PROJECT JURISPRUDENCE

In Santiago v. CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc., it was held that a seafarer who has already signed a POEA-approved employment contract but was not deployed overseas and, therefore, there is no employer-employee relationship, may file his monetary claims case with the Labor Arbiter. This is due to the fact that the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters is not limited to claims arising from employer-employee relationships. Under Section 10 of R. A. No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995), the Labor Arbiter may exercise jurisdiction over the claims of OFWs arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment, including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damage.

The Social Security Commission (SSC) has also this power. In Republic of the Philippines v. Asiapro Cooperative, involving the issue of coverage of owners-members of respondent Cooperative under the Social Security System (SSS) , it was held that it is not only the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC who/which has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the existence of the employer-employee relationship. The Social Security Commission (SSC) has also that power.

M. Y. San Biscuits, Inc. v. Laguesma declared that the Med-Arbiter has the authority to determine the employer-employee relationship because it is necessary and indispensable in the exercise of his jurisdiction. It is absurd to suggest that the Med-Arbiter and Secretary of Labor cannot make their own independent finding as to the existence of such relationship and must have to rely and wait for such a determination by the Labor Arbiter or NLRC in a separate proceeding. For then, given a situation where there is no separate complaint filed with the Labor Arbiter, the Med-Arbiter and/or the Secretary of Labor can never decide a certification election case or any labor-management dispute properly brought before them as they have no authority to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Such a proposition is, to say the least, anomalous.

Under labor laws, it is not only the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC who are vested with the power to determine the existence of employer-employee relationship. The DOLE Secretary and the DOLE Regional Directors are possessed of similar power as held in the 2012 en banc Resolution in People’s Broadcasting Service (Bombo Radyo Phils. , Inc. ) v. The Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment. In fact, it was held here that thedetermination by the DOLE Regional Director and the DOLE Secretary of the existence of employer-employee relationship in the exercise of their visitorial and enforcement power under Article 128(b) of the Labor Code is to the exclusion of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.

Under this rule, if there is a reasonable causal connection between the claim asserted and the employer-employee relations, then the case is within the jurisdiction of labor courts. In the absence of such nexus, it is the regular courts that have jurisdiction. While we have upheld the present trend to refer worker-employer controversies to labor courts in light of the aforequoted provision, we have also recognized that not all claims involving employees can be resolved solely by our labor courts, specifically when the law provides otherwise. For this reason, we have formulated the "reasonable causal connection rule," wherein if there is a reasonable causal connection between the claim asserted and the employer-employee relations, then the case is within the jurisdiction of the labor courts; and in the absence thereof, it is the regular courts that have jurisdiction. Such distinction is apt since it cannot be presumed that money claims of workers which do not arise out of

The following are the effects of renunciation in favor of a secondary party or in favor of the principal debtor: [1] A renunciation in favor of a secondary party may be made by the holder before, at or after maturity of the instrument. What is the effect of this? Such secondary party is discharged and all parties subsequent to him but the instrument itself remains in force. [2] A renunciation in favor of the principal debtor may be effected at or after maturity. What is the effect of this? The instrument is discharged and all parties thereto provided the renunciation is made unconditionally and absolutely. Note that, in either case, renunciation does not affect the rights of a holder in due course without notice.

There are three kinds of retirement schemes. The first type is compulsory and contributory in character. The second type is one set up by agreement between the employer and the employees in collective bargaining agreements or other agreements between The third type is one that is voluntarily given by the employer, expressly as in an announced company policy or impliedly as in a failure to contest the employee's claim for retirement benefits. (G.R. No. 102157, July 23, 1993)

It is, once a year, that Article 287 does not itself purport to impose any obligation employers to set up a retirement scheme for their employees over and above that already established under existing laws. In other words, Article 287 recognizes that existing laws already provide for a scheme by which retirement benefits may be earned or accrue in favor of employees, as part of a broader social security system that provides not only for retirement benefits but also death and funeral benefits, permanent disability benefits, sickness benefits and maternity leave benefits. (G.R. No. 82895, November 7, 1989)

Article 280 of the Labor Code has construed security of tenure as referring to regular employment and as meaning that "the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by "the Code." (G.R. No. L-43835, March 31, 1981)

