing on the credibility of the witness. A certain latitude must be given to whatever minor mistake the witness might have said about the actual confrontation. For apart from the shock and the numbing effect of the whole incident, the rapidity with which the sequence of events took place must have its toll on the accuracy of the witness' account. [G.R. No. 118770. December 6, 1996]

The rule is that witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered. It has never been uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a single witness. [G.R. No. 118770. December 6, 1996]

The rule is to accord much weight to the impressions of the trial judge, who had the opportunity to observe the witnesses directly and to test their credibility by their demeanor on the stand. [G.R. No. 118770. December 6, 1996]

The fact that the lesser offense, and its necessary lower penalty, resulted from a plea bargaining agreement is of no moment as far as the penalty to be imposed is concerned. Plea bargaining is authorized by the present Rules and is in fact required to be considered by the trial court at the pre-trial conference. The felony of homicide which must constitute the basis for the penalty to be imposed having been agreed upon among the requisite parties and approved by the trial court itself, that downgraded offense and its lower penalty shall control the adjudgment of and any further proceedings before the court a quo. [G.R. No. 123991. December 6, 1996]

The present rule is that an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter. Our pronouncements here with respect to petitioner Felix Ladino, his co-accused, are definitely favorable and applicable to accused Restituto Amistad. He should not therefore be treated as the odd man out, but should also benefit form the more beneficial indeterminate sentence that we shall impose. In fact, under similar conditions and on the same ratiocination, the aforecited Rule has justified the extension of our judgment of acquittal to the co-accused who failed to appeal from the judgment of the trial court which we subsequently reversed. [G.R. No. 123991. December 6, 1996]

It should be kept in mind that to determine whether an indeterminate sentence and not a straight penalty is proper, what is considered is the penalty actually imposed by the trial court, after considering the attendant circumstances, and not the imposable penalty. Corollarily, it would be an unduly strained postulate that a sentence arrived at by a court after a valid plea bargaining should constitute an exception to the Indeterminate Sentence Law in addition to those enumerated in Section 2 thereof. [G.R. No. 123991. December 6, 1996]

As regards appellant's alibi, the Court has time and again ruled that alibi is the weakest of defenses because it is easy to fabricate but difficult to prove. It cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by witnesses. For the defense to prosper, the requirements of time and place (or distance) must be stricly met: it is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime during its commission. In the case before us, such physical impossibility had not been proven, and in fact, quite the opposite was shown. According to the Fiscal Fidel Sarmiento, the distance between Pawa and Bogtong, which are adjacent barangays, could be negotiated in ten to twenty minutes by crossing the river; and appellant admitted that in travelling between Bogtong and Pawa to peddle his wares, he would usually cross t...

The mere fact that, according to his companions at the wake, appellant did not flee that crime scene, may not be deemed as indicative of his innocence. There is no law or dictum holding that non-flight of an accused is conclusive proof of innocence. [G.R. No. 88043. December 9, 1996]

Appellant is liable for attempted robbery with homicide even if he was not himself the author of the killing of Generoso Jacob, for lack of evidence showing that he endeavored to prevent such slaying. Thus, the general rule applies that whenever homicide is committed on the occasion or as a consequence of robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery shall be held guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the homicide. The same principle applies even if the crime committed is attempted robbery with homicide. [G.R. No. 88043. December 9, 1996]

Pursuant to Art. 297 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime charged and proven in this case carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua "unless the homicide committed shall deserve a higher penalty." We find that the aggravating circumstance of dwelling had been duly proven. Although dwelling (morada) is considered as inherent in crimes which can only be committed in the abode of the victim such as trespass to dwelling and robbery in an inhabited house, it has been held as aggravating in robbery with homicide because the author thereof could have accomplished the heinous deed of snuffing out the victim's life without having to violate his domicile. Hence, in view of this aggravating circumstance, the penalty imposable upon appellant shall be reclusion perpetua. In conformity with prevailing jurisprudential law, indemnity for the death of Generoso Jacob shall be increased to P50,000.00. [G.R. No. 88043. December 9, 1996]

