PROJECT JURISPRUDENCE

Section 63 of the Corporation Code determines the validity of the transfer of shares through purchase, to wit: Section 63. Certificate of stock and transfer of shares. – x x x Shares of stock so issued are personal property and may be transferred by delivery of the certificate or certificates indorsed by the owner or his attorney-in-fact or other person legally authorized to make the transfer. No transfer, however, shall be valid, except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation showing the names of the parties to the transaction, the date of the transfer, the number of the certificate or certificates and the number of shares transferred. No shares of stock against which the corporation holds any unpaid claim shall be transferable in the books of the corporation. In this regard, the Supreme Court has instructed in Ponce v. Alsons Cement Corporation[1] that: x x x [A] transfer of shares of stock not recorded in the

A stock certificate is prima facie evidence that the holder is a shareholder of the corporation,[1] but the possession of the certificate is not the sole determining factor of one’s stock ownership. A certificate of stock is merely: x x x the paper representative or tangible evidence of the stock itself and of the various interests therein.  The certificate is not stock in the corporation but is merely evidence of the holder's interest and status in the corporation, his ownership of the share represented thereby, but is not in law the equivalent of such ownership.  It expresses the contract between the corporation and the stockholder, but it is not essential to the existence of a share in stock or the creation of the relation of shareholder to the corporation.[2] (Emphasis supplied.) [1] Lao v. Lao, G.R. No. 170585, October 6, 2008. [2] Tan v. Securities and Exchange Commission, G.R. No. 95696, March 3, 1992. 

In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence that is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Thus, the party, whether the plaintiff or the defendant, who asserts the affirmative of an issue bears the  onus  to prove his assertion in order to obtain a favorable judgment. From the plaintiff the burden to prove his positive assertions never parts. Yet, for the defendant, an affirmative defense is one that is not a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiff’s cause of action, but rather one that, if established, will be a good defense – i.e., an “avoidance” of the claim. (Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Royeca, G.R. No. 176664, July 21, 2008).

Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court which provides: Sec. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the Court's own motion without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counter-claim in the same or in a separate action. The dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the Court.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The requisites of treachery are: (1) The employment of means, method, or manner of execution which will ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliating acts on the part of the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) Deliberate or conscious adoption of such means, method, or manner of execution.[1] [1] Cirera v. People, G.R. No. 181843, 14 July 2014.

Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, now reads: SEC. 4.  When and where petition filed . – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from notice of the denial of the motion. If the petition relates to an act or omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the court’s appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be file

As a general rule, a petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration .[1] This is in accordance with the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC where no provision for the filing of a motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari exists, unlike in the previous Section 4, Rule 65[2] of the Rules of Court which allowed the filing of such a motion but only for compelling reasons and in no case exceeding 15 days.[3] Under exceptional cases, however, the Supreme Court has held that the 60-day period may be extended subject to the court’s sound discretion .[4] Eventually, in Labao v. Flores,[5] the Supreme Court laid down the following recognized exceptions to the strict observance of the 60-day reglementary period :  (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons;  (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed pr

Administrative proceedings are governed by the substantial evidence rule where a finding of guilt would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial evidence that the respondent committed acts stated in the complaint. Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The standard of substantial evidence is met when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or even preponderant,[1] and respondent’s participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position.[43] [1] Menor v. Guillermo, 595 Phil. 10, 15 (2008). Citations omitted. [2] Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) v. Mayordomo, G.R. No. 191218, May 31, 2011. Citations omitted.

