PROJECT JURISPRUDENCE

Essentially, the word deliberate as used in the article must imply something more than mere negligence; it must be premeditated, obstinate, headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong. In the case at bar, it is evident that there was no deliberate refusal or failure on the part of the accused-appellants to restore the custody of the complainant's child to her. When the accused-appellants learned that complainant wanted her daughter back after five (5) long years of apparent wanton neglect, they tried their best to help herein complainant find the child as the latter was no longer under the clinic's care. Accused-appellant Dr. Ty did not have the address of Arabella's guardians but as soon as she obtained it from Dr. Fe Malonga who was already working abroad, she personally went to the guardians' residence and informed them that herein complainant wanted her daughter back. When the guardians refused to return the child, accused-appellant Dr. Ty so

C.A. Azucena, Jr. (CAA. Jr's) is an award-winning and respected author and expert in labor law. His textbooks in labor law are used in almost all law schools all over the country. He has been cited by the Supreme Court of the Philippines multiple times. In fact, in the case of David v. Macasio (G.R. No. 195466; July 2, 2014), Justice Brion adopted his views regarding the distinguishing characteristic of "pakyaw" or task basis engagement, as opposed to straight-hour wage payment. One of CAA, Jr.'s unpopular views can be found on Page 404 of Azucena, C. A. (2013). The Labor Code: with Comments and Cases (Vol. 1). National Book Store. It's about women and, below, it is quoted in full. MORE ABSENT THAN PRESENT? The increasing number of legislated absences with pay effectively reduces the productivity of a female employee. She is allowed by law to be absent from work for various reasons for a number of days: Holidays ................................. 22 day

Justice Leonen : In G.R. No. 180771, petitioners Resident Marine Mammals allegedly bring their case in their personal capacity, alleging that they stand to benefit or be injured from the judgment on the issues. The human petitioners implead themselves in a representative capacity "as legal guardians of the lesser life-forms and as responsible stewards of God's Creations." They use Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. as basis for their claim, asserting their right to enforce international and domestic environmental laws enacted for their benefit under the concept of stipulation pour autrui. As the representatives of Resident Marine Mammals, the human petitioners assert that they have the obligation to build awareness among the affected residents of Tañon Strait as well as to protect the environment, especially in light of the government's failure, as primary steward, to do its duty under the doctrine of public trust. Resident Marine Mammals and the human petitioners also assert t

The Supreme Court of the Philippines has held that, although a violation of the Traffic Code (such as lack of license or overloading) gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the violator, contributory negligence cannot be said to be present if there is no logical or causal connection between such traffic violation and the resulting injury. In short, even if one vehicle has no lights or exceeds the gross weight limit, if such has no relation to the accident, contributory negligence cannot be appreciated. Below is a quote from G.R. No. 119092 (December 10, 1998). "First of all, it has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver contributed to the collision between the vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has the burden of showing a causal connection between the injury received and the violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show that the violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it subs

Before a conviction for kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code can be had, two elements must concur, namely: (a) the offender has been entrusted with the custody of the minor, and (b) the offender deliberately fails to restore said minor to his parents or guardians. The essential element herein is that offender is entrusted with the custody of the minor but what is actually punishable is not the kidnapping of the minor, as the title of the article seems to indicate, but rather the deliberate failure or refusal of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. Said failure or refusal, however, must not only deliberate but must also be persistent as to oblige the parents or the guardians of the child to seek the aid of the courts in order to obtain custody. [G.R. No. 121519. October 30, 1996]

REGULATED RPW (CETHCHUP CRAP) >>> WORKER v. EE + Peo.v.Panis (presump.) +Peo.v.Goce(direct impre)+Peo.v.Angeles (no ill.rec. if no promise of ENT) DISQUALIFIED FROM RPW! NO LICENSE! (RULE 1 OF IRR) 1.Travel agencies, board members, management officials 2.Sales agencies of airlines 3.Employees of travel agencies/airlines directly or indirectly managing 4.Non-Filipinos 5.Corp. lower then 75% Fil. Ownership 6.Those with derogatory record 7.EE of gov’t agencies implementing labor laws 8.Those who license/autho. Have been previously revoked Regulations: 1.Public ENT office only (Art. 16) 2.Private sector partici. (Art25) License (fee)

