Civil liability, indemnify (Article 20, Civil Code)
Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. (Article 20 of the New Civil
Code of the Philippines)
Article 20 punishes (not criminally but only civilly) illegal acts. It does
not matter whether such act be done willfully or negligently. In relation to
this, Article 2176 provides: "Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done." Civil Code). Article 2176 is considered as a basic provision on tort
(otherwise known as quasi-delict).
Article 20 echoes a basic principle in criminal law, i.e., every person
criminally liable shall likewise be civilly liable. (Article 100 of Act No.
3815 or the Revised Penal Code) For example, if one kills another person
either by recklessly or imprudently driving a car or by deliberately aiming
and firing a gun, there is civil liability. This is regardless of the filing
or success of a criminal action against the offender.
In other words, Article 20, etc. are enough legal bases to proceed against a
person even if the criminal action is not filed, does not proceed, gets
dismissed or results in acquittal. The law on tort is a separate source of
obligation than criminal law.
In Banal v. Tadeo, Jr., G.R. Nos. 78911-25, December 11, 1987, the Supreme
Court held that regardless of whether or not a special law so provides,
indemnification of the offended party may be on account of the damage, loss or
injury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of another. The
indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the
penalty imposed by law for the commission of the crime. Every crime gives
rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party, and
also to civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage,
and indemnification for the losses. (United States v. Bernardo, 19 Phil. 265)
In the above-cited case of Banal v. Tadeo, Jr., the argument was that Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 punishes the act of knowingly issuing worthless checks as an
offense against public order. As such (being a crime against public order, not
a crime against persons, etc.), it is argued that it is the State and the
public that are the principal complainants and, therefore, no civil indemnity
is provided for by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for which a private party or
prosecutor may intervene.
Citing Lozano v. Hon. Martinez (G.R. No. 63419, December 18, 1986), the
Supreme Court held that, although the effects of a worthless check transcend
the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and
touch the interests of the community at large, the wrong done to the private
party defrauded has to be recognized as well. The mischief it creates is not
only a wrong to the payee or the holder, but also an injury to the public.
(G.R. Nos. 78911-25, December 11, 1987)
Thus, civil liability to the offended private party cannot be denied. The
payee of the check is entitled to receive the payment of money for which the
worthless check was issued. Having suffered damages, she is entitled to
recompense. (G.R. Nos. 78911-25, December 11, 1987)
EVEN IF NO CRIMINAL ACTION IS PURSUED. As mentioned above, civil
liability arising from tort is a separate source of obligation. Article
1157 says: "Obligations arise from: (1) Law; (2) Contracts; (3)
Quasi-contracts; (4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and (5)
Quasi-delicts." (Civil Code) Therefore, even if the aggrieved party does not
intent to file criminal charges against the offending party, an action for
damages may still proceed and prosper.
EVEN IF A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT WAS DISMISSED BY THE PROSECUTOR. In
Conrado Bunag, Jr. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 101749, July 10, 1992, a case of forcible abduction with rape was dismissed by the fiscal’s office
of Pasay City. One of the issues raised was the effect of the said dismissal
on the liability of the accused for damages.
The Supreme Court said that the dismissal of the complaint for forcible
abduction with rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary
investigation stage. There is no declaration in the final judgment that the
fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the
dismissal did not in any way affect the right of herein private respondent to
institute a civil action arising from the offense because such preliminary
dismissal of the penal action did not carry with it the extinction of the
civil action.
The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings
involved are not between the same parties. Furthermore, it has long been
emphasized, with continuing validity up to now, that there are different rules
as to the competency of witnesses, and the quantum of evidence in criminal and
civil proceedings. In a criminal action, the State must prove its case by
evidence which shows the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while
in a civil action, it is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by
preponderance of evidence only. (Ocampo vs. Jenkins, et al., 14 Phil. 681).
Thus, in Rillon, et al. vs. Rillon, it was stressed that it is not now
necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be first instituted and
prosecuted to final judgment before a civil action based on said offense in
favor of the offended woman can likewise be instituted and prosecuted to final
judgment.
WHEN A CRIMINAL ACTION IS PENDING. The pendency of a criminal action in
court will, generally, cause the suspension of the civil action for damages
arising from the same act or omission. When the civil action is based on
an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony,
such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter. (Article 31, Civil Code)
In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or
fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or
property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the
city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil
action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and
a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action. (Article
33-34, Civil Code)
WHEN THE ACCUSED GETS ACQUITTED. The acquittal of the accused does
not necessarily mean his absolution from civil liability.
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil
liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused
is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes
the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the
perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for
such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out
of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be
based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation
contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an
acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case,
even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he
is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only. (G.R. No. 163753, January 15, 2014)
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment
against him on the civil aspect of the case.1âwphi1 The extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability
where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused
is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from
or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the
civil action based on delictmay be deemed extinguished if there is a finding
on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not
commit the acts or omission imputed to him. (Daluraya v. Oliva, G.R. No. 210148, December 8, 2014, citing Dayap v. Sendiong, 597 Phil. 127)