We are also unpersuaded by appellant's contention that it would have been well nigh impossible for Emelita to have the courage to snatch the mask off his face when she was being held at gunpoint, and considering that her husband did not even dare lift a finger. While it is true that people faced with danger usually become passive and submissive; it is equally true that there are some people who are emboldened in sudden or impulsive reaction to a frightening experience. Different persons have different reactions to similar situations. Man's behavior and reactions can never be stereotyped. [G.R. No. 88043. December 9, 1996]

As regards the variance in the testimonies of Emelita and her mother Amada concerning the type of weapon used by appellant in threatening the former, such alleged inconsistency in insignificant as it refers only to a minor detail. Rather than eroding the credibility of their testimonies, such difference in fact constitutes a sign of veracity. It is a well-recognized fact that witnesses testifying about the same nerve-wracking event can hardly be expected to be correct in every detail nor consistent with other witnesses in every aspect, considering the inevitability of differences in their perception, recollection, viewpoint or impressions, as well as in their physical, mental, emotional and psychological states at the time of reception and recall of such impressions. After all, to begin with, no two individuals are alike in term of powers of observation and of recall. Total recall or perfect symmetry is not required as long as witnesses concur on material points. [G.R. No. 88043. Decem...

Very telling is the fact that appellant does not even discuss Emelita's testimony establishing his presence at the crime scene, notwithstanding that it was Emelita whom he confronted and threatened and who pulled off his mask inside the well-lighted bedroon. Appellant was no stranger to the Jacob family; in fact, they were familiar with his build and his voice, since he frequented their home when peddling fruit juices and homemade chocolates in Pawa. Considering these circumstances, in the absence of proof that she had any bias or ill-motive against appellant, Emelita's sole identification of appellant as one of the three intruders in the Jacob residence stands completely unscathed. Consequently, such identification suffices to obtain conviction even in the absence of corroboration. [G.R. No. 88043. December 9, 1996]

We cannot stamp with approval the trial curt's imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua on appellant Nestor Escandor in view of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, which should instead be in its minimum period, that is, reclusion temporal maximum. [G.R. No. 95049. December 9, 1996]

It is beyond doubt that appellant are guilty of murder. We agree with the trial court's appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of treachery in view of the fact that the initial assault on Sabino was made from behind and was unexpected. Appellant undoubtedly employed a method in the execution of the crime which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to themselves arising from the defense which Sabino might make. [G.R. No. 95049. December 9, 1996]

One who sets up self-defense "must rely on the strength of his own evidence." Hence, if the evidence for the defense is of doubtful veracity, "conviction is imperative," the accused having admitted the killing. Here, nestor claims that Sabino was the aggressor. he shot Sabino twice, first on his hip when the latter was about to hack him (Nestor) with a bolo, and the second on his right chest. Be that as it may, the physical evidence however runs roughshod over Nestor's claim of self defense. [G.R. No. 95049. December 9, 1996]

Against positive identification, alibi cannot prevail. But even granting that he was at his house in the morning of the incident, this alone in the absence of other substantial evidence, is insufficient to remove the cloud of guilt, for by his own admission his house and the scene of the crime are only 60 meters apart, and there is nothing to show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the place of the commission of the crime. [G.R. No. 95049. December 9, 1996]

The testimony of an eyewitness who, while the crime is taking place, made no outcry and exerted no effort in order to help the victim will not be rendered unbelievable by such fact alone. witnessing a crime is an unusual experience which elicits different reactions from the witnesses and for which no clear-cut standard form of behavior can be drawn. in this case, Glenn, Gil and Madelyn must have been so shocked in witnessing the swift assault on their father that they failed to make an outcry. [G.R. No. 95049. December 9, 1996]