Apart from the fact that only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies - rules of procedure cannot - it is noteworthy that the New Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, which was adopted on May 30, 1994, now provide that in the event a landowner is not satisfied with a decision of an agrarian adjudicator, the landowner can bring the matter directly to the Regional Trial Court sitting as Special Agrarian Court. [G.R. No. 122256. October 30, 1996]

Consequently, although the new rules speaks of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to 57 and therefore would be void. What adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide this question. [G.R. No. 122256. October 30, 1996]

Thus, under the law, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking. Through notice sent to the landowner pursuant to 16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR makes an offer. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative prodeeding is held and afterward the provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the Central (DARAB) adjudicator as the case may be, depending on the value of the land, fixes the price to be paid for the land. If the landowner does not agree to be the price fixed, he may bring the matter to the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court. This in essence is the procedure for the determination of compensation cases under R.A. No. 6657. In accordance with it, the private respondent's case was properly brought by it in the RTC, and it was error for the latter court to have dismissed the case. In the terminology of 57, the RTC, si

The general rule is that jurisdiction is conferred by law and determined by the allegations made by the plaintiff in his initiatory pleading. The Supreme Court has held that jurisdiction cannot be determined by the allegations of the defendant in his answer. Hence, if, for example, a plaintiff goes to court outside Metro Manila, files his claim before a metropolitan trial court and demands to collection a sum of 50,000 pesos, the defendant cannot insist on transferring the case to a regional trial court by saying that his debt is actually more than 300,000 pesos. An otherwise rule would create a situation where the defendant can easily evade litigation by filing an answer removing the case from the jurisdiction of whatever court. However, an exception to this rule obtains in agrarian disputes. A landlord may attempt to circumvent the law by simply filing a ejectment case against his tenant through an accion interdictal. Unsurprisingly, the defendant-tenant is forced to allege in his

Law students have shared their ideas on how to answer this question. Listed below are Project Jurisprudence' personal picks. This list has been arranged randomly. It does not follow any order of importance, correctness, etc. [1]  Jonathan Maximo Juan answers, "No. Anti-hazing law prohibits physical maltreatment. Hence, the accused are still liable for such special law. But with regards to the death of atio, the proximate cause should be first determined.. taking into consideration various evidences such as autopsy, previous heart ailments, witnesses, object evidences,etc." [2]  Jose T. Peralta III answers, "Even if the heart condition is the direct cause of death and not the beating, the proximate cause that may have triggered that pre-existing heart condition is the hazing itself." [3]  Randolph Jon Guerzon anwers, "In the prosecution of hazing, death is not an element. It merely “aggravates” the offense. So whether or not namatay siya and for wha

Thus Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) "all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners" and (2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under [R.A. No. 6657]." The provision of 50 must be construed in harmony with this provision by considering cases involving the determination of just compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitude of power conferred on the DAR. Indeed, there is a reason for this distinction. The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain (for such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal cases. Thus, in EPZA v. Dulay and Sumulong v. Guerero we held that the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies. [G.R. No. 122256. Octo

Once the judgment becomes final and executory, the "interim period from the finality of judgment awarding a monetary claim until payment thereof, is deemed to be equivalent to forbearance of credit." Thus, in accordance with the pronouncement in Eastern Shipping the rate of 12% p.a. should be imposed, and to be computed from the time the judgment became final and executory until fully satisfied. The actual base for the computation of this 12% interest after the judgment in this damage suit became final shall be the amount adjudge (P98,691.90) [G.R. No. 123643. October 30, 1996]

The rate 12% interest referred to in Cir. 416 applies only to: "[L]oan or forbearance of money, or to cases where money is transferred from one person to another and the obligation to return the same or a portion thereof is adjudged. Any other monetary judgment which does not fall within its coverage for such imposition is not within the ambit of the authority granted to the Central Bank. When an obligation not constituting a loan or forbearance of money is breached then an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum in accordance with Art. 2209 of the Civil Code. Indeed, the monetary judgment in favor of private respondent does not involve a loan of forbearance of money, hence the proper imposable rate of interest is (6%) per cent." [G.R. No. 123643. October 30, 1996]

Petitioners also asseverate that the scheme of financial assistance under Res. 56 may be likened to the monetary benefits of government officials and employees who are paid, over and above their salaries and allowances as provided by statute, an additional honorarium in varying amounts. We find this comparison baseless and misplaced. As clarified by the Solicitor General: Petitioners comparison of SSS Resolution No. 56 with the honoraria given to government officials and employees of the National Prosecution Service of the Department of Justice, Office of the Government Corporate Counsel and even in the Office of the Solicitor General is devoid of any basis. The monetary benefits or honoraria given to these officials or employees are categorized as travelling and/or representation expenses which are incurred by them in the course of handling cases, attending court/administrative hearings, or performing other field work. These monetary benefits are given upon rendition of service while

