PROJECT JURISPRUDENCE

The case below is between a 30-year-old female teacher and a 16-year old male student. Many are curious about what the Supreme Court would say if it were between an older male teacher and a minor female student. As earlier stated, from the outset even the labor arbiter conceded that there was no direct evidence to show that immoral acts were committed. Nonetheless, indulging in a patently unfair conjecture, he concluded that "it is however enough for a sane and credible mind to imagine and conclude what transpired during those times." In reversing his decision, the National Labor Relations Commission observed that the assertions of immoral acts or conducts are gratuitous and that there is no direct evidence to support such claim, a finding which herein public respondent himself shared. [The Supreme Court], therefore, at a loss as to how public respondent could adopt the volte-face in the questioned resolution, which [this Court] hereby reject[s], despite his prior tre

That sometime in the evening of the 26th day of August, 2002, at x x x and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, moved by lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with his own daughter, "AAA"   who is a minor 6 years of age, that resulted to devirginizing her and causing her great dishonor. That sometime in the evening of the 27th day of August, 2002, at x x x and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent and with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously let his own daughter, "AAA" who is a minor 6 years of age, masturbate his penis, which act is constitutive of physical abuse which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of the victim as a human being. The evidence for the State discloses that "AAA" who was then only six-years old was sleeping inside their hous

The power to tax is an attribute of sovereignty. It is a power emanating from necessity. It is a necessary burden to preserve the State's sovereignty and a means to give the citizenry an army to resist an aggression, a navy to defend its shores from invasion, a corps of civil servants to serve, public improvement designed for the enjoyment of the citizenry and those which come within the State's territory, and facilities and protection which a government is supposed to provide. Considering that the reinsurance premiums in question were afforded protection by the government and the recipient foreign reinsurers exercised rights and privileges guaranteed by our laws, such reinsurance premiums and reinsurers should share the burden of maintaining the state. (G.R. No. L-22074; April 30, 1965)

Did you know that the birthplace of Felix Y. Manalo is currently under the ownership of the Philippine Government? Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig. Metro Manila, with an area of about four hundred ninety-two (492) square meters. When the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. The resolution was, on 06 January 1986, approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports. Later, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked on the legality of the measure. In his Opinion No. 133, Series of 1987, the Secretary of Justice replied in the affirmative; he explained: According to your guidelines, national landmarks are places or objects that are associated with an event, achievement, characteristic, or mod

Redundancy exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise. A position is redundant where it is superfluous, and superfluity of a position or positions may be the outcome of a number of factors, such as overhiring of workers, decreased volume of business, or dropping of a particular product line or service activity previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise. Retrenchment, on the other hand, is used interchangeably with the term "lay-off." It is the termination of employment initiated by the employer through no fault of the employee's and without prejudice to the latter, resorted to by management during periods of business recession, industrial depression, or seasonal fluctuations, or during lulls occasioned by lack of orders, shortage of materials, conversion of the plant for a new production program or the introduction of new methods or more efficient machinery, or of automati

An action was filed to recover property claiming that purchase of it from Casimiro Vere was on July 1971, who had earlier bought it from Alvegia Rodrigo in August 1970. Answer was filed, claiming that said property was purchased from Eufracia Rodriguez to whom Rodrigo donated in May 1965. The deed of donation stated among others: [1] a property was given to the done, his heirs and successors; [2] the Deed of Donation or that ownership be vested on her upon my demise. [3] if the Donee predeceases me, the same land will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ; [4]f The done accepted the land donated; Is this donation one mortis causa or inter vivos? Reason. It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a perfected donation inter vivos. First. Rodrigo stipulated that “if the Donee predeceases me, the [Property] will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez.&q

SMART's assertion that Astorga cannot complain of lack of notice because the organizational realignment was made known to all the employees as early as February 1998 fails to persuade. Astorga's actual knowledge of the reorganization cannot replace the formal and written notice required by the law. In the written notice, the employees are informed of the specific date of the termination, at least a month prior to the effectivity of such termination, to give them sufficient time to find other suitable employment or to make whatever arrangements are needed to cushion the impact of termination. In this case, notwithstanding Astorga's knowledge of the reorganization, she remained uncertain about the status of her employment until SMART gave her formal notice of termination. But such notice was received by Astorga barely two (2) weeks before the effective date of termination, a period very much shorter than that required by law. (Smart Communications, Inc. vs. Regina M. Asto

It was the contention of the mortgagor that the stipulation appointing the mortgagee as the mortgagor's attorney-in-fact, to sell the property (used as security) in case of default in the payment of the loan violates the prohibition on pactum commissorium under the Civil Code. Does the contention hold water? No, the contention does not hold water. There is no automatic appropriation of the thing mortgaged, which is what the law on pactum commissorium abhors. Instead, the stipulation gives the mortgagee the power to sell it as the mortgagor's attorney in fact.. The following are the elements of pactum commissorium: [1] There should be a property mortgaged by way of security for the payment of the principal obligation; and [2] There should be a stipulation for automatic appropriation by the creditor of the thing mortgaged in case of non-payment of the principal obligation within the stipulated period. (G.R. No. 118342) Villar's purchased of the subject property did

RECOMMENDED CITATION: Mark Angelo S. Dela Peña (2024), Employee with Attitude Problem May Be Fired from Work, 09 PJP 21, available at <insert link> (last accessed on <date>). LAST REVISION: September 21, 2024 at 7:30 AM. The Labor Code of the Philippines (LCP) provides for the just and authorized grounds for an employer to terminate the employment relationship with an employee. In fact, the Supreme Court has held that the dismissal of an employee for a just or authorized cause is valid despite nonobservance of due process of law -- the twin requirement of notice -- that the LCP guarantees to the employee. The dismissal is effective against the employee, subject to the payment by the employer of an indemnity.[1] This illustrates the primacy of the substantive reason for dismissal over the procedural steps to be taken to carry out the same. Just causes, or those reasons attributable to the employee, include: (a) serious miscon

Abandonment of work, or the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment, is a just cause for the termination of employment under paragraph (b) of Article 282 of the Labor Code, since it constitutes neglect of duty. The jurisprudential rule is that abandonment is a matter of intention that cannot be lightly presumed from equivocal acts. To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intent , manifested through overt acts, to sever the employer-employee relationship. The employer bears the burden of showing a deliberate and unjustified refusal by the employee to resume his employment without any intention of returning. (G.R. No. 177664) Dismissal from employment on the ground of abandonment is legal and valid if it is shown that there is a clear and deliberate intent on the part of the employee to discontinue his employment without any intention of

BOOK V ON LABOR RELATIONS A. What is the important of the existence of employer-employee relationship in the application of Book V of the Labor Code? B. What is the right of control test? C. What is the economic dependence test? D. What are landmark decisions of the Supreme Court on the existence of employment relationship regardless of inapplicability of the tests? E. Article 219’s definition of an employee 1. Can a striking employee receive bonus or other benefits given during the period of strike? F. What is the purpose of Book V of the Labor Code as contradistinguished from other books? G. Employee’s right to self-organization under Article 292 H. What is a collective bargaining unit? I. What are the tests in determining if a collective bargaining unit is proper? Who declares if it is not? J. Right to organize as a constitutional right 1. Who can unionize for purposes of collective bargaining? i. All Persons Employed ii. Employees of Govern

Clearly, constructive dismissal had already set in when the suspension went beyond the maximum period allowed by law. Section 4, Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules provides that preventive suspension cannot be more than the maximum period of 30 days. Hence, we have ruled that after the 30-day period of suspension, the employee must be reinstated to his former position because suspension beyond this maximum period amounts to constructive dismissal. (G.R. No. 143204) Constructive dismissal exists when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain, on the part of an employer has become so unbearable as to leave an employee with no choice but to forego continued employment. The temporary "off-detail" of respondent Valenzuela is not such a case. (G.R. No. 143215) Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work because "continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminut

The doctrine of loss of confidence requires the concurrence of the following: (1) loss of confidence should not be simulated; (2) it should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified; (3) it may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary; (4) it must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify an earlier action taken in bad faith; and (5) the employee involved holds a position of trust and confidence. Loss of confidence, as a just cause for termination of employment, is premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds a position of responsibility, trust and confidence. He must be invested with confidence on delicate matters, such as the custody, handling, care, and protection of the employer's property and/or funds. In order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be "work-related" such as would show the employee concerned to be unfit to continue working f

For gross insubordination, also called "willful disobedience of a lawful order," to lie, two (2) requisites are also necessary. First, the assailed conduct must have been intentional and characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude. Second, the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, and made known to the employee and should pertain to the duties which he has been engaged to discharge. (G.R. No. 164403)

The offense of willful disobedience requires the concurrence of 2 requisites: (1) the employee’s assailed conduct must have been willful , that is characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude ; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. (G.R. No. 149074) Willful disobedience requires the concurrence of two requisites: (a) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (b) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. (G.R. No. 152636)

To constitute a valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must be met, namely: (1) the employee must be afforded due process, and (2) the dismissal must be for a valid cause. (G.R. No. 121004) It is now settled that where the dismissal of an employee is in fact for a just and valid cause and is so proven to be but he is not accorded his right to due process, i.e., he was not furnished the twin requirements of notice and the opportunity to be heard, the dismissal shall be upheld but the employer must be sanctioned for non-compliance with the requirements of or for failure to observe due process. The sanction, in the nature of indemnification or penalty, depends on the facts of each case and the gravity of the omission committed by the employer. (G.R. No. 115394) It is now settled that where the dismissal of one employee is in fact for a just and valid cause and is so proven to be but he is not accorded his right to due process, i.e., he was not furnished the twin requirement

The general rule is that no writ of injunction can issued against the holding of picketing by workers. Under Philippine constitutional law, picketing is considered part of freedom of speech. (G.R. No. 159460) The following are exceptions to the general rule explained above. Under the situations below, picketing may be enjoined by the NLRC: [1] Where picketing is carried out through the use of illegal means; [2] Where picketing involves the use of violence and other illegal acts; [3] Where picketing affects the rights of third parties and injunction becomes necessary to protect such rights.

