PROJECT JURISPRUDENCE

FACTS:   Lirag Textile (LIRAG) ceased operations by early 1982. Pursuant to a final and executory judgment of the NLRC, dated 20 March 1983, LIRAG was adjudged liable to its workers for unpaid wages and salaries which, as of 12 February 1986, amounted to P6,292,380.00. LIRAG's only remaining asset was mortgaged to Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) which on 15 April 1983 foreclosed the mortgage and acquired said property at public auction for P31,346.462.90, in partial satisfaction of LIRAG's indebtedness to DBP. LIRAG's workers through their union (LAND) thereupon sought to garnish on DBP the proceeds of the foreclosure sale, to the extent of their adjudged unpaid wages (P6,292,380.00). The NLRC ruled for LAND over DBP's objection. The issue therefore, in practical terms, is whether P6,292,380.00 should be deducted from the P31,346,462.90 realized by DBP from the foreclosure sale of LIRAG's property, to fully satisfy LAND's claim for LIRAG workers

CASE DIGEST: PEDRO ERMAC, and his children, ELENA, CARLOS, ANTONIO, LUCIANO, HILARIO, INDALECIO and FRANCISCA, all surnamed ERMAC, petitioners, vs. CENON MEDELO and JUDGE HERNANDO PINEDA as presiding judge of Branch II of the LANAO DEL NORTE Court of First Instance, respondents. (G.R. No. L-32281. June 19, 1975) FACTS: In a probate proceeding, a third person sought to prevent distribution of the estate on the ground that certain properties did not belong to the estate but to him. ISSUE:  Should the settlement proceeding go on? HELD:  The policy of the law is to terminate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons with the least loss of time. The settlement proceeding must go on, and not be delayed. The probate court is NOT  the best forum for the resolution of adverse claims of ownership of any property ostensibly belonging to the decedent’s estate. While there are settled exceptions to this rule, it is not proper to delay the summary settlement of dece

CONGRESSMAN HERMILANDO I. MANDANAS; MAYOR EFREN B. DIONA; MAYOR ANTONINO A. AURELIO; KAGAWAD MARIO ILAGAN; BARANGAY CHAIR PERLITO MANALO; BARANGAY CHAIR MEDEL MEDRANO; BARANGAY KAGAWAD CRIS RAMOS; BARANGAY KAGAWAD ELISA D. BALBAGO, AND ATTY. JOSE MALVAR VILLEGAS, Petitioners, v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.; SECRETARY CESAR PURISIMA, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE; SECRETARY FLORENCIO H. ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT; COMMISSIONER KIM JACINTO-HENARES, BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE; AND NATIONAL TREASURER ROBERTO TAN, BUREAU OF THE TREASURY, Respondents. (G.R. No. 199802. July 03, 2018) WRITTEN BY JUSTICE BERSAMIN FOR THE SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES. The petitioners hereby challenge the manner in which the just share in the national taxes of the local government units (LGUs) has been computed. Antecedents One of the key features of the 1987 Constitution is its push towards decentralization of government and local autonomy. Local autonomy has two facets, the

May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss? THE ANSWER IS NO . Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extraordinary writ of habeas corpus. In a case decided by the Supreme Court of the Philippines (reproduced in full below), it was held that, if a husband wants to live away from the wife, she cannot go to court and ask that he be compelled to live with her or make him let her visit his house. Being of sound mind, a husband is possessed with the capacity to make choices. Where to live and which people to see or live with are his choices only. The choices he has made may not appeal to some of his family members but these are choices which exclusively belong to the husband. In the case cited below, the husband made it clear that he was not prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration, and absent any true restraint on his liberty, there is