There is nothing unusual in the manner of assaulting a person even if no altercation between the victim and the assailant immediately preceded the attack. In fact, judicial notice can be taken of the normal predisposition of those with criminal intent to execute their sinister plan in a way least expected in order to insure it execution. in this case, knowing that Sabino was then carrying a bolo, appellant Nestor Escandor suddenly and without any warning shot Sabino from behind. The execution of the appellant's plan was achieved with greater ease and without risk to themselves. [G.R. No. 95049. December 9, 1996]

We find purported inconsistencies more apparent than real. As correctly averred by the appellee in its brief, Glenn's answers to the questions propounded by the trial court should be considered as a clarification or rectification of his earlier answer to appellants' counsel that his brother and sister ran away before the shooting. Besides, the alleged inconsistencies do not effect the substance of Glenn's testimony. It refers only to minor and insignificant details of the incident and not to the established fact that Glenn was then present at the palce of the commission of the crime and actually witnessed the appellants' assault on Sabino. It, thus reinforces rather than weakens Glenn's credibility as "minor inaccuracies" suggest that the witness is telling the truth. [G.R. No. 95049. December 9, 1996]

Appellant assail the credibility of Glenn Huelva, the prosecution's lone witness, by pointing out his relationship with the victim and as such his testimony is tainted with bias. Aside from this general averment in their brief, however, not an iota of evidence was ever presented at the trial to prove this charge. Relationship with the victim per se is not proof of prejudice. Nor is it a sufficient motive to testify falsely. [G.R. No. 95049. December 9, 1996]

The issue hinges on the trial court's assessment of the witness' credibility. Factual findings of the lower court especially on the credibility of the witnesses is generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal, as the trial court is in the best position to make an honest determination of the witnesses' deportment during trial. In this case, the trial court, in giving full faith and credence to the testimony of Glenn, observed that he "testified in a straight forward manner." We find no cogent reason to hold otherwise. [G.R. No. 95049. December 9, 1996]

This Court has ruled that: "We do not agree with the contention of the Solicitor General that since a paltik is a homemade gun, is illegally manufactured as recognized in People vs. Fajardo, and cannot be issued a license or permit, it is no longer necessary to prove that it is unlicensed. This appears to be at first blush, a very logical proposition. We cannot, however, yield to it because fajardo did not say that paltiks can in no case be issued a license or permit and that proof that a firearm is a paltiks dispenses with proof that it is unlicensed. [G.R. No. 110569. December 9, 1996]

In the case at bench, the testimony of a representative of, or a certification from the PNP (FEU) that petitioner was not a licensee of the said firearm would have sufficed for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of the crime of illegal possession. The absence of the foregoing is fatal to the prosecution's case and renders petitioner's conviction erroneous. True that in the case of People vs. Mesal, this Court dispensed with a certification from the firearms and Explosives Unit (FEU) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) to establish the alleged lack of license or permit on the part of the accused-appellant to possess the M-14 rifle found in his possession. This was, however, premised on that fact that: "The records reveal that the allegation was successfully substantiated by other evidence which firmly and undisputably established that accused-appellant did not have and could not possibly have, the requisite license or authority to p...

In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof, viz: (a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess the same. The latter is a negative fact which constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession, and it is the duty of the prosecution not only to allege it but also to prove it beyond reasonable doubt. [G.R. No. 110569. December 9, 1996]

Appellant's arrest being lawful, the search and seizure made incident thereto is likewise valid, albeit conducted without a warrant. In the case of People vs. Acol, where the unlicensed firearms were found when the police team apprehended the accused for robbery and not for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, this Court held that the unlicensed firearms may be seized without the necessity of obtaining a search warrant. Expounding thereon, it stated that: '''x x x The illegality of the search is independent from the illegal possession of prohibited arms. The illegality of the search did not make a legal an illegal possession of firearms. When, in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the offending police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they are not precluded from performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty and the taking of the corpus d...