Article 261 of the Labor Code provides that violations of a CBA, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the parties' CBA. Moreover, "gross violations of CBA" under the same Article referred to flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement, which is not the issue in the instant case. (G.R. No. 178083, July 22, 2008) Under this provision [Article 261], voluntary arbitrators have original and exclusive jurisdiction over matters which have not been resolved by the grievance machinery. (G.R. No. 174420, March 22, 2010)

The purpose of certification election is to give the employees true representation in their collective bargaining with an employer because certification election is the most democratic and expeditious method by which the laborers can freely determine the union that shall act as their representative in their dealing with the establishment where they are working. It is the most effective way of determining which labor organization can truly represent the working force. (G.R. No. 73504 October 15, 1991)

Article 260 of the Labor Code clarifies that such disputes must be referred first to the grievance machinery and, if unresolved within seven days , they shall automatically be referred to voluntary arbitration. Article 261. Jurisdiction of voluntary arbitrators and panel of voluntary arbitrators. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred to in the immediately preceding Article. Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this Article, gross violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement shall

In construing the above provision, the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators over the cases enumerated in the Labor Code, Articles 217, 261 and 262, can possibly include money claims in one form or another. While a voluntary arbitrator is not part of the governmental unit or labor department's personnel, said arbitrator renders arbitration services provided for under labor laws. Generally, the arbitrator is expected to decide only those questions expressly delineated by the submission agreement. Nevertheless, the arbitrator can assume that he has the necessary power to make a final settlement since arbitration is the final resort for the adjudication of disputes. (Ludo & Luym Corp. vs. Ferdinand Saornido, G.R. No. 140960, January 20, 2003)

The jurisdiction of a court or quasi-judicial or administrative organ is determined by the issues raised by the parties, not by their success or failure in proving the allegations in their respective. Reception of proof is not a condition precedent to the assumption of jurisdiction, for precisely jurisdiction must exist before evidence can be taken, since the authority to receive it is in itself an exercise of jurisdiction. To affect the jurisdiction of said court, or organ, the main requirement is that the issue raised be a genuine one. In other words, the question posed must be one that is material to the right of action or which could affect the result of the dispute or controversy. (G.R. No. L-26461; November 27, 1968)

It was only on March 2, 1989, with the approval of Republic Act No. 6715, amending Article 211 of the Labor Code, that the law explicitly considered it a State policy "(t)o ensure the participation of workers in decision and policy-making processes affecting their rights, duties and welfare." However, even in the absence of said clear provision of law, the exercise of management prerogatives was never considered boundless. Thus, in Cruz vs. Medina (G.R. No. 73053, September 15, 1989), it was held that management's prerogatives must be without abuse of discretion. Indeed, industrial peace cannot be achieved if the employees are denied their just participation in the discussion of matters affecting their rights. Thus, even before Article 211 of the labor Code (P.D. 442) was amended by Republic Act No. 6715, it was already declared a policy of the State, "(d) To promote the enlightenment of workers concerning their rights and obligations . . . as employees." This

Under the Labor Code, there are twin requirements to justify a valid dismissal from employment: [1] The dismissal must be for any of the causes provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code ( substantive aspect ); and [2] The employee must be given an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself ( procedural aspect ). The essence of the due process requirement being a mere opportunity to be heard, we agree with the Court of Appeals that although respondent was given a limited time to explain his side and present evidence, he, however, was able to refute the findings of petitioner. Hence, the chance afforded to respondent, although limited, is a clear opportunity to be heard on the issue at hand. What the law abhors and prohibits is the absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard. It is necessary for this Court to clarify and explicitly declare that no liability for respondent’s illegal dismissal should attach to petitioners Aguiluz and Cruz, and respondent’s complaint as agains

When there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal and the burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause. An employee’s dismissal due to serious misconduct must be supported by substantial evidence.

"Labor standards" refers to the minimum requirements prescribed by existing laws, rules and regulations relating to wages, hours of work, cost of living allowance and other monetary and welfare benefits, including occupational, safety and health standards (G.R. No. 86963, August 6, 1999). They are covered by Books I to IV of the Labor Code. "Labor relations laws" are the laws, rules and regulations which govern the relationship between employees and their employers, promote the right of the employees to self-organization and collective bargaining, penalize unfair labor practice, and provide modes for the settlement of labor disputes such as conciliation, mediation, grievance machinery, voluntary arbitration and compulsory arbitration. They are covered by Books V – VII of the Labor Code.

