PROJECT JURISPRUDENCE

The Supreme Court's ruling in the recent case of Thenamaris Philippines, Inc. (Formerly Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc.) v. Court of Appeals[1] is instructive, to wit: In Republic v. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc., we had the occasion to settle the seeming conflict on various jurisprudence touching upon the issue of whether the period for filing a petition for certiorari may be extended. In said case, we stated that the general rule, as laid down in Laguna Metis Corporation v. Court of Appeals, is that a petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. This is in accordance with the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC where no provision for the filing of a motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari exists, unlike in the original Section 4 of Rule 65 which allowed the filing of such a motion but only for compelling reason and in no case exceeding 15 days. Under exc

As clarified in Nacar v. Gallery Frames,[1] pursuant to Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas-Monetary Board (BSP-MB) Circular No. 799 (Series of 2013), the legal rate of interest is currently at six percent (6%) regardless of the source of obligation.[2] Such new rate should be applied prospectively,[3] and the twelve percent (12%) legal interest shall apply only until June 30, 2013. Thereafter, the new rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be the prevailing rate of interest. Nacar, thus, modified the previous guidelines laid down in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[4] on the imposition of interest. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages , the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows: 1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money , the interest due should be that which may have be

Restitution is sanctioned by the rules. Section 5, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that: SEC. 5. Effect of reversal of executed judgment.  Where the executed judgment is reversed totally or partially, or annulled, on appeal or  otherwise , the trial court may, on motion, issue such orders of restitution or reparation of damages as equity and justice may warrant under the circumstances. (Emphasis ours) The Rules of Court provides for restitution according to equity, in case the executed judgment is reversed on appeal.[1] When the executed decision is reversed, the premature execution is considered to have lost its legal bases.[2] The situation necessarily requires equitable restitution to the party prejudiced thereby.[3] The phrase "on appeal or otherwise" in Section 5 of Rule 39 specifically permits the application of restitution or reparation in cases where a judgment is reversed or annulled, not only on appeal but also thro

Indeed, the well-settled principle of immutability of final judgments demands that once a judgment has become final, the winning party should not, through a mere subterfuge, be deprived of the fruits of the verdict.[1] There are, however, recognized exceptions to the execution as a matter of right of a final and immutable judgment, one of which is the existence of a supervening event.[2] "A supervening event is a fact which transpires or a new circumstance which develops after a judgment has become final and executory. This includes matters which the parties were unaware of prior to or during trial because they were not yet in existence at that time."[3] To be sufficient to stay or stop the execution,  a supervening event must create a substantial change in the rights or relations of the parties which would render execution of a final judgment unjust, impossible or inequitable making it imperative to stay immediate execution in the interest of ju

Under Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, if the MTC tries a case on the merits despite having no jurisdiction over the subject matter, its decision may be reviewed on appeal by the RTC, to wit: Sec. 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction. If an appeal is taken from an order of the lower court dismissing the case without a trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court may affirm or reverse it, as the case may be. In case of affirmance and the ground of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover, shall try the case on the merits as if the case was originally filed with it. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded for further proceedings. If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the ease if it has original jurisdiction thereof

The jurisdictions of the RTC and the MTC over civil actions involving title to, or possession of real property or interest therein, like an action for reconveyance of ownership and possession with damages, are distinctly set forth under Section 19 (2) and Section 33 (3) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended: Section 19.   Jurisdiction in civil cases . - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such the value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; Section 33.   Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Cou

A temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so declared by the company-designated physician within the periods he is allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability.[1] The 240-day period is meant to harmonize the provision of the POEA-SEC above with the provisions of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Book IV of the Labor Code, specifically Rule X, Section 2, on disability benefits.[2] Where before it was held that permanent disability is the inability of a seafarer to perform his work for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body,[3] now the rule is that if the injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days, the company-designated physician has, including the initial 120 days, up to a maximum of 240 days to declare either fitness to work or p

The relations between the parties and the procedure that is followed in case of a conflict in medical findings during claims for disability benefits is governed by the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels (also known as POEA Standard Employment Contract [POEA-SEC]) under POEA Memorandum Circular No. 9, dated June 14, 2000. It states: Section 20. Compensation and Benefits x x x x B. Compensation And Benefits For Injury Or Illness. The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows: 1. The employer shall continue to pay the seafarer his wages during time he is on board the vessel; 2. If the injury or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment in a foreign port, the employer shall be liable for the full cost of such medical, serious dental, surgical and

In labor cases, as in all cases which require the presentation and weighing of evidence, the basic rule is that the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue.[1] In particular, in a case of claims for disability benefits, the onus probandi falls on the seafarer as claimant to establish his claim with the right quantum of evidence; it cannot rest on speculations, presumptions or conjectures.[2] Such party has the burden of proving the said assertion with the quantum of evidence required by law which, in a case such as this of a claim for disability benefits arising from one's employment as a seafarer, is substantial evidence.[3] Substantial evidence is not one that establishes certainty beyond reasonable doubt, but only "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.[4] It is more than a mere scintilla of evidence.