In the landmark case of Philippine Journalists, Inc. v. CIR (PJI case), the Supreme Court held that a waiver is not automatically a renunciation of the right to invoke the defense of prescription. A waiver of the Statute of Limitations is nothing more than “an agreement between the taxpayer and the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that the period to issue an assessment and collect the taxes due is extended to a date certain.” It is a bilateral agreement, thus necessitating the very signatures of both the CIR and the taxpayer to give birth to a valid agreement. Furthermore, indicating in the waiver the date of acceptance by the BIR is necessary in order to determine whether the parties (the taxpayer and the government) had entered into a waiver “before the expiration of the time prescribed in Section 203 (the three-year prescriptive period) for the assessment of the tax.” When the period of prescription has expired, there will be no more need to execute a waiver as t

Under Section 2, Rule I of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure and reiterated verbatim in the same provision of the 2011 Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission, it is provided that: Section 2. Construction. – These Rules shall be liberally construed to carry out the objectives of the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines and other relevant legislations, and to assist the parties in obtaining just, expeditious and inexpensive resolution and settlement of labor disputes. Further, under Section 10, Rule VII of both the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure and the 2011 NLRC Rules it is also identically stated that: Section 10. Technical rules not binding. – The rules of procedure and evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling and the Commission shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure

G.R. No. L-61311 September 2l, 1987 FELICIDAD VILLANUEVA, FERNANDO CAISIP, ANTONIO LIANG, FELINA MIRANDA, RICARDO PUNO, FLORENCIO LAXA, and RENE OCAMPO, Petitioners, vs. HON. MARIANO CASTAÑEDA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch III, VICENTE A. MACALINO, Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Mayor, San Fernando, Pampanga, Respondents. Facts: In 1961, the municipal council of San Fernando adopted a resolution authorizing members of Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association to construct permanent stags and sell along Mercado Street. Petitioned by the Municipality, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga issued a writ of preliminary injunction that prevented defendants from constructing the said stalls until the final resolution. While the case was pending, the municipal council adopted a resolution that the subject area be returned to its original purposes as a parking place and a public plaza, thereby implicitly revoking the resolution authoriz

G.R. NO. 179505, DECEMBER 04, 2009 FIRST PHILIPPINE HOLDINGS CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. TRANS MIDDLE EAST (PHILS.) EQUITIES INC., Respondent. Facts: FPHC is a power-generating and distributing company. In 1984, FPHC allegedly sold its more than 6 million shares in PCIB (bank) to TMEE allegedly owned by Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez who was then facing a charge in the Sandiganbayan for ill-gotten wealth. FPHC wants the sale of shares to be declared void because, allegedly, FPHC’s officers and board directors were allegedly dummies of Romualdez and, thus, obtained through fraud and acts contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. When FPHC attempted to intervene in the Sandiganbayan, it failed because the Sandiganbayan said that it was too late to question the fraud-element of the contract, the case having been on December 28, 1988, instead of May 24, 1988 (counted from May 24, 1984, or date of sale). On the other hand, FPHC said that it could only file the case when Marcos was ou

G.R. NO. 172919  JANUARY 13, 2016: TIMOTEO BACALSO and DIOSDADA BACALSO, Petitioners,  GREGORIA ACA-AC, EUTIQUIA AGUILA, JULIAN BACUS and EVELYN SYCHANGCO, Respondents. Facts: The Bacus siblings were the registered owners of a parcel of land which they inherited from their Mother, Matea. In 1987, they sold this land to their cousin, Timoteo, at P8,000. However, in 1988, Timoteo, together with his sisters Lucena and Victoria and some of his cousins filed a complaint against the Bacus siblings and four other persons before the RTC of Cebu City to declare null the documents and certificate of title and to reconvey the land, plus damages. They claim that they are the co-owners of the three-fourths portion of land because Matea bought it for and on behalf of his brother Alejandro (father of Timoteo) and others all surnamed Bacalso. In 1989, the RTC ruled Matea as the sole owner of the parcel of land, affirming the validity of conveyances to her childr