[1] A shop steward is appointed by the union in a shop, department, or plant and serves as representative of the union, charged with negotiating and adjustment of grievances of employees with the supervisor of the employer. [2] A shop steward may be an elective official within the union or key administrative personnel, and it is considered to be within the same class as union officers, agents and representatives. [3] Since the Shop Steward is a union position, the controversy surrounding his recall from his position as Shop Steward becomes a dispute within the union. An “Internal Union Dispute” or intra – union conflict refers to a conflict within or inside a labor union. It includes all disputes or grievances arising from any violation of or disagreement over any provision of the constitution and by – laws of a union. [4] TMI, and not on grounds under labor laws. Though the end of the contract between the DA and TMI was not the ground for the withdrawal of De Raedt from the CECA

Salon notified in writing about the charges against her, she was given a reasonable opportunity to explain her side; she was also called to an investigation where, again, she had the opportunity to explain why she should not be dismissed. She was only dismissed after the conclusion of the investigation and after she had been given a second notice in writing that she was being terminated as a faculty member of the school. In short, she has nothing to complain about in terms of the process she underwent that led to her dismissal. (G.R. No. 174141; June 26, 2009)

Salon admitted that she changed the grade of Manalo from one of "failure" (5.0) to "dropped" (6.0) at the behest of a colleague, the mother of Manalo, to save the son from being harmed by his father for his failing grade. Salon thought she was doing the family of Manalo a favor, but her act produced the opposite result because the father himself lodged a complaint against her for grade tampering; as suspected all along, the father was not satisfied with a grade of 6.0 for his son. As in the case of unauthorized selling of examination papers, Salon's guilt is not erased or mitigated by the fact that she meant well, or that she tried to rectify her indiscretion after realizing that she violated the grading system of the school. Two differences exist between the examination paper selling violation and the present one. First, her examination paper violation is largely a transgression against a school regulation. The present one goes beyond a school violation; it

The employment of a project employee ends on the date specified in the employment contract. Therefore, respondent was not illegally dismissed but his employment terminated upon the expiration of his employment contract. Here, Alcatel employed respondent as a Site Inspector until 31 December 1995. A project employee or a member of a work pool may acquire the status of a regular employee when the following concur: [1] There is a continuous rehiring of project employees even after the cessation of a project; and [2] The tasks performed by the alleged “project employee” are vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer. (G.R. No. 174316; July 23, 2009)

In evaluating a charge of abandonment, the jurisprudential rule is that abandonment is a matter of intention that cannot be lightly presumed from equivocal acts. To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur: [1] The failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason ; and [2] A clear intent, manifested through overt acts, to sever the employer-employee relationship. (G.R. No. 164315. July 3, 2009) <!-- adsense --?

In the present case, we find that the CA did indeed consider the statements the parties made during conciliation; thus, the CA erred by considering excluded materials in arriving at its conclusion. The reasons behind the exclusion are two-fold. First, since the law favors the settlement of controversies out of court, a person is entitled to buy his or her peace without danger of being prejudiced in case his or her efforts fail; hence, any communication made toward that end will be regarded as privileged. Indeed, if every offer to buy peace could be used as evidence against a person who presents it, many settlements would be prevented and unnecessary litigation would result, since no prudent person would dare offer or entertain a compromise if his or her compromise position could be exploited as a confession of weakness. Second, offers for compromise are irrelevant because they are not intended as admissions by the parties making them. A true offer of compromise does not, in legal c

It is well to note that there is no provision in the Labor Code that grants separation pay to voluntarily resigning employees. However, an employer who agrees to expend such benefit as an incident of the resignation should not be allowed to renege on the fulfillment of such commitment. (G.R. No. 178337 June 25, 2009)

To be considered a company practice, the giving of retirement benefits should have been done over a long period of time, and must be shown to have been consistent and deliberate. In a case, the Supreme Court held that the grant of these benefits has ripened into company practice or policy which cannot be peremptorily withdrawn. It is a jurisprudential rule that where there is an established employer practice of regularly, knowingly and voluntarily granting benefits to employees over a significant period of time, despite the lack of a legal or contractual obligation on the part of the employer to do so, the grant of such benefits ripens into a vested right of the employees and can no longer be unilaterally reduced or withdrawn by the employer. (G.R. No. 163924. June 18, 2009)

Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. (G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989)

A strike otherwise valid, if violent in character, may be placed beyond the pale. Care is to be taken, however, especially where an unfair labor practice is involved, to avoid stamping it with illegality just because it is tainted by such acts. To avoid rendering illusory the recognition of the right to strike, responsibility in such a case should be individual and not collective. A different conclusion would be called for, of course, if the existence of force while the strike lasts is pervasive and widespread, consistently and deliberately resorted to as a matter of policy. It could be reasonably concluded then that even if justified as to ends, it becomes illegal because of the means employed. (G.R. No. L-32853, September 25, 1981)

While the employer is authorized to declare a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment, his/its option is not as wide with respect to union members or workers for the law itself draws a line and makes a distinction between union officers and members/ordinary workers. An ordinary striking worker or union member cannot, as a rule, be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike; there must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the strike. And lest it be forgotten, the law invests the Secretary of Labor and Employment the prerogative of tempering the consequence of the defiance to the assumption order. The Secretary may thus merely suspend rather than dismiss the employee involved. (G.R. 158190-91, June 21, 2006)

Aside from the mandatory notices embedded in Article 263, paragraphs (c) and (f) of the Labor Code, a union intending to stage a strike is mandated to notify the NCMB of the meeting for the conduct of strike vote, at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to such meeting. Unless the NCMB is notified of the date, place and time of the meeting of the union members for the conduct of a strike vote, the NCMB would be unable to supervise the holding of the same, if and when it decides to exercise its power of supervision. (Capitol Medical Center vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 147080, April 26, 2005)

Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code is explicit that if a strike has already taken place at the time of assumption of jurisdiction or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. (G.R. 169632, March 28, 2006)

The Secretary's assumption of jurisdiction power necessarily includes matters incidental to the labor dispute, that is, issues that are necessarily involved in the dispute itself, not just to those ascribed in the Notice of Strike; or otherwise, submitted to him for resolution. (G.R. 158944-45, August 22, 2006)

The powers granted to the Secretary under Article 263 (g) have been characterized as an exercise of the police power of the State, with the aim of promoting public good. When the Secretary exercises these powers, he is granted “great breadth of discretion” in order to find a solution to a labor dispute. The most obvious of these powers is the automatic enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or its lifting if one has already taken place. A strike declared on the basis of grievances which have not been submitted to the grievance committee as stipulated in the CBA of the parties is premature and illegal.(G.R. 144315, July 17, 2006)

One of the substantive evils which Article 263(g) of the Labor Code seeks to curb is the exacerbation of a labor dispute to the further detriment of the national interest. The Secretary of Labor and Employment may therefore order the employer (a university) to suspend the effect of the termination of the employment of the employees, which termination was the reason of one of the notices of strike filed by the union. It is not a question anymore of whether or not the terminated employees, the individual respondents herein, are part of the bargaining unit. Any act committed during the pendency of the dispute that tends to give rise to further contentious issues or increase the tensions between the parties should be considered an act of exacerbation and should not be allowed. (G.R. No. 151379. January 14, 2005)

Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code does not violate the workers' constitutional right to strike. The section provides in part, viz.: When in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration... The foregoing article clearly does not interfere with the workers' right to strike but merely regulates it, when in the exercise of such right, national interests will be affected. The rights granted by the Constitution are not absolute. They are still subject to control and limitation to ensure that they are not exercised arbitrarily. The interests of both the employers and employees are intended to be protected and not one of them is given undue preference. (G.R. No. 117169, March 12, 1997)

A return-to-work order is a "statutory part and parcel" of the Secretary's assumption or certification order. Article 263 (g) succinctly provides that: ... Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. Thus, following an assumption or certification order, returning to work, on the part of a worker, is "not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation." The sanction for failure to comply with such obligation, under the law, is loss of employment status. Case law likewise provides that by staging a strike after the assumption of jurisdiction or

The Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code the authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, and decide the same accordingly. Necessarily, this authority to assume jurisdiction over the said labor dispute must include and extend to all questions and controversies arising therefrom, including cases over which the labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction. Plainly, Article 263(g) of the Labor Code was meant to make both the Secretary (or the various regional directors) and the labor arbiters share jurisdiction, subject to certain conditions. Otherwise, the Secretary would not be able to effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute. To hold the contrary may even lead to the absurd and undesirable result wherein the Secretary and labor arbiter concerned may have diametrically opposed rulings. (G.R. No. 92981-83, January 9, 1992)

