PROJECT JURISPRUDENCE

The  Civil Service Law  classifies the positions in the civil service into career and non-career service positions . Career positions are characterized by: (1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examinations , or based on highly technical qualifications ; (2) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) security of tenure .[36] The Career Service shall include[37]: (1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate examination is required; (2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and technical positions in scientific or research institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit systems; (3) Positions in the Career Executive Service ; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau

It is established that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. However, this admits of exceptions for it is likewise settled that the right to security of tenure is not available to those employees whose appointments are contractual and coterminous in nature. [1] In Civil Service Commission (CSC) v. Pililla Water District,[2] since the position of General Manager of a water district remains a primarily confidential position whose term still expires upon loss of trust and confidence by the BOD provided that prior notice and due hearing are observed, it cannot therefore be said that the phrase “shall not be removed except for cause and after due process” converted such position into a permanent appointment. Significantly, loss of confidence may be predicated on other causes for removal provided in the civil service rules and other existing laws. In Tanjay Water District v. Quinit, Jr.,[3] the Supr

In Civil Service Commission (CSC) v. Pililla Water District (G.R. No. 190147, March 05, 2013), the Supreme Court stressed that a primarily confidential position is characterized by the close proximity of the positions of the appointer and appointee as well as the high degree of trust and confidence inherent in their relationship.[1] The tenure of a confidential employee is coterminous with that of the appointing authority, or is at the latter’s pleasure. However, the confidential employee may be appointed or remain in the position even beyond the compulsory retirement age of 65 years.[2] Among those positions judicially determined as primarily confidential positions are the following: Chief Legal Counsel of the Philippine National Bank; Confidential Agent of the Office of the Auditor, GSIS; Secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan; Secretary to the City Mayor; Senior Security and Security Guard in the Office of the Vice Mayor; Secretary to the Board of a government co

In Civil Service Commission (CSC) v. Pililla Water District (G.R. No. 190147, March 05, 2013), the Court of Appeals (CA) held that the position of General Manager of a water district is primarily confidential in nature, explaining thus: x x x we rule that the position of general manager remains primarily confidential in nature despite the amendment of Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 by R.A. No. 9286, which gave the occupant of said position security of tenure, in that said officer could only be removed from office for cause and after due process . The nature of the duties and functions attached to the position points to its confidential character.  First , the general manager is directly appointed by the board of directors .  Second , the general manager directly reports to the board of directors .  Third,  the duties and responsibilities of a general manager are determined by the board of directors, which is a clear indication of a closely intimate re

In Civil Service Commission (CSC) v. Javier,[1] the Supreme Court categorically declared that the CSC's classification of confidential positions in the government is not binding on the Supreme Court: At present, there is no law enacted by the legislature that defines or sets definite criteria for determining primarily confidential positions in the civil service. Neither is there a law that gives an enumeration of positions classified as primarily confidential. What is available is only petitioner's own classification of civil service positions, as well as jurisprudence which describe or give examples of confidential positions in government. Thus, the corollary issue arises: should the Court be bound by a classification of a position as confidential already made by an agency or branch of government? Jurisprudence establishes that  the Court is not bound by the classification of positions in the civil service made by the legislative or execu

Based on the 1950 case of De los Santos v. Mallare,[1] a position that is primarily confidential in nature is defined as follows: x x x. These positions [policy-determining, primarily confidential and highly technical positions],  involve the highest degree of confidence, or are closely bound up with and dependent on other positions to which they are subordinate , or are temporary in nature. It may truly be said that the good of the service itself demands that appointments coming under this category be terminable at the will of the officer that makes them. x x x x Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase  denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of [discussion, delegation and reporting] without embarrassment or freedom from

Section 23 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 198, otherwise known as “The Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973” reads: Sec. 23. Additional Officers.–At the first meeting of the board, or as soon thereafter as practicable, the board shall appoint, by a majority vote, a general manager, an auditor, and an attorney, and shall define their duties and fix their compensation.  Said officers shall serve at the pleasure of the board.  (Emphasis supplied) The provision was subsequently amended by P.D. No. 768[13]: SEC. 23. The General Manager.–At the first meeting of the board, or as soon thereafter as practicable, the board shall appoint, by a majority vote, a general manager and shall define his duties and fix his compensation.  Said officer shall serve at the pleasure of the board . (Emphasis supplied) On April 02, 2004, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9286[7] was approved and signed into law, Section 2 of which provides: Sec. 2. Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 198, as a

Under Section 13, Rule V of the  Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws  and CSC Resolution No. 91-1631 issued on December 27, 1991, appointments in the civil service may either be of permanent or temporary status. A permanent appointment is issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed/promoted, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereof, while a temporary appointment may be extended to a person who possesses all the requirements for the position except the appropriate civil service eligibility and for a limited period not exceeding twelve months or until a qualified civil service eligible becomes available. Section 14 of the same resolution provides for a coterminous appointment: Sec. 14. An appointment may also be co-terminous which shall be issu