Section 1, Memorandum Circular No. 15[1] of the Civil Service Commission defines disgraceful and immoral conduct as a willful act that violates basic decency or morality of society. It states: Section 1. Definition of Disgraceful and Immoral conduct  – Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct refers to an act which violates the basic norm or decency, morality and decorum abhorred and condemned by the society . It refers to conduct which is willful, flagrant or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinions of the good and respectable members of the community. It may be committed in a scandalous or discreet manner, within or out of the workplace.[2] A complaint may be brought or initiated by the disciplining authority or any person against the parties involved.[3] According to Section 46 B.3, Rule 10 of the RRACCS, disgraceful and immoral conduct is a grave offense which is punishable by suspension from the service for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first

The exceptions to the three-year prescriptive period on the assessment of taxes is provided under Section 222(b) of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, which states: SEC. 222. Exceptions as to Period of Limitation of Assessment and Collection of Taxes.- (a) In the case of a false or fraudulent return with intent to evade tax or of failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be filed without assessment, at any time within ten (10) years after the discovery of the falsity, fraud or omission: Provided, That in a fraud assessment which has become final and executory, the fact of fraud shall be judicially taken cognizance of in the civil or criminal action for the collection thereof. (b) If before the expiration of the time prescribed in Section 203 for the assessment of the tax, both the Commissioner and the taxpayer have agreed in writing to its assessment after such time, the tax may be assessed within the period agreed upon. T

The period to assess and collect an internal revenue tax is limited only to three years by Section 203 of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, quoted hereunder as follows: SEC. 203. Period of Limitation Upon Assessment and Collection. – Except as provided in Section 222,  internal revenue taxes shall be assessed within three years after the last day prescribed by law for the filing of the return , and no proceeding in court without assessment for the collection of such taxes shall be begun after the expiration of such period: Provided, That  in a case where a return is filed beyond the period prescribed by law, the three (3)-year period shall be counted from the day the return was filed . For purposes of this Section,  a return filed before the last day prescribed by law for the filing thereof shall be considered as filed on such last day . (Emphasis supplied) This mandate governs the question of prescription of the government’s right to assess internal revenue taxes primarily to safeguard t

The Supreme Court has previously upheld as legal the dismissal of employees for using the employer's vehicle for their own private purposes without prior permission or authority. In Soco v. Mercantile Corporation of Davao,[1] the Supreme Court held that “a rule prohibiting employees from using company vehicles for private purposes without authority from management is a reasonable one.” Thus, an employee who used the company vehicle twice in pursuing his own personal interests, on company time and deviating from his authorized route, all without permission, was held to have been validly dismissed, for, as the Supreme Court held, to condone the employee's conduct will erode the discipline that an employer should uniformly apply so that it can expect compliance to the same rules and regulations by its other employees.[2] In another case, Family Planning Organization of the Philippines v. NLRC,[3] the Supreme Court also affirmed the dismissal of an employee who used the company veh

In Raza v. Daikoku Electronics Phils. Inc.,[1] the petitioner alleged that the penalty of dismissal imposed upon him is too harsh. It is long established that an employer is given a wide latitude of discretion in managing its own affairs , and in the promulgation of policies, rules and regulations on work-related activities of its employees.[2] The broad discretion includes the implementation of company rules and regulations and the imposition of disciplinary measures on its workers.[3] But for the management prerogative to be upheld, the exercise of disciplining employees and imposing appropriate penalties on erring workers must be practiced in good faith for the advancement of the employer’s interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements.[4] [1] G.R. No. 188464, July 29, 2015. [2] San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, 574 Phil. 556, 570 (2008). [3] Dongon v. Rapid Movers and Forwarders Co., Inc.