A cursory examination of the preambular clauses and provisions of Res. 56 provides a number of clear indications that its financial assistance plan constitutes a supplemental retirement/pension benefits plan. In particular, the fifth preambular clause which provides that it is the policy of the Social Security Commission to promote and to protect the interest of all SSS employees, with a view to providing for their well-being during both their working and retirement years, and the wording of the resolution itself which states Resolved, further, that SSS employees who availed themselves of the said life annuity (under RA 660), in appreciation and recognition of their long and faithful service, be granted financial assistance x x x can only be interpreted to mean that the benefit being granted is none other than a kind of amelioration to enable the retiring employee to enjoy (or survive) his retirement years and a reward for his loyalty and service. Moreover, it is plain to see that the

Nevertheless, insofar as herein petitioners are concerned, this Court cannot just sit back and watch as these two erstwhile government employees, who after spending the best parts of their lives in public service have retired hoping to enjoy their remaining years, face a financially dismal if not distressed future, deprived of what should have been due them by way of additional retirement benefits, on account of a bureaucratic boo-boo improvidently hatched by their higher-ups. It is clear to our mind that petitioners applied for benefits under RA 660 only because of the incentives offered by Res. 56, and that absent such incentives, they would have without fail availed of RA 1616 instead. We likewise have no doubt that petitioners are simply innocent bystanders in this whole bureaucratic rule-making/financial scheme-making drama, and that therefore, to the extent possible, petitioners ought not be penalized or made to suffer as a result of the subsequently determined invalidity of Res.

As a necessary consequence of the invalidity of Res. 56, we can hardly impute abuse of discretion of any sort to respondent Commission for denying petitioners request for reconsideration of the 3rd Indorsement of July 10, 1989. On the contrary, we hold that public respondent in its assailed Decision acted with circumspection in denying petitioners claim. It reasoned thus: After a careful evaluation of the facts herein obtaining, this Commission finds the instant request to be devoid of merit. It bears stress that the financial assistance contemplated under SSS Resolution No. 56 is granted to SSS employees who opt to retire under R.A. No. 660. In fact, by the aggrieved parties own admission (page 2 of the request for reconsideration dated January 12, 1993), it is a financial assistance granted by the SSS management to its employees, in addition to the retirement benefits under Republic Act. No. 660. There is therefore no question, that the said financial assistance partakes of the natur

Sec. 28(b) of CA 186 as amended by RA 4968 in no uncertain terms bars the creation of any insurance or retirement plan other than the GSIS for government officers and employees, in order to prevent the undue and inequitous proliferation of such plans. It is beyond cavil that Res. 56 contravenes the said provision of law and is therefore invalid, void and of no effect. To ignore this and rule otherwise would be tantamount to permitting every other government office or agency to put up its own supplementary retirement benefit plan under the guise of such financial assistance. [G.R. No. 116422. November 4, 1996]

The mere circumstance of AFP-MBAI receiving payments from respondent Eleazar who acquiesced to assume the obligation of petitioner under the contract of sale of securities, when there is clearly no agreement to release petitioner from her responsibility, does not constitute novation, at most, it only creates a juridical relation of co-debtorship or suretyship on the part of respondent Eleazar to the contractual obligation of petitioner to AFP-MBAI and the latter can still enforce the obligation against the petitioner. x x x In the civil law setting, novation is literally construed as to make new. So it is deeply rooted in the Roman Law jurisprudence, the principle novatio non praesumitur that novation is never presumed. At bottom, for novation to be a jural reality, its animus must be ever present, debitum pro debito basically extinguishing the old obligation for the new one. The foregoing elements are found wanting in the case at bar. [G.R. No. 120817. November 4, 1996]

The case at bench does not involve a loan, forbearance of money or judgment involving a loan or forbearance of money as it arose from a contract of sale whereby Ibarrola did not receive full payment for her merchandise. When an obligation arises "from a contract or mutuum," the applicable rate is "6% per annum as provided in Article 2209 of the NCC and not the rate of 12% per annum as provided in (CB) Cir. No. 416." Indeed, PNB's liability is based only on the RTC's judgment where it was held solidarily liable with the other defendants due to its negligence when it "failed to assure itself" if the Provincial Treasurer was "properly authorized" by Ibarrola to "make indorsement" of said checks. [G.R. No. 123643. October 30, 1996]

