Mayor cannot force prostitutes to change residence

"The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in another
case, "that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living,
or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of
another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as
being the essence of slavery itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S.,
356, 370.) All this explains the motive in issuing the writ of habeas corpus,
and makes clear why we said in the very beginning that the primary question
was whether the courts should permit a government of men or a government of
laws to be established in the Philippine Islands.
One hundred and seventy women, who had lived in the segregated district for
women of ill repute in the city of Manila, were by orders of the Mayor of the
city of Manila and the chief of police of that city isolated from society and
then at night, without their consent and without any opportunity to consult
with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board
steamers for transportation to regions unknown. No law, order, or regulation
authorized the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of the police of that
city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands to change their domicile from
Manila to another locality. Held: That the writ of habeas corpus was properly
granted, and that the Mayor of the city of Manila who was primarily
responsible for the deportation, is in contempt of court for his failure to
comply with the order of the court.
These women, despite their being in a sense lepers of society, are
nevertheless not chattels, but Philippine citizens protected by the same
constitutional guaranties as are other citizens. On the contrary,
Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer who, not being
expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his
residence. (Villavicencio vs. Lukban; G.R. No. 14639, March 25, 1919)