Garnishment has been defined as a specie of attachment for reaching credits belonging to the judgment debtor and owing to him from a stranger to the litigation.[1] A writ of attachment is substantially a writ of execution except that it emanates at the beginning, instead of at the termination, of a suit. It places the attached properties in custodia legis, obtaining pendente lite a lien until the judgment of the proper tribunal on the plaintiff’s claim is established, when the lien becomes effective as of the date of the levy.[2] By virtue of the writ of garnishment, for example, deposits in a bank may be placed in custodia legis of the court even though the bank is not a party to the case. From that time onwards, such deposits become under the sole control of the court and the bank holds them subject to its orders until such time that the attachment or garnishment is discharged, or the judgment in favor of the judgment credit is satisfied or the credit or deposit i

Section 43, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court states: SECTION 43. Proceedings when indebtedness denied or another person claims the property. – If it appears that a  person or corporation, alleged to have property of the judgment obligor or to be indebted to him , claims an interest in the property adverse to him or denies the debt , the court may authorize, by an order made to that effect,  the judgment oblige to institute an action against such person or corporation for the recovery of such interest or debt , forbid a transfer or other disposition of such interest or debt within one hundred twenty (120) days from notice of the order, and may punish disobedience of such order as for contempt. Such order may be modified or vacated at any time by the court which issued it, or by the court in which the action is brought, upon such terms as may be just. (Underscoring supplied). The institution of a separate action against a garnishee contemplates a situation where the garnishee (th

It is a settled rule that upon service of the writ of garnishment, the garnishee becomes a “virtual party” or “forced intervenor” to the case and the trial court thereby acquires jurisdiction to bind the garnishee to comply with its orders and processes. In Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Ramolete,[1] the Supreme Court ruled: In order that the trial court may validly acquire jurisdiction to bind the person of the garnishee, it is not necessary that summons be served upon him. The garnishee need not be impleaded as a party to the case. All that is necessary for the trial court lawfully to bind the person of the garnishee or any person who has in his possession credits belonging to the judgment debtor is service upon him of the writ of garnishment . The Rules of Court themselves do not require that the garnishee be served with summons or impleaded in the case in order to make him liable. xxxx Through the service of the writ of garnishment, the g

In Australian Professional Realty, Inc. v. Municipality of Padre Garcia, Batangas Province,[1] the Supreme Court held that a writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive reliefs and preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights and interests. Essential to granting the injunctive relief is the existence of an urgent necessity for the writ in order to prevent serious damage. A TRO issues only if the matter is of such extreme urgency that grave injustice and irreparable injury would arise unless it is issued immediately .[2] Also, the Supreme CourCourt, in the case of Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo,[3]emphasized that - Injunctive relief is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences that cannot be redressed under any standard of compensation. The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ of injuction i's that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuo

The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution.[1] By virtue of the powers vested in him by the Constitution and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1486.[2] The decree was later amended by P.D. No. 1606,[3] Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,[4] P.D. No. 1860,[5] and P.D. No. 1861.[6] With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was retained as provided for in Section 4, Article XI thereof.[7] Aside from Executive Order Nos. 14[8] and 14-a,[9] and R.A. 7080,[10] which expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 was further modified by R.A. No. 7975,[11] R.A. No. 8249,[12] and just this year, R.A. No. 10660.[13] Based on Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, those that fall within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2

The requirements for a taxpayer be able to claim a refund or credit of its input tax are found in Section 112 of the NIRC, as amended, the relevant portions of which read: Sec. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax.— x x x x (C) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Made. — In proper cases, the Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the application filed in accordance with Subsection (A) hereof. In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part of the Commissioner to act on the application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the expiration of the one hundred twenty-day period, appeal the decision or the unact

Under Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, certiorari should be filed "not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution" sought to be assailed. The provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. The timeliness of filing a pleading is a jurisdictional caveat that even this Court cannot trifle with.[1] First. The fact that the delay in the filing of the petition for certiorari was  only one day  is  not  a legal justification for non-compliance with the rule requiring that it be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the assailed judgment, order or resolution. The Court cannot subscribe to the theory that the ends of justice would be better sub served by allowing a petition for certiorari filed only one-day late. When the law fixes sixty (60) days, it cann

In civil proceedings, venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be waived by the defendant if not seasonably raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer.[1] Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court thus expressly stipulates that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. As it relates to the place of trial, indeed, venue is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than to restrict their access to the courts.[2] In other words, unless the defendant seasonably objects, any action may be tried by a court despite its being the improper venue. [1] Marcos-Araneta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154096, August 22, 2008. [2] Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. v. Registry of Deeds of Parañaque City, G.R. No. 133240, November 15, 2000.