A question was raised by  Jonathan Magdaraog Villanobos : Why is it that, in every rule, there is an exception? Project Jurisprudence thinks this is a good question. No less than the Supreme Court affirms this idea. The High Court has held, "It is past dispute of course that in every rule, there are always settled exceptions." (G.R. No. 153578; January 28, 2005) Below is a list of the three (3) best answers given in response to this question. This list has been randomly arranged and follows no order of correctness, importance, etc. [1] Julius Sandino Roxas Gili answers, "Because law is not an exact science." [2] Kiks Jampas  answers, "Because of: 1) The intricacies of social interactions, and 2) The limitations of the written text. Besides, not every rule has an exception. (Unless, you mean to construe additional rules to a general rule, as an exception, which should not be the case)" [3] Punkie Punx  answers, “In everything there is a crack. That

This Court has always held that equity, which has been aptly described as justice outside legality, is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. In this case, equity cannot be applied to give validity and effect to Res. 56, which directly contravenes the clear mandate of the provisions of RA 4968. [G.R. No. 116422. November 4, 1996]

We find no plausible explanation nor justifiable reason offered by petitioner for the obvious delay or omission to take a timely action against the questioned resolution. She is apparently guilty of laches which bars her from seeking relief in a court of law after she intentionally and unreasonably fails to guard of her rights. Laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by exerting due diligence could/should have been done earlier. Petitioners omission to assert her right to avail of the remedies in law within a reasonable time warrants a presumption that she abandoned it or declined to assert it. The law serves those who are vigilant and diligent and not those who sleep when the law requires them to act. [G.R. No. 120817. November 4, 1996]

Just like in the first questioned resolution, no novation took place in this case. A thorough examination of the records shows that no hard evidence was presented which would expressly and unequivocably demonstrate the intention of respondent AFP-MBAI to release petitioner from her obligation to pay under the contract of sale of securities. It is a rule that novation by substitution of debtor must always be made with the consent of the creditor pursuant to Article 1293 of the Civil Code. [G.R. No. 120817. November 4, 1996]

Notwithstanding our disagreement with the decision of the respondent court and the ruling of the Secretary of Justice that a novation by substitution of creditor has taken place, we opt not to disturb the Resolution of the respondent Secretary of Justice dated January 23, 1992 finding a prima facie case against the petitioner in as much as it had already become final. It appears that petitioner filed two motions for reconsideration to the said resolution, the first one on February 6, 1992 and the second one in June 2, 1992. These two motions were, however, denied by the respondent Secretary of Justice, the last denial was contained in a Resolution dated June 25, 1992 which was received by petitioner on July 9, 1992. Petitioner made no prompt attempt to question the said resolutions before the proper forum. It took her almost seventeen months (from July 9, 1992 to February 2, 1994) to challenge the January 23, 1992 Resolution when she filed the petition for certiorari with the responden

Retirement benefits are, after all, a form of reward for an employees loyalty and service to the employer, and are intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his life, lessening the burden of worrying about his financial support or upkeep. On the other hand, a pension partakes of the nature of retained wages of the retiree for a dual purpose: to entice competent people to enter the government service, and to permit them to retire from the service with relative security, not only for those who have retained their vigor, but more so for those who have been incapacitated by illness or accident. [G.R. No. 116422. November 4, 1996]

Private respondent was merely an agent or an independent dealer of the petitioner. He was free to conduct his work and he was free to engage in other means of livelihood. At the time he was connected with the petitioner company, private respondent was also a director and later the president of the Farmers Rural Bank. Had he been an employee of the company, he could not be employed elsewhere and he would be required to devote full time for petitioner. If private respondent was indeed an employee, it was rather unusual for him to wait for more than a year from his separation from work before he decided to file his claims. As stated earlier, the element of control is absent; where a person who works for another does so more or less at his own pleasure and is not subject to definite hours or conditions of work, and in turn is compensated according to the result of his efforts and not the amount thereof, we should not find that the relationship of employer and employee exists. In fine, ther