The applicable provision is not Section 5, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests, but Section 7, Rule 113 which allows a police officer to effect arrest without the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest. [G.R. No. 110569. December 9, 1996]

Further bolstering the arresting officers' testimonies is the absence of any motive on their part to falsely testify against the petitioner. And it has been repeatedly held that without proof of such motive, law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duties. Thus, absent strong and convincing proof to the contrary, this Court is bound by the presumption that the arresting officers were aware of the legal mandates in effecting an arrest and strictly complied with the same. [G.R. No. 110569. December 9, 1996]

The threshold issue is factual: whether or not there indeed existed a standing warrant for the arrest of the petitioner. At the outset, this Court reiterates the general rule that when supported by substantial evidence, factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. A careful scrutiny of the records of the case at bench leads this Court to concur with the Court of Appeals in its finding that when the petitioner was arrested, there was then a standing warrant of arrest against him in connection with Criminal Case No. 471. This fact is manifest from the testimonies of the arresting officers which the defense failed to rebut during trial. [G.R. No. 110569. December 9, 1996]

It is true that as respondent Judge Alejo quite frankly admits, that fact that he "misplaced notes ** (he had) taken of the proceedings and ** (he) encountered difficulty in having the transcripts of stenographic notes later on transcribed," and the so called and the so-called "extra effort that ** (he exerted in deciding old and new cases in other courts," would not excuse or justify his failure to decide his own cases in his own court, yet the Court cannot, all things considered, see its way to imposing on him a penalty heavier than severe reprimand. While the Court cannot and should not tolerate sloth or negligence in a Judge in the disposition of his cases, the particular circumstances of this case preclude the extension of a stern punishing hand on the erring respondent. [A.M. No. 95-4-41-MeTC. December 10, 1996]

The Court is not unaware of the caution to be observed when circumstantial evidence is to be considered as inculpatory indicia in a criminal prosecution. That is why it has spent unusual time and effort to reflect upon all facets of the circumstances which the lower court accepted as an unbroken chain of events, reinforced by corroboration and yielding a conclusion of guilt, all consonant with the requisites therefor. But, from whatever angle we take the view, the catena of facts cannot but produce an inference consistent with guilt and not with innocence. All these, even aside from the tenet that flight bespeaks guilt, a further strike against appellant in addition to the cover-up running the gamut from falsification to false testimony. [G.R. No. 119359. December 10, 1996]

The circumstances which the court below considered as reactions betraying a sense and knowledge of guilt on the part of appellant and his cohorts have already been catalogued. One of them is the fact that immediately after the death of victim in the hospital, appellant took his entire household to Paco, Manila, abandoned their house in Quezon City and never came back until several years later. This is admitted by appellant and Acosta. In fact, appellant admitted that, while investigations into the death of his son were going on, he left for Japan in 1990 and returned in 1993, only to be arrested since the investigation had by then zeroed in on his culpability. [G.R. No. 119359. December 10, 1996]

That is why when the victim was brought to the hospital, Acosta never even mentioned at all that the boy merely fell down the stairs. The normal action of any person bringing a patient to a hospital, especially a medico-legal case, is to give information even tentatively as to how the injuries were sustained. Yet although the grandmother was announcing to everybody that the boy was killed through violent maltreatment by his own father, Acosta says he merely told her to keep quiet, and he forthwith left the hospital. He never dared to tell his present cock-and-bull story or mention the conjured accident on the stairs, especially to the medical staff whom he knew he could not delude and yet he has the affrontery to do so before this Court. [G.R. No. 119359. December 10, 1996]

Insofar as the statements of Rufina Alconyes are concerned, they are admissible as part of the res gestae, they having been caused by and did result from the startling, if not gruesome, occurrence that she witnessed; and these were shortly thereafter uttered by her with spontaneity, without prior opportunity to contrive the same. The report made thereof by Joshephine Aguilar is not hearsay since she was actually there and personally heard the statement of Alconyes which she recounted in court. Her account of said statements of Alconyes is admissible under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, with respect to the tenor and not the truth thereof, since independent of the truth or falsity of the same they are relevant to the issue on the cause of the death of the victim. [G.R. No. 119359. December 10, 1996]