Among the many things the class has learned from labor law professor Atty. Ernesto, Jr. A. Piedad, two (2) things always prove useful in everyday law school life and in any legal situation. First, throw your biases out the window when talking about the law. Second, your emotion is not relevant. Recently, as shown below, a photo of a Food Panda rider operating a bicycle on a public road was posted on the Project Jurisprudence - Philippines Facebook page. The delivery bag has a sign on it that says: "PWD [Person with Disability] I AM DEAF." The caption of the photo reads: "Are the deaf legally allowed to operate bicycles on a public road? Explain." Basically, this question requires a visit into the law on traffic and transportation and the law on persons with disabilities. For a few followers of the page, the answer is painfully obvious. Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, those, among othe

In Santos v. People, et al.[1] where petitioner argues that a resolution of a CTA Division denying a motion to quash, an interlocutory order, is a proper subject of an appeal to the CTA en banc under Section 18 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, the Supreme Court ruled in the negative and disposed the argument as follows: Petitioner is invoking a very narrow and literal reading of Section 18 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended. Indeed, the filing of a petition for review with the CTA en banc from a decision, resolution, or order of a CTA Division is a remedy newly made available in proceedings before the CTA, necessarily adopted to conform to and address the changes in the CTA. There was no need for such rule under Republic Act No. 1125, prior to its amendment, since the CTA then was composed only of one Presiding Judge and two Associate Judges. Any two Judges constituted a quorum and the concurrence of two Judges was necessary to promulgate any decisi

Section 2, Rule 1 of the RRCTA expressly provides that: SEC. 2. Liberal construction.- The Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding before the Court. (RCTA, Rule 1, sec. 2a)

Section 5 of Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides: Section 5.  Effect of failure to appear. — The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action . The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless other-wise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof. (2a, R20)

In Denso (Phils.), Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[1] the Supreme Court expounded on the differences between a “final judgment” and an “interlocutory order,” to wit: x x x A “final” judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case , leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties' next move x x x and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes “final” or, to use the established and mor

Section 23 of the Corporation Code of the Philippines provides: Sec. 23. The board of directors or trustees.  – Unless otherwise provided in this Code, the corporate powers of all corporation formed under this Code shall be exercised such corporations controlled and held by the board of directors or trustees to be elected from among the holders of stock, or where there is no stock, from among the members of the corporation, who shall hold office for one (1) year and until their successors are elected and qualified. Every director must own at least one (1) share of the capital stock of the corporation of which he is a director , which share shall stand in his name on the books of the corporation. Any director who ceases to be the owner of at least one (1) share of the capital stock of the corporation of which he is the director shall thereby cease to be a director. Trustees of non-stock corporations must be members thereof. A majority of the directors or trustees of all corporations or

Section 25 of the Corporation Code provides: Section 25.   Corporate officers, quorum . – Immediately after their election, the directors of a corporation must formally organize by the election of a president, who shall be a director, a treasurer who may or may not be a director, a secretary who shall be a resident and citizen of the Philippines, and such other officers as may be provided for in the by-laws. Any two (2) or more positions may be held concurrently by the same person, except that no one shall act as president and secretary or as president and treasurer at the same time. The directors or trustees and officers to be elected shall perform the duties enjoined on them by law and the by-laws of the corporation. Unless the articles of incorporation or the by-laws provide for a greater majority, a majority of the number of directors or trustees as fixed in the articles of incorporation shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of corporate business, and every decision of at l

A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must be pre-emptively resolved before the latter may proceed , because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative  juris et de jure  of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.[1] The rationale behind the principle is to avoid two conflicting decisions,[2] and its existence rests on the concurrence of two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.[3] [1] Yap v. Cabales, G.R. No. 159186, June 5, 2009. [2] Id. [3] RULES OF COURT, Rule 111, Sec. 7.

Article 106 of the Labor Code provides that there "is 'labor-only' contracting where the person supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, and the workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of the employer.  In such cases, the person or intermediary shall be considered merely an agent of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him .  (emphasis supplied) Sec. 5. Department Order No. 18-02, s. of 2002, implementing Articles 106 to 109 of the Labor Code,  prohibits labor-only contracting  and defines it as "an arrangement where the contractor or sub-contractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or service for a principal, and any of the following is present: (i)

Section 14(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that an accused has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be alleged in the Information. Section 8 of said rule provides that the Information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute and aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense. The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts alleged in the Information and not by the title or designation of the offense contained in the caption of the Information. It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is comprised must be alleged in the Information. See Garcia v. People, 457 Phil. 713, 719-720 (2003).