The lower court finds that the officers represented by Atty. Dumadag do not as yet have the legal capacity to sue for and in behalf of the plaintiff corporation and/or the filing of the present action (Civil Case 14413) by them before Case No. 2688 of the SEC could be decided is a premature exercise of authority or assumption of legal capacity for and in behalf of plaintiff corporation. The issues raised in Civil Case No. 14444 are similar to those raised in Civil Case No. 14413. This Court is of the opinion that before SEC Case No. 2688 could be decided, neither the set of officers represented by Atty. Dumadag nor that set represented by the Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office, may prosecute cases in the name of the plaintiff corporation. It is clear from the pleadings filed by the parties in these two cases that the existence of a cause of action against the defendants is dependent upon the resolution of the case involving intra-corporate controversy still pending be

By the express mandate of the Corporation Code (Section 26), all corporations duly organized pursuant thereto are required to submit within the period therein stated (30 days) to the Securities and Exchange Commission the names, nationalities and residences of the directors, trustees and officers elected. Evidently, the objective sought to be achieved by Section 26 is to give the public information, under sanction of oath of responsible officers, of the nature of business, financial condition and operational status of the company together with information on its key officers or managers so that those dealing with it and those who intend to do business with it may know or have the means of knowing facts concerning the corporation’s financial resources and business responsibility. [G.R. No. 96551. November 4, 1996]

The power of the corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the board of directors that exercises its powers. Thus, the issue of authority and the invalidity of plaintiff-appellants subscription which is still pending, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the Securities & Exchange Commission. [G.R. No. 96551. November 4, 1996]

Though well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree, nevertheless, there is really nothing to interpret in either RA 4968 or SSS Res. 56, and correspondingly, the absence of any doubt as to the ultra-vires nature and illegality of the disputed resolution constrains us to rule against petitioners. [G.R. No. 116422. November 4, 1996]

It is doctrinal that in case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the former must prevail. A rule or regulation must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid. The rule-making power of a public administrative body is a delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the authority given it by the Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by such a body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute. [G.R. No. 116422. November 4, 1996]

The fact that respondent Eleazar made payments to AFP-MBAI and the latter accepted them does not ipso facto result in novation. There must be an express intention to novate animus novandi. Novation is never presumed. Article 1300 of the Civil Code provides inter alia that conventional subrogation must be clearly established in order that it may take effect. [G.R. No. 120817. November 4, 1996]

Upon the facts shown in the record, there is no doubt that the last three essential requisites of novation are wanting in the instant case. No new agreement for substitution of creditor was forged among the parties concerned which would take the place of the preceding contract. The absence of a new contract extinguishing the old one destroys any possibility of novation by conventional subrogation. In concluding that a novation took place, the respondent court relied on the two letters dated March 19, 1991, which, according to it, formalized petitioners and respondent Eleazars agreement that BERMIC would directly settle its obligation with the real owners of the funds the AFP-MBAI and DECS IMC. Be that as it may, a cursory reading of these letters, however, clearly and unmistakably shows that there was nothing therein that would evince that respondent AFP-MBAI agreed to substitute for the petitioner as the new creditor of respondent Eleazar in the contract of loan. It is evident that th

The term regular local election must be confined to the regular election of elective local officials, as distinguished from the regular election of national officials. The elective national officials are the President, Vice-President, Senators and Congressmen. The elective local officials are Provincial Governors, Vice-Governors of provinces, Mayors and Vice-Mayors of cities and municipalities, Members of the Sanggunians of provinces, cities and municipalities, punong barangays and members of the sangguniang barangays, and the elective regional officials of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. These are the only local elective officials deemed recognized by Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides: SEC 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions: x x x (2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city offici

Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the officials replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate. [G.R. No. 123169. November 4, 1996]

The principle of novation by substitution of creditor was erroneously applied in the first questioned resolution involving the contract of loan between petitioner and respondent Eleazar. Admittedly, in order that a novation can take place, the concurrence of the following requisites is indispensable: 1. there must be a previous valid obligation, 2. there must be an agreement of the parties concerned to a new contract, 3. there must be the extinguishment of the old contract, and 4. there must be the validity of the new contract. [G.R. No. 120817. November 4, 1996]

Moreover, petitioners too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition: We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth x x x The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent. [G.R. No. 123169. November 4, 1996]

The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides: SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence, (b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election. It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office. T

