Jimenez vs. CEMRUPC (G.R. No. 140472; June 10, 2002)

NORA T. JIMENEZ, JOSEFINA T. GAVINO, LIBRADA T. DINO and SUSAN T. JOVEN, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ECUMENICAL MISSION AND RELATIONS OF THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE PHILIPPINES and POLICARPIO CARUNGIN, respondents. Written by Justice Panganiban. (G.R. No. 140472; June 10, 2002; 383 SCRA 326)

The well-settled rule that factual findings of trial courts deserve respect, sometimes even finality, is based on the postulate that they had the distinct opportunity, not available to the reviewing courts, to hear the testimonies of witnesses and to observe their conduct and demeanor on the stand. But where the factual assessments refer to documents that are available to the scrutiny of appellate courts in the same manner that they were to the lower courts, this reliance does not apply. In the present case, the controversy revolves around the allegedly forged signatures on documents that could be examined by the Court of Appeals (CA). In any event, since there was a conflict in the factual assessments made by the trial and the appellate courts, we have opted to pass upon the issue as an exception to the general rule.

ON THE FIRST ISSUE: It is also hornbook doctrine that the opinions of handwriting experts, even those from the NBI and the PC, are not binding upon courts. This principle holds true especially when the question involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual comparison of specimens of the questioned signatures with those of the currently existing ones.

Handwriting experts are usually helpful in the examination of forged documents because of the technical procedure involved in analyzing them. But resort to these experts is not mandatory or indispensable to the examination or the comparison of handwriting. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an independent examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.

ON THE SECOND ISSUE: First, the 1936 Deed of Sale -- a notarized document -- carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon duly executed instruments provided by law. As discussed earlier, petitioners did not succeed in assailing the authenticity of the signatures of their parents on the notarized Deed.

Second, the CA, which had the same opportunity as the RTC to decipher the signatures, found no reason to doubt their authenticity.

Third, it is the quality, not the number, of witnesses that will tilt the scale of evidence. Although the number of witnesses may be considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence, preponderance does not necessarily lie in the greatest number.

Fourth, after reviewing the evidence on record, we hold that it sufficiently supports the CA Decision.

Finally, the fact that petitioners waited until 1982 to file their Complaint assailing the validity of the 1936 Deed of Sale detracts from their credibility. To repeat, petitioners’ mother, father or aunt (who was the administrator/caretaker of their mother’s properties) had not done anything to protest the building of the church on the subject property.