PSALM v. CIR (G.R. No. 198146. August 08, 2017)

CASE DIGEST: POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL RESPONDENT. [G.R. No. 198146, August 08, 2017]. THIS CASE BRIEF INVOLVES THE ISSUE ON JURISDICTION. FOR OTHER ISSUES: https://www.projectjurisprudence.com/2019/08/psalm-v-cir-gr-no-198146-august-08-2017_10.html.

FACTS: Petitioner Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) is a government-owned and controlled corporation created under Republic Act No. 9136 (RA 9136), also known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA). Section 50 of RA 9136 states that the principal purpose of PSALM is to manage the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of the National Power Corporation (NPC) generation assets, real estate and other disposable assets, and Independent Power Producer (IPP) contracts with the objective of liquidating all NPC financial obligations and stranded contract costs in an optimal manner.

PSALM conducted public biddings for the privatization of the Pantabangan-Masiway Hydroelectric Power Plant (Pantabangan-Masiway Plant) and Magat Hydroelectric Power Plant (Magat Plant) on 8 September 2006 and 14 December 2006, respectively. First Gen Hydropower Corporation with its $129 Million bid and SN Aboitiz Power Corporation with its $530 Million bid were the winning bidders for the Pantabangan-Masiway Plant and Magat Plant, respectively.

On 28 August 2007, the NPC received a letter dated 14 August 2007 from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) demanding immediate payment of P3,813,080,472 deficiency value-added tax (VAT) for the sale of the Pantabangan-Masiway Plant and Magat Plant. The NPC indorsed BIR's demand letter to PSALM.

On 30 August 2007, the BIR, NPC, and PSALM executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA).

On 21 September 2007, PSALM filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a petition for the adjudication of the dispute with the BIR to resolve the issue of whether the sale of the power plants should be subject to VAT. The case was docketed as OSJ Case No. 2007-3.
On 13 March 2008, the DOJ ruled in favor of PSALM.

The BIR moved for reconsideration, alleging that the DOJ had no jurisdiction since the dispute involved tax laws administered by the BIR and therefore within the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). Furthermore, the BIR stated that the sale of the subject power plants by PSALM to private entities is in the course of trade or business, as contemplated under Section 105 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997, which covers incidental transactions. Thus, the sale is subject to VAT. On 14 January 2009, the DOJ denied BIR's Motion for Reconsideration.

The BIR went up to the Court of Appeals which held that the petition filed by PSALM with the DOJ was really a protest against the assessment of deficiency VAT, which under Section 204 of the NIRC of 1997 is within the authority of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) to resolve. In fact, PSALM's objective in filing the petition was to recover the P3,813,080,472 VAT which was allegedly assessed erroneously and which PSALM paid under protest to the BIR.

Quoting paragraph H of the MOA among the BIR, NPC, and PSALM, the Court of Appeals stated that the parties in effect agreed to consider a DOJ ruling favorable to PSALM as the latter's application for refund.

Citing Section 4 of the NIRC of 1997, as amended by Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8424 (RA 8424) and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), the Court of Appeals ruled that the CIR is the proper body to resolve cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the NIRC or other laws administered by the BIR. The Court of Appeals stressed that jurisdiction is conferred by law or by the Constitution; the parties, such as in this case, cannot agree or stipulate on it by conferring jurisdiction in a body that has none.In conclusion, the Court of Appeals found that the DOJ Secretary gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he assumed jurisdiction over OSJ Case No. 2007-3. PSALM moved for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in its 3 August 2011 Resolution. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the Secretary of Justice has jurisdiction over the case?

We agree with the Court of Appeals that jurisdiction over the subject matter is vested by the Constitution or by law, and not by the parties to an action. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent or acquiescence of the parties or by erroneous belief of the court, quasi-judicial office or government agency that it exists.

However, the DOJ is vested by law with jurisdiction over this case. This case involves a dispute between PSALM and NPC, which are both wholly government- owned corporations, and the BIR, a government office, over the imposition of VAT on the sale of the two power plants. There is no question that original jurisdiction is with the CIR, who issues the preliminary and the final tax assessments. However, if the government entity disputes the tax assessment, the dispute is already between the BIR (represented by the CIR) and another government entity, in this case, the petitioner PSALM.

Under Presidential Decree No. 242 (PD 242), all disputes and claims solely between government agencies and offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be administratively settled or adjudicated by the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General, or the Government Corporate Counsel, depending on the issues and government agencies involved. As regards cases involving only questions of law, it is the Secretary of Justice who has jurisdiction. His ruling or determination of the question in each case shall be conclusive and binding upon all the parties concerned.

(a) The Solicitor General, with respect to disputes or claims [or] controversies between or among the departments, bureaus, offices and other agencies of the National Government;
(b) The Government Corporate Counsel, with respect to disputes or claims or controversies between or among the government-owned or controlled corporations or entities being served by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel; and
(c) The Secretary of Justice, with respect to all other disputes or claims or controversies which do not fall under the categories mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b).

The purpose of PD 242 is to provide for a speedy and efficient administrative settlement or adjudication of disputes between government offices or agencies under the Executive branch, as well as to filter cases to lessen the clogged dockets of the courts. PD 242 is only applicable to disputes, claims, and controversies solely between or among the departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the National Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and where no private party is involved. In other words, PD 242 will only apply when all the parties involved are purely government offices and government-owned or controlled corporations.

Since this case is a dispute between PSALM and NPC, both government-owned and controlled corporations, and the BIR, a National Government office, PD 242 clearly applies and the Secretary of Justice has jurisdiction over this case.

Since the amount involved in this case is more than one million pesos, the DOJ Secretary's decision may be appealed to the Office of the President in accordance with Section 70, Chapter 14, Book IV of EO 292 and Section 5 of PD 242. If the appeal to the Office of the President is denied, the aggrieved party can still appeal to the Court of Appeals under Section 1, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However, in order not to further delay the disposition of this case, the Court resolves to decide the substantive issue raised in the petition.

Other issues discussed in this case were [a] the power of the President to control all offices and bureaus of the Executive Branch; [b] the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies; and [c] harmonization between an earlier law and a later law which are general and special, respectively.