In situations where the picket affects not only the employer but also the business operations of other establishments owned by third parties, an injunction may be secured by the latter from the regular courts to enjoin the picket. Picketing strikers cannot prevent employees of other companies from using the same premises being picketed. A picketing labor union has no right to prevent employees of another company which is not their employer, from getting in and out of its rented premises, otherwise, it will be held liable for damages for its acts against an innocent bystander. Under the “Innocent Bystander Rule,” the third-party employers or “innocent bystanders” who have no employer-employee relationship with the picketing strikers, may apply for injunction with the regular courts (not with the NLRC) to enjoin the conduct of the picket. Because of the absence of such employer-employee relationship, the NLRC cannot entertain such application for injunction from “innocent bystander

Here are three (3) very important things to remember when studying the law on real mortgage. As simple as they are, they mostly get forgotten by law students. [1] Mortgagor must be the owner of the property mortgaged. [2] Mortgage lien is a right in rem which follows property. [3] Notice of lis pendens cannot prejudice mortgage previously registered.

Generally, the probationary period of employment is limited to six (6) months. The exception to this general rule is when the parties to an employment contract may agree otherwise, such as when the same is established by company policy or when the same is required by the nature of work to be performed by the employee. In the latter case, there is recognition of the exercise of managerial prerogatives in requiring a longer period of probationary employment, such as in the present case where the probationary period was set for eighteen (18) months, i.e. from May, 1980 to October, 1981 inclusive, especially where the employee must learn a particular kind of work such as selling, or when the job requires certain qualifications, skills, experience or training. (G.R. No. L-63316) The provision of Art. 280 that "probationary employment shall not exceed six (6) months" means that the probationary employee may be dismissed for cause at any time before the expiration of six (6) mon

A project employee or a member of a work pool may acquire the status of a regular employee when the following concur: (1) There is a continuous rehiring of project employees even after cessation of a project; and (2) The tasks performed by the alleged "project employee" are vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer. However, the length of time during which the employee was continuously re-hired is not controlling, but merely serves as a badge of regular employment. (G.R. No. 120969) The principal test for determining whether particular employees are properly characterized as "project employees" as distinguished from "regular employees" is whether or not the project employees were assigned to carry out a " specific project or undertaking, " the duration and scope of which were specified at the time the employees were engaged for that project. (G.R. No. 170181)

A work pool may exist although the workers in the pool do not receive salaries and are free to seek other employment during temporary breaks in the business, provided that the worker shall be available when called to report for a project. Although primarily applicable to regular seasonal workers, this set-up can likewise be applied to project workers insofar as the effect of temporary cessation of work is concerned. This is beneficial to both the employer and employee for it prevents the unjust situation of "coddling labor at the expense of capital" and at the same time enables the workers to attain the status of regular employees. (G.R. No. 116781)

It is well to remind both parties that, as early as Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora, we already held that seafarers are not covered by the term regular employment, as defined under Article 280 of the Labor Code. This was reiterated in Coyoca v. National Labor Relations Commission. Instead, they are considered contractual employees whose rights and obligations are governed primarily by the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Filipino Seamen (POEA Standard Employment Contract), the Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment, and, more importantly, by Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. Even the POEA Standard Employment Contract itself mandates that in no case shall a contract of employment concerning seamen exceed 12 months. (G.R. No. 172038)

Below is the Supreme Court's list of Bar passers: 1. ABAD, Avalavenia M. 2. ABANGAN, Joan Risel B. 3. ABAPO, Yvonne Aussie I. 4. ABASTA, III, Sancho G. 5. ABDULCADER, Gada M. 6. ABDULJALEEL, Sittie Nayilah D. 7. ABDULLAH, Somayyah S. 8. ABE, Roenet Mark D. 9. ABELLANA, Lourde Liz L. 10. ABELLANOSA, Joanna Mae T. 11. ABENOJA, Nadine C. 12. ABES, Charmaine A. 13. ABESAMIS, Aerwin Carlo S. 14. ABESAMIS, Dan Runille M. 15. ABILO, Mark Emmanuel L. 16. ABIQUIBIL, Niña Rose B. 17. ABOLAIS-LANGLANG, Nasifah D. 18. ABUD, Gladys D. 19. ACEITUNA, Myra Jean C. 20. ACHARON, Joahanna A. 21. ACMAD, Aznairah O. 22. ACOSTA, Rae Genevieve L. 23. ACOSTA, Ryan P. 24. ACUBA, Demetrio Medino J. 25. ADAN, Queenie Kate T. 26. ADDUN, Madeleine M. 27. ADVINCULA, Michael Caesar A. 28. AFRICA, Alyssa M. 29. AFRICA, Carlo Gino G. 30. AGAD, Al Philip B. 31. AGARIN, Conbelyn I. 32. AGBAYANI, Doris Joy N. 33. AGBAYANI, James Edward C. 34. AGNAR, Maria Shirin T. 35. AGRASADA,