In Perfecto v. Judge Esidera, the Supreme Court held that lawyers are not and should not be expected to be saints. "What they do as citizens of their faiths are beyond this court's power to judge. Lawyers, however, are officers of court. They are expected to care about and sustain the law. This court's jurisdiction over their actions is limited to their acts that may affect public confidence in the Rule of Law. Our state has secular interests to protect. This court cannot be expected to condone misconduct done knowingly on account of religious freedom or expression." (A.M. NO. RTJ-15-2417, July 22, 2015)

It is essential that the person initiating the petition for reconstitution must have an interest in the property. Section 12 of Republic Act No. 26 expressly provides as follows: Section 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e) 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of this Act shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns,  or any person having an interest in the property . The petition shall state or contain, among other things, the following: (a) that the owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owner’s, mortgagee’s, or lessee’s duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c) the location area and boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the building or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings o

Reading A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC together with Rule 17, Section 3 and Rule 18, Section 1 of the Rules of Court accommodates the outright dismissal of a complaint upon plaintiff's failure to show justifiable reason for not setting the case for pre-trial within the period provided by the Rules. Thus, trial courts must consider the facts of each case. The Supreme Court has allowed cases to proceed despite failure by the plaintiff to promptly move for pre-trial when it finds that "the extreme sanction of dismissal of the complaint might not be warranted:[1] It must be stressed that even if the plaintiff fails to promptly move for pre-trial without any justifiable cause for such delay,  the extreme sanction of dismissal of the complaint might not be warranted if no substantial prejudice would be caused to the defendant, and there are special and compelling reasons which would make the strict application of the rule clearly unjustified . .... While

THE ESTATE OF PEDRO C. GONZALES and HEIRS OF PEDRO C. GONZALES, Petitioners, vs. THE HEIRS OF MARCOS PEREZ, Respondents. G.R. No. 169681, November 5, 2009, on whether the Deed of Sale is invalid because it does not appear in a public document." On the question of whether the subject Deed of Sale is invalid on the ground that it does not appear in a public document, Article 1358 of the same Code enumerates the acts and contracts that should be embodied in a public document, to wit: Art. 1358. The following must appear in a public document: (1) Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property; sales of real property or of an interest therein are governed by Articles 1403, No. 2 and 1405; (2) The cession, repudiation or renunciation of hereditary rights or of those of the conjugal partnership of gains; (3) The power to administer property, or any

Judicial functions involve the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertaking to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.[1] Quasi-judicial functions apply to the actions and discretion of public administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action, in their exercise of discretion of a judicial nature.[2] Ministerial functions are those which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard to the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.[3] Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights under which adverse claims are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brough

The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides: The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. In Montañez v. Cipriano,[1] the Supreme Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows: The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d)  the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.  The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be vali

Art. 350 of the Revised Penal Code punishes the crime of illegal marriages as follows: Art. 350. Marriage contracted against provisions of laws . — The penalty of  prision correccional  in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next proceeding article, shall have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment. If either of the contracting parties shall obtain the consent of the other by means of violence, intimidation or fraud, he shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty provided in the next preceding paragraph.

The case of Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy Regulatory Board v. Barin is instructive, to wit: A valid order of abolition must not only come from a legitimate body, it must also be made in good faith. An abolition is made in good faith when it is not made for political or personal reasons, or when it does not circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees. Abolition of an office may be brought about by reasons of economy, or to remove redundancy of functions, or a clear and explicit constitutional mandate for such termination of employment . Where one office is abolished and replaced with another office vested with similar functions, the abolition is a legal nullity. When there is a void abolition, the incumbent is deemed to have never ceased holding office. The Supreme Court has also held that, other than the aforestated reasons of economy, making the bureaucracy more efficient is also indicative of the exercise of go

Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is created either by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence.[1] Indubitably, for example, the legislature through R.A. No. 9497 abolished the Air Transportation Office (ATO) as explicitly stated in Sections 4 and 85 thereof, viz: SEC. 4. Creation of the Authority. – There is hereby created an independent regulatory body with quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative powers and possessing corporate attributes to be known as the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), hereinafter referred to as the “Authority”, attached to the Department of Transportation and Communica

An issue is said to have become moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a declaration on the issue would be of no practical use or value.[1] The Court will therefore abstain from expressing its opinion in a case where no legal relief is needed or called for.[2] Nevertheless, despite mootness and despite the presence of some procedural flaws in a petition, such as disregard of the hierarchy of courts or the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, the Court may deem it necessary to address the essential issues. For example, it is in the interest of the State that questions relating to the status and existence of a public office be settled without delay.[3] [1] Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Tuazon, Jr., 469 Phil. 79, 85-86 (2004). [2] Korea Exchange Bank v. Gonzales, 520 Phil. 690, 701 (2006), citing Desaville, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128310, August 13, 2004, 436 SCRA 387, 391-392. [3] Buklo

For a successful prosecution for the crime of statutory rape there are two elements which must be proven: (1) that the victim was under 12 years of age at the time of the incident and (2) carnal knowledge by the assailant of the victim. Both must be proven before an accused may be found guilty of statutory rape. The Supreme Court has held that for minority to be considered as an element of a crime or a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape, it must not only be alleged in the Information, but it must also be established with moral certainty .[1] Under Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, it is inferred that the victim's birth certificate is the best evidence of her age. The Supreme Court is guided by the guidelines set in People v. Pruna[2] in appreciating age as an element of the crime or as an aggravating or qualifying circumstance: 1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such part