A well-settled rule in procedural law is that the allegations in the body of the pleading or the complaint, and not its title, determine the nature of an action.[1] In Fong v. Dueñas,[2] an examination of Fong’s complaint shows that  although it was labeled as an action for a sum of money and damages, it was actually a complaint for rescission . The following allegations in the complaint support this finding: 9. Notwithstanding the aforesaid remittances, defendant failed for an unreasonable length of time to submit a valuation of the equipment of D.C. Danton and Bakcom x x x. 10. Worse, despite repeated reminders from plaintiff, defendant failed to accomplish the organization and incorporation of the proposed holding company, contrary to his representation to promptly do so. x x x x 17. Considering that the incorporation of the proposed holding company failed to materialize, despite the lapse of one year and four months from the time of subscription, plaintiff has

Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution enshrines the principle that a public office is a public trust . It mandates that public officers and employees, who are servants of the people, must at all times be accountable to them , serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. To enforce this constitutional tenet, the Supreme Court has incessantly reminded officials and employees involved in the administration of justice to faithfully adhere to their mandated duties and responsibilities . Any act of impropriety – whether committed by the highest judicial official or by the lowest member of the judicial workforce – can greatly erode the people's confidence in the Judiciary. The image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct of its personnel . It is the personnel’s constant duty, therefore, to maintain the good name and standing of the court as a true temple of justice.[1]

"Tulfo Court" is a recurring and long-running joke on the Internet about the show of Rafael "Raffy" Teshiba Tulfo, called "Raffy Tulfo in Action" where he invites people who have legal, family and other problems needing a solution. Often, episodes revolve around family and marital matters. In other episodes, government officials, officers and employees are put under fire for certain, misconduct, misfeasance, malfeasance and nonfeasance. In the "Tulfo Court," the plaintiff is allowed to hurl any and all accusations against the defendant without regard to the rule on evidence. The defendant, on the other hand, is given the chance to respondent either in person on the show or via a phone or video call. There have been many instances in which the "Tulfo Court" was criticized for being too hasty in judgment against a defendant, for having no legal or factual basis in its pronouncements and, among many others, for making misinform

In People v. Nelmida (G.R. No. 184500, September 11, 2012), the Supreme Court explained elaborated on the principle of criminal conspiracy and its ramifications in this manner: There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and then decide to commit it.[1] It arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. Once established, each and every one of the conspirators is made criminally liable for the crime actually committed by any one of them. In the absence of any direct proof, the agreement to commit a crime may be deduced from the mode and manner of the commission of the offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. As such, it does not matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as each of the actors incurs the same criminal liability, because the act of one is the act of all. (Citation

Section 70 of P.D. 1529[1] provides: Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this decree for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number of certificates of title of the registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed. The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant’s residence, and a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the certificate of title.  T he adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration . After the lapse of the said period , the annotation of adve

In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Heirs of Estanislao Miñoza, et. al., the Supreme Court clarified that: xxx  an independent controversy cannot be injected into a suit by intervention, hence, such intervention will not be allowed where it would enlarge the issues in the action and expand the scope of the remedies. It is not proper where there are certain facts giving the intervenor’s case an aspect peculiar to himself and differentiating it clearly from that of the original parties; the proper course is for the would-be intervenor to litigate his claim in a separate suit . Intervention is not intended to change the nature and character of the action itself, or to stop or delay the placid operation of the machinery of the trial. The remedy of intervention is not proper where it will have the effect of retarding the principal suit or delaying the trial of the action. (G.R. No. 186045, 2 February 2011)

Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit. (Allied Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108089, 10 January 1994) The elements of res judicata are as follows: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject matter and cause of action. (Mirpuri v. Court of Appeals, 376 Phil. 628, 650)