Article 263(g) was devised to maintain the status quo between the workers and management in a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, pending adjudication of the controversy. (University of Sto. Tomas vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 89920, October 18, 1990)

In order for a strike to be valid, the following requirements laid down in paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code must be complied with: (a) a notice of strike must be filed; (b) a strike-vote must be taken; and (c) the results of the strike-vote must be reported to the DOLE. It bears stressing that these requirements are mandatory , meaning, non-compliance therewith makes the strike illegal. The evident intention of the law in requiring the strike notice and strike-vote report is to reasonably regulate the right to strike, which is essential to the attainment of legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law. (G.R. No. 158158; January 17, 2005)

The discretion to assume jurisdiction may be exercised by the Secretary of Labor and Employment without the necessity of prior notice or hearing given to any of the parties. The rationale for his primary assumption of jurisdiction can justifiably rest on his own consideration of the exigency of the situation in relation to the national interests. (G.R. No. 155690, June 30, 2005)

"Payroll reinstatement" of the employees, as an exception to the actual reinstatement required by a return to work order, may be allowed, pending final resolution of the validity of their dismissal, in view of a "superseding circumstance," i.e., the final decision of the panel of arbitrators as to the confidential nature of the positions. (G.R. No. 151379; January 14, 2005)

The powers granted to the Secretary under Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code have been characterized as an exercise of the police power of the State, aimed at promoting the public good. When the Secretary exercises these powers, he is granted " great breadth of discretion " to find a solution to a labor dispute. The most obvious of these powers is the automatic enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or its lifting if one has already taken place. (G.R. Nos. 169829-30; April 16, 2008)

Article 263 of the Labor Code speaks of the right of workers to engage in concerted activities for their mutual benefit and protection. Concerted activities, like the holding of a strike, are resorted to by employees in their effort to obtain more favorable terms and conditions of work for themselves. Due to its importance, the exercise of such right is limited only by the demands of national interest under paragraph (g) of said article. (G.R. No. 120751; March 17, 1999)

THE RIGHT TO STRIKE is one of the rights recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution as an instrument of labor for its protection against management exploitation. By virtue of this right the workers are able to press their demands for better terms and conditions of employment with more energy and persuasiveness, poising the threat to strike as their reaction to their employer's intransigence. The strike is indeed a powerful weapon of the working class. But precisely, if not because of this, it must be handled carefully, like a sensitive explosive, lest it blows up in the workers' own hands. Simply put, a strike is recognized and protected by our labor laws only when waged on account of a labor dispute. In the absence thereof, the employees who engage themselves in work stoppage commit an illegal strike and should face the consequences thereof. (G.R. No. 124823; July 28, 1999)

It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes. While the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, they are prohibited from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public services. The right of government employees to organize is limited only to the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike. The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. In the absence of statute, public employees do not have the right to engage in concerted work stoppages for any purpose. As a general rule, even in the absence of express statutory prohibition like Memorandum Circular No. 6, public employees are denied the right to strike or engage in a work stoppage against a public employer. The right of the sovereign to prohibit strikes or work stoppages by public employe

The State guarantees the right of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, as well as peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike, in accordance with law. The right to strike, however, is not absolute. It has heretofore been held that a "no strike, no lock-out" provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") is a valid stipulation although the clause may be invoked by an employer only when the strike is economic in nature or one which is conducted to force wage or other concessions from the employer that are not mandated to be granted by the law itself. It would be inapplicable to prevent a strike which is grounded on unfair labor practice. In this situation, it is not essential that the unfair labor practice act has, in fact, been committed; it suffices that the striking workers are shown to have acted honestly on an impression that the company has committed such unfair labor practice and the surrounding

The right to strike is one of the rights recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution as an instrument of labor for its protection against exploitation by management. By virtue of this right, the workers are able to press their demands for better terms of employment with more energy ad persuasiveness, poising the threat to strike as their reaction to the employer's intransigence. The strike is indeed a powerful weapon of the working class. But precisely because of this, it must be handled carefully, like a sensitive explosive, lest it blow up in the workers' own hands. Thus, it must be declared only after the most thoughtful consultation among them, conducted in the only way allowed, that is, peacefully , and in every case conformably to reasonable regulation . Any violation of the legal requirements and strictures, such as a defiance of a return-to-work order in industries affected with public interest, will render the strike illegal, to the detriment of the very workers it

Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law.(G.R. No. 85279; July 28, 1989)

A strike otherwise valid, if violent in character, may be placed beyond the pale. Care is to be taken, however, especially where an unfair labor practice is involved, to avoid stamping it with illegality just because it is tainted by such acts. To avoid rendering illusory the recognition of the right to strike, responsibility in such a case should be individual and not collective . A different conclusion would be called for, of course, if the existence of force while the strike lasts is pervasive and widespread , consistently and deliberately resorted to as a matter of policy. It could be reasonably concluded then that even if justified as to ends, it becomes illegal because of the means employed. (G.R. No. L-32853; September 25, 1981)

Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court provides that when by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer. If this Court were to sustain petitioners' contention that jurisdiction over their certiorari petition lies with the CA, this Court would be confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter – precisely the split-jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of justice.35 The Court cannot accept that such was the legislative motive, especially considering that the law expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review over local tax cases without mention of any other court that may exercise such power. Thus, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA

Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as "the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another." The cause of action in Civil Case No. 273 and Civil Case No. 576 is the sale of the entire subject property by Basilia, et al., to petitioners without respondent’s knowledge and consent, hence, depriving respondent of her rights and interests over her pro-indiviso share in the subject property as a co-heir and co-owner. The annulment of the sale of respondent’s share in the subject property, the legal redemption by respondent of her co-heirs’ share sold to petitioners, and the claim for damages should not be mistaken to be the causes of action, but they were the remedies and reliefs prayed for by the respondent to redress the wrong allegedly committed against her. [R]espondent invoked Articles 1088 and 1620 of the Civil Code of the Philippines in support of their right to redeem the subject property. The said provisions state: Art. 1088.

The registration of the lien should also be distinguished from the enforcement of the lien. Registration merely determines the birth of the lien. The enforcement of the lien, on the other hand, can only take place once a final money judgment has been secured in favor of the client. The enforcement of the lien is a claim for attorney’s fees that may be prosecuted in the very action where the attorney rendered his services or in a separate action. However, a motion for the enforcement of the lien is in the nature of an action commenced by a lawyer against his clients for attorney’s fees. As in every action for a sum of money, the attorney-movant must first pay the prescribed docket fees before the trial court can acquire jurisdiction to order the payment of attorney’s fees. Lastly, the enforcement of a charging lien can only take place after a final money judgment has been rendered in favor of the client. The lien only attaches to the money judgment due to the client and is contin

This much was directed in the 19 May 2008 Order issued by Branch 22 of the Manila RTC which determined that the case is a real action and admitted the Amended and Supplemental Complaint R-II Builders subsequently filed in the case. In obvious evasion of said directive to pay the correct docket fees, however, R-II Builders withdrew its Amended and Supplemental Complaint and, in lieu thereof, filed its Second Amended Complaint which, while deleting its causes of action for accounting and conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool, nevertheless prayed for its appointment as Receiver of the properties comprising the same. In the landmark case of Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that jurisdiction over any case is acquired only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee which is both mandatory and jurisdictional. Although it is true that the Manchester Rule does not apply despite insufficient filing fees when there is no inten

Action filed by stockholders to annul the issuance of shares of stock at a price below their par value is incapable of pecuniary estimation where the stockholders do not seek to be declared the owners or transferees of the shares. That the percentage holdings of the stockholders would be diluted does not make the same capable of pecuniary estimation. (G.R. No. 153690; 15 February 2011)

The docket fees on the supplemental complaint should be paid at the time of the filing thereof and should not be treated as a first lien on the judgment award. Hence the supplemental complaint should be expunged if the docket fees thereon were not paid. The trial court nonetheless does not lose the jurisdiction it had acquired over the case with the filing of the original complaint. (G.R. No. 176339. January 10, 2011)

Does this violate Atty. Hipolito's duties as a lawyer under the Code of Professional Responsibility? Is writing, marketing or advertising one's law book practice of law? In relation to these questions, here is a part of a piece of jurisprudence on advertising legal services. Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics