Suggested readings on power over processes; separation of powers
The phrase "power over processes" refers to the rule-making power of the Supreme Court. "Power over processes" is sometimes used instead of the latter because of the administrative law principle called "power of subordinate legislation" which is also often called "rule-making power."
In this post, what is referred to is the power of the Judiciary to promulgate rules regarding pleading, practice and procedure. This has direct connection with the principle of separation of powers because no other Branch of Government is allowed to promulgate orders, statutes or rules that interferes with this judicial power.
[1] Estipona v. Judge Lobrigo. https://www.projectjurisprudence.com/2017/09/estipona-vs-lobrigo-226679-august.html.
[2] Garcia v. Judge Drilon, et al., 712 Phil. 44, 84 (2013).
[3] GMA Network, Inc. v. COMELEC, 742 Phil. 174, 209-210 (2014).
[4] People v. Castro, 340 Phil. 245, 246 (1997); People v. Camba, 302 Phil. 311, 323 (1994); People v. Tantiado, 288 Phil. 241, 258 (1992); People v. Zapanta, 272-A Phil. 161, 166 (1991); People v. Taruc, 241 Phil. 177, 186 (1988); and People v. Ale, 229 Phil. 81, 87 (1986).
[16] RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fee.
[17] 356 Phil. 787 (1998).
[5] People v. Tanliado, as cited in People v. Camba, and People v. Caco, 294 Phil. 54, 65 (1993).
[6] People v. Quintana, 256 Phil, 430, 436 (1989).
[7] People v. Gatlabayan, 669 Phil. 240, 261 (2011); People v. Lagmay, 365 Phil. 606, 632 (1999); and People v. Arcega, G.R. No. 96319, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 681, 688.
[8] GMA Natwork; Inc. v. COMELEC.
[9] Matibag v. Benipayo, 429 Phil. 554, 579 (2002).
[10] Philippine Woman's Christian Temperance Union, Inc. v. Teodoro R. Yangco 2nd And 3rd Generation Heirs Foundation, Inc., 731 Phil. 269, 292 (2014).
[11] Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 361 Phil. 73, 88 (1999), as cited in RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fee, 626 Phil. 93, 106 (2010) and Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes, 627 Phil. 543, 549 (2010).
[12] Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice.
[13] RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fee and In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees, 629 Phil. 1, 4-5 (2010).
[14] G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, 774 SCRA 431.
[15] Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division).
[16] RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fee.
[17] 356 Phil. 787 (1998).
[18] 738 Phil. 37 (2014).
[19] 638 Phil. 353 (2010).
[20] Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), citing Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes.
[21] People v. Mamarion, 459 Phil. 51, 74 [2003].
[20] Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), citing Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes.
[21] People v. Mamarion, 459 Phil. 51, 74 [2003].
[22] CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5). Ogayon v. People, 768 Phil. 272, 288 (2015) and San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. v. CA, 352 Phil. 405, 415-416 (1998).
[23] Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division).
[24] Fabian v. Desierto.
[25] Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division); Securities and Exchange Commission v. Judge Laigo, et al., 768 Phil. 239 269-270 (2015); Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan. et al., 751 Phil. 123, 141-142 (2015); Land Bank of the Phils. v. De Leon, 447 Phil. 495, 503 (2003); and Bernabe v. Alejo, 424 Phil. 933, 941 (2002).
[26] 448 Phil. 317 (2003).
[27] Los Baños v. Pedro, 604 Phil. 215, 229 (2009).
[28] People v. Lacson.
[29] Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., id. at 142-143.
[30] CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5). Neypes v. Court of Appeals, 506 Phil. 613, 626 (2005) and San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. v. CA.
[31] Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977); and the Majority Opinion and Mr. Justice Douglas' Concurring Opinion in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
[32] People v. Villarama, Jr., 285 Phil. 723, 730 (1992), citing Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1979, p. 1037.
[33] Gonzales III v. Office of the President of the Philippines, et al., 694 Phil. 52. 106 (2012); Atty. Amante-Descallar v. Judge Ramas, 601 Phil. 21, 40 (2009); Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, 573 Phil. 368, 375 (2008); and People v. Mamarion.
[34] Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
[35] Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990)
[36] Santobello v. New York, and Blackledge v. Allison.
[37] Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
[38] Brady v. United States and Mr. Justice Douglas' Concurring Opinion in Santobello v. New York.
[39] Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977). Mr. Justice Scalia's Dissenting Opinion in Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2011).
[40] The State is the offended party in crimes under R.A. No. 9165. In People v. Villarama, Jr., the Court ruled:
"x x x While the acts constituting the crimes are not wrong in themselves, they are made so by law because they infringe upon the rights of others. The threat posed by drugs against human dignity and the integrity of society is malevolent and incessant (People v. Ale, G.R. No. 70998, October 14, 1986, 145 SCRA 50, 58). Such pernicious effect is felt not only by the addicts themselves but also by their families. As a result, society's survival is endangered because its basic unit, the family, is the ultimate victim of the drug menace. The state is, therefore, the offended party in this case. As guardian of the rights of the people, the government files the criminal action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The Fiscal who represents the government is duty bound to defend the public interests, threatened by crime, to the point that it is as though he were the person directly injured by the offense (United States v. Samio, 3 Phil. 691, 696). Viewed in this light, the consent of the offended party, i.e. the state, will have to be secured from the Fiscal who acts in behalf of the government."
[41] People v. Villarama, Jr.
[42] Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987).
[43] Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan. In Capati v. Dr. Ocampo (199 Phil. 230, 234 [1982], citing In Re: Hirsh's Estate 5A. 2d 160, 163; 334 Pa. 172; Words & Phrases, permanent edition, 26a.), the Court also held:
"It is well settled that the word 'may' is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion upon a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the term 'may be' connotes possibility; it does not connote certainty. 'May' is an auxiliary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or possibility."
[44] Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan and People v. Villarama, Jr.
"It is well settled that the word 'may' is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion upon a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the term 'may be' connotes possibility; it does not connote certainty. 'May' is an auxiliary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or possibility."
[44] Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan and People v. Villarama, Jr.
[45] Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, id. at 376; People v. Mamarion; Ladino v. Hon. Garcia, 333 Phil. 254, 258 (1996); and People v. Villarama, Jr.
[46] Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan.
[47] Sofronio Albania v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 226792, June 6, 2017.
[48] People v. Villarama, Jr., as cited in Gonzales III v. Office of the President of the Philippines, et al., and People v. Mamarion.