In Corsiga v. Judge Defensor (G.R. No. 139302, October 28, 2002), which concerned the reassignment of an engineer in the National Irrigation Authority, the Supreme Court ruled: Section 13 Rule VII of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (the Adm. Code of 1987) provides how appeal can be taken from a decision of a department or agency head. It states that such decision shall be brought to the Merit System Protection Board (now the CSC En Banc per CSC Resolution No. 93-2387 dated June 29, 1993). It is the intent of the Civil Service Law, in requiring the establishment of a grievance procedure in Rule XII, Section 6 of the same rules, that decisions of lower level officials be appealed to the agency head, then to the Civil Service Commission. Decisions of the Civil Service Commission, in turn, may be elevated to the Court of Appeals.  Under this set up, the trial court does not have jurisdiction over personnel actions and, thus, committed an error in taking jurisdictio

Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, Series of 1998 (Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions) includes reassignment in the enumeration of personnel movements that do not require the issuance of a new appointment, to wit: SEC. 6. Other Personnel Movements. The following personnel movements which will not require issuance of an appointment shall nevertheless  require an office order by duly authorized official. a.  Reassignment  – movement of an employee from one organizational unit to another in the same department or agency which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary.  If reassignment is without the consent of the employee being reassigned, it shall be allowed only for a maximum period of one year. Reassignment is presumed to be regular and made in the interest of public service unless proven otherwise or if it constitutes constructive dismissal. Constructive dismissal exists when an employee quits his work because of the agency head’s

The CSC enumerates in Section 1, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules the personnel actions of (1) original appointment; (2) appointment through certification; (3) promotion; (4) transfer; (5) reinstatement; (6) reemployment; (7) detail; (8) secondment; (9) demotion; and (10) separation. It may be noted that items (1), (8), and (9) are not included in the enumeration of personnel actions in Book V, Title I A, Chapter 5, Sec. 26 of the Administrative Code of 1987. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 02-05, issued pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 041458 dated December 23, 2004, defines reassignment as the “movement of an employee across the organizational structure within the same department or agency, which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary.” It also provides that “personnel movements involving transfer or detail should not be confused with reassignment since they are governed by separate rules.” The reassignment of employees “with station-specific

A public servant who has an issue against a directive for her re-assignment must exhaust her available administrative remedies before resorting to judicial action. The non-exhaustion of available administrative remedies is fatal to the resort to judicial action. (G.R. No. 163109, January 22, 2014) The rule requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the principle that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter again, will decide the same correctly. There are both legal and practical reasons for the rule. The administrative process is intended to provide less expensive and speedier solutions to disputes. Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review and provides a system of administrative appeal or reconsideration, therefore, the courts – for reasons of law, comity and convenience – will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and th

Freedom of expression is guaranteed in its fullest outside government but, perhaps, more regulated when one assumes the role of a public officer . The right to speech is inherent. However, the act of joining a government office should be construed as an understanding that the individual's exercise of this basic right is subsumed by the necessity of providing public services to the greater majority. (Justice Leonen, concurring in Davao City Water District v. Aranjuez, et al., G.R. No. 194192, 16 June 2015) The limits are inherent in the nature of governance. The Constitution states that "[p]ublic officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."[1] Republic Act No. 6713[2] known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officials and Employees thus provides for the following norms of conduct: Section 4. Nor

Equal Work Opportunities for All The State shall protect labor, promote full employment, provide equal work opportunity regardless of gender, race, or creed; and regulate employee-employer relations. Male and female employees are entitled to equal compensation for work of equal value and to equal access to promotion and training opportunities. Discrimination against female employees is unlawful. It is also unlawful for an employer to require a condition of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that a woman employee shall be deemed dismissed upon marriage. The minimum age of employment is 18 years for hazardous jobs, and 15 years for non-hazardous jobs. But a child below 15 maybe employed by parents or guardians in a non-hazardous job if the employment does not interfere with the child's schooling. Security of Tenure Every employee shall be assured security of tenure. No employee can be dismissed