[Please note that the following discussion may have been heavily affected by the 2020 Rules of Civil Procedure. Read with caution.] In Leobrera v. Court of Appeals[1], the issue was the propriety of an order of the trial court granting a Motion to File Supplemental Complaint, when notice thereof was received by the other party only a day after the issuance of the said order, when it was already too late to contest the same. In addition, it was also observed that the notice did not even indicate the time and place of the scheduled hearing. As such, the order of the trial court granting the admission of the supplemental complaint was nullified for non-compliance with Sections 4,[2] 5,[3] and 6[4] of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, in Daaco v. Yu (G.R. No. 183398, June 22, 2015), it was undisputed that notice of the pre-trial conference was received by petitioner a day before the same. Said notice sufficiently indicated the time and place

There is a particular denial that has the earmark of what is called in the law on pleadings as a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It is in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.[1] If an allegation is not specifically denied or the denial is a negative pregnant, the allegation is deemed admitted. Where a fact is alle

In Mahilum v. Ilano (G.R. No. 197923, June 22, 2015), the Supreme Court made a quite - uh - interesting statement about the immediate issuance of certificate of title over real property under the name of the buyer. The issue in that case was whether respondents are an innocent purchaser for value of a piece of land. The High Court said that there were circumstances which could lead one to believe that respondents are not exactly innocent of the charge. It was held: Their failure to register the unnotarized and undated deed of absolute sale is at the very least unusual ; it is contrary to experience. It is uncharacteristic of a conscientious buyer of real estate not to cause the immediate registration of his deed of sale as well as the issuance of a new certificate of title in his name . Having supposedly paid a considerable amount (P250,000.00) for the property, respondents certainly would have protected themselves by immediately registering the sale

A certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. The real purpose of the Torrens system of land registration is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title.[1] In Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, it was explained that the purpose of the Torrens system and its legal implications to third persons dealing with registered land are as follows: The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry. Where innocent third persons, re

In Sps. Solivel v. Judge Francisco, the High Court held that, in order that the holder of a certificate for value issued by virtue of the registration of a voluntary instrument may be considered a holder in good faith for value, the instrument registered should not be forged. When the instrument presented is forged, even if accompanied by the owner's duplicate certificate of title, the registered owner does not thereby lose his title, and neither does the assignee in the forged deed acquire any right or title to the property. The innocent purchaser for value protected by law is one who purchases a titled land by virtue of a deed executed by the registered owner himself, not by a forged deed, as the law expressly states. In Instrade, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, it was reiterated that: "[A]s early as Joaquin v. Madrid, x x x, [it was] said that in order that the holder of a certificate for value issued by virtue of the registration of a voluntary ins

In Mahilum v. Spouses Ilano (G.R. No. 197923, June 22, 2015), the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals (CA) failed to consider that title to the property remained in petitioner's name; TCT 85533 was never cancelled and no new title was issued in respondents' name. As a matter of fact, what they did when petitioner annotated her affidavit of loss upon TCT 85533 was to cause the annotation of an "affidavit of non-loss" afterward. Since a new title was never issued in respondents' favor and, instead, title remained in petitioner's name, the former never came within the coverage and protection of the Torrens system, where the issue of good or bad faith becomes relevant. Since respondents never acquired a new certificate of title in their name, the issue of their good or bad faith which is central in an annulment of title case is of no consequence; petitioner's case is for annulment of the Agreement and Deed of Absolute Sale , and not one to annul tit

A person is considered in law as an innocent purchaser for value when he buys the property of another, without notice that some other person has a right or an interest in such property, and pays a full price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property. A person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title of the vendor/transferor, and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property. (Spouses Chu, Sr. v. Benelda Estate Development Corporation, 405 Phil. 936, 2001)

Parties may not object to the execution by raising new issues of fact or law, except under the following circumstances: (1) the writ of execution varies the judgment; (2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust; (3) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution; (4) it appears that the controversy has been submitted to the judgment of the court; (5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof; or (6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority.[1] [1] Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Borreta, 519 Phil. 637, 642-643 (2006).

It is a consistent practice that once a judgment has become final and executory, a writ of execution is issued as a matter of course, in the absence of any order restraining its issuance.[1] In addition, even a writ of demolition, if the case calls for it, is ancillary to the process of execution and is logically also issued as a consequence of the writ of execution earlier issued.[2] Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is clear: Section 1.  Execution upon judgments or final orders. —  Execution shall issue as a matter of right , or motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected. If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be en

Article 266-B of the RPC imposes different penalties for rape committed under paragraph 1 or rape by sexual intercourse and under paragraph 2 or rape by sexual assault. Article 266-B prescribes: ART. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. x x x x The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances: 1. When the  victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent , ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. x x x x Rape under paragraph 2  of the next preceding article shall be punished by prision mayor. x x x x Reclusion temporal shall also be imposed if the rape is committed with any of the ten aggravating/qualifying circumstances  mentioned in this article. (Emphasis