Apparently, petitioner deceived respondents by filling the blank spaces in the deed, having the lots surveyed and subdivided, and then causing the issuance of transfer certificates of title without their knowledge, much less consent. Thus all the elements of fraud vitiating consent for purposes of annulling a contract concur: (a) It was employed by a contracting party upon the other; (b) It induced the other party to enter into the contract; (c) It was serious ; and, (d) It resulted in damages and injury to the party seeking annulment. Perhaps, another compelling reason for the annulment of the document of settlement and conveyance is that the second page thereof clearly manifests that the number of the subdivision plan and the respective areas of Lots 4-A and 4-B were merely handwritten while all the rest of the statements therein were typewritten, which leads us to the conclusion that handwritten figures thereon were not available at the time the document was formalized. [G.R. No. 11

The trial court correctly appreciated the fact that the deed was notarized in Manila when it could have been notarized in Bulacan. This additional detail casts doubt on the procedural regularity in the preparation, execution and signing of the deed. It is not easy to believe that petitioner and the ten (10) Torres heirs traveled all the way to Manila to have their questioned document notarized considering that they, with the exception of respondent Roque, are residents of Balagtas, Bulacan, where notaries public are easy to find. Consequently, the claim of private respondents that they did not sign the document before a notary public is more plausible than petitioners feeble claim to the contrary. [G.R. No. 116018. November 13, 1996]

Petitioner also insists that the real intent of the parties was to make the entire Lot 4-B the subject matter of the sale. She claims that during cross-examination respondent Aurora S. Roque admitted that she signed in behalf of her co-heirs a receipt for P30,000.00 as partial payment for the lot occupied by Ka Baring and Lina (relatives of petitioner) and Iling (Consuelo Lim). x x x The admission of respondent Roque cannot prevail in the face of the clear evidence that there was as yet no meeting of the minds on the land area to be sold since private respondents were still awaiting the survey to be conducted on the premises. x x x Likewise, we find the allegation of respondents that they signed the deed prior to the survey, or before determination of the area to be sold, worthy of credit as against the contention of petitioner that they signed after the survey or on 10 October 1984. As found by the trial court, such contention was contradicted by petitioners own witness who positively

The trial court was correct in holding that petitioner waived the right to formally offer his evidence. A considerable lapse of time, about three (3) months, had already passed before petitioners counsel made effort to formally offer his evidence. For the trial court to grant petitioners motion to admit her exhibits would be to condone an inexcusable laxity if not non-compliance with a court order which, in effect, would encourage needless delays and derail the speedy administration of justice. [G.R. No. 116018. November 13, 1996]

Unless these are cogent reasons, and we do not find any, this Court will not alter, modify or reverse the factual findings of the Secretary of Labor because, by reason of her official position, she is considerd to have acquired expertise as her jurisdiction is confined to specific matters. [G.R. No. 117174. November 13, 1996]

With respect to the additional six (6) days for compulsory retirement and three (3) days for optional retirement, these may appear in excess of the requirements of the law and the demand of respondent Union. Yet, it should be noted that the law merely establishes the minimum retirement benefits as it recognized that an employeemay receive more under existing laws and any CBA or other agreements. Besides, respondent Secretary of Labor had to break the bargaining deadlock. After taking into account all the circumstances, public respondent found it expedient to strike a reasonable middle ground between the parties' respective positions. [G.R. No. 117174. November 13, 1996]

The records fail to disclose that petitioner bothered to inform the Court how it arrived at 21.82 days as basis in the computation of the retirement pay. Anyway, it is clear in the law that the term "one-half (1/2) month salary" means 22.5 days: 15 days plus 2.5 days representing one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay plus 5 days of service incentive leave. In this regard, there is no reason for petitioner to complain that the retirement benefits granted by respondent Secretary of Labor exceeded the requirements of the law. [G.R. No. 117174. November 13, 1996]

Petitioner argues next that granting procedural due process was not afforded the dismissed emloyees, still, the award of two (2) months salary for each of them is not in accord with existing jurisprudence. The Wenphil doctrine teaches, as in other cases, that where the dismissal of an employee is for a just cause but without due process, the employer must indemnify the dismissed employee. Petitioner must have failed to read the full text to Wenphil or simply chose to ignore the sentence immediately succeeding the P1,000.00 indemnify enunciated therein. The case is explicit that the measure of the award depends on the facts of each case and the gravity of the omission committed by the employer. In fact, in the recent case of Reta vs. NLRC, the Court saw fit ti impose P10,000.00 as penalty for the employer's failure to comply with the due process requirement. The ratiocination of respondent Secretary of Labor should have out petitioner's argument at rest - xxx Wenphil, however, s