Under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), there are two ways by which the crime of rape may be committed: by sexual intercourse or by sexual assault.[1] Rape by sexual intercourse is defined under Article 266-A(l) where it is committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge with a woman under a certain set of circumstances enumerated in the provision. When a person is found guilty of rape by sexual intercourse, the perpetrator is ordinarily punished by reclusion perpetua.[2] Rape by sexual assault, on the other hand, is committed by any person who, under the same set of circumstances in Article 266-A(l), inserts his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person. Article 266-A(2) provides: ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed - x x x x 2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit

The Supreme Court has always reiterated that the credibility of witnesses is a question best addressed by the trial court because of its opportunity to observe their demeanor while testifying on the stand: an opportunity denied to the appellate courts.[1] Absent any substantial reason to justify the reversal of the trial court's assessment and conclusion, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former's findings, especially when no significant fact nor circumstance is shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered could affect the outcome of the case.[2] The rule is strictly applied when the appellate court affirms the finding of the lower court. The High Court has also acknowledged that it is difficult to have corroborating testimonies in rape cases since in majority of the cases only the offended party's testimony is available; and has affirmed a conviction of rape as long as it is supported by a conclusive, logical and

Penalty for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service may be imposed upon an erring public officer as long as the questioned act or conduct taints the image and integrity of the office; and the act need not be related to or connected with the public officer's official functions.[1] Under our civil service laws, there is no concrete description of what specific acts constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, but the following acts or omissions have been treated as such: Misappropriation of public funds; Abandonment of office; Failure to report back to work without prior notice; Failure to safekeep public records and property; Making false entries in public documents; Falsification of court orders; A judge's act of brandishing a gun, and threatening the complainants during a traffic altercation; A court interpreter's participation in the execution of a document

In Catipon v. Japson (G.R. No. 191787, June 22, 2015), a letter-complaint was filed with the Civil Service Commission Regional Director, alleging that petitioner made deliberate false entries in his Career Service Professional Examination (CSPE) application, specifically, that he obtained his college degree in 1993 when actually he graduated in 1995 only, after removing his deficiency of 1.5 units in Military Education; also, that petitioner was not qualified to take the CSPE examination in 1993 since he was not yet then a graduate of a four-year college course, contrary to the entry in his application form.[1] The Supreme Court found petitioner to be negligent in filling out his CSPE application form and in failing to verify beforehand the specific requirements for the CSPE examination. Petitioner's claim of good faith and absence of deliberate intent or willful desire to defy or disregard the rules relative to the CSPE was held to be an invalid defense

The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, particularly Sections 2 (1) and 3 of Article XI-B, states that: Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs. Thus, "the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, has jurisdiction over disputes involving the re

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence.[1] It has been held, however, that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are not iron-clad rules. In the case of Republic v. Lacap,[2] the Supreme Court enumerated the numerous exceptions to these rules, namely: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal a

As a public servant, a court employee is likewise liable under Rule X, Section 46(A)(11) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which prohibits "soliciting or accepting, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value which in the course of an employee's official duties may affect the functions of his office." In Villahermosa, Sr. v. Sarcia, the Supreme Court held that "the sole act of receiving money from litigants, whatever the reason may be, is antithesis to being a court employee."[1] It does not matter, therefore, that herein respondent did not actually grant the favor he promised, and that he paid back the money he had received from Ms. Delson. He should be held accountable for soliciting and receiving money from litigants for personal gain - an act that constitutes grave misconduct. In Ramos v. Limeta,[2] grave misconduct is defined as a serious transg

When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership . (Article 145, Family Code) In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of Article 145 of the Family Code, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household . (Article 145, Family Code) Neither party can encumbe

Lawyers are the protectors and defenders of society. We protect your life, your family, and your livelihood. (Onki Kwan, 2019) For example, criminal lawyers defend those who are charged with a crime, even heinous ones like murder; estate planning lawyers help pass your legacy onto your family and even ensure that your children are taken care of if something tragic happens to you; and business lawyers help protect and even grow your business. There are many examples of lawyers helping people improve their lives both directly and indirectly. I worked at a public interest law firm, where this happened every single day. Unfortunately, not everyone can get access to a lawyer and many do not seek legal help until it’s too late. We hear about preventative health, but no one talks about preventative legal services when both can play a fundamental role in your health and life outcomes. I majored in Public Health and became a lawyer. Initially, I never thought about how the two are related and e

A lawyer can serve in several roles. Here are some examples, but in practice most lawyers do more than one of these, sometimes even simultaneously: 1. Advocate Here, by “advocate,” I mean somebody who tries to advance their client’s interests in some way, typically involving (at least to some extent) persuasion. The classic example is in court, especially in something like closing arguments: a lawyer advocates for their client by persuading the judge or jury that their client deserves to win their case. It doesn’t have to be in court though. It could be in front of a licensing board or some other administrative body. 2. Counselor This is more “behind closed doors.” The role of a counselor isn’t to persuade, it’s to advise. Often, a client calls up a lawyer and says: “So and so just happened. I want to end up with an outcome like such and such. What are my options?” This is the typical case where a lawyer steps into a counseling role. This could happ