PROJECT JURISPRUDENCE

Those in the legal profession must always conduct themselves with honesty and integrity in all their dealings.[1] Lawyers should maintain, at all times, "a high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code [of Professional Responsibility]."[2] Members of the bar took their oath to conduct themselves "according to the best of [their] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [their] clients[,]"[3] and to "delay no man for money or malice[.]"[4] These mandates apply especially to dealings of lawyers with their clients considering the highly fiduciary nature of their relationship.[5] Clients entrust their causes—life, liberty, and property—to their lawyers, certain that this confidence would not be abused. Moreover, Article 1878 of

Section 3602 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines provides: Section 3602. Various Fraudulent Practices Against Customs Revenue . - Any person who makes or attempts to make any entry of imported or exported article by means of any false or fraudulent invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper or by any means of any false statement, written or verbal, or by any means of any false or fraudulent practice whatsoever, or knowingly effects any entry of goods, wares or merchandise, at less than true weight or measures thereof or upon a false classification as to quality or value, or by the payment of less than the amount legally due, or knowingly and willfully files any false or fraudulent entry or claim for the payment of drawback or refund of duties upon the exportation of merchandise, or makes or files any affidavit abstract, record, certificate or other document, with a view to securing the payment to himself or others of any drawback, allowance, or refund of duties on the

Respondent argues that the action of petitioner to recover possession of the property is already barred by prescription. The Supreme Court does not agree. An action to recover possession of a registered land never prescribes in view of the provision of Section 44 of Act No. 496 to the effect that no title to registered land in derogation of that of a registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. It follows that an action by the registered owner to recover a real property registered under the Torrens System does not prescribe. Despite knowledge of this avowed doctrine, the trial court ruled that petitioners cause of action had already prescribed on the ground that the imprescriptibility to recover lands registered under the Torrens System can only be invoked by the person under whose name the land is registered. Again, the Supreme Court does not agree. It is well settled that the rule on imprescriptibility of registered lands not only applies to the regis

PROHIBITED DISCRIMINATION ON EMPLOYMENT:  No entity, whether public or private, shall discriminate against a qualified PWD by reason of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, promotion, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions and privileges of employment. The following constitute acts of discrimination: [1] Limiting, segregating or classifying a job applicant with disability in such a manner that adversely affects his work opportunities; [2] Using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out a PWD unless such standards, tests or other selection criteria are shown to be job-related for the position in question and are consistent with business necessity; [3] Utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration that: (1) have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability, or; (2) perpetuate the discrimin

"Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax." (Article III, 1987 Constitution of the Philippines)

It is well-settled that a sheriff performs a sensitive role in the dispensation of justice. He is duty-bound to know the  basic rules  in the implementation of a writ of execution and be vigilant in the exercise of that authority. While sheriffs have the ministerial duty to implement writs of execution promptly, they are bound to discharge their duties with prudence, caution, and attention which careful men usually exercise in the management of their affairs. Sheriffs, as officers of the court upon whom the execution of a judgment depends, must be circumspect and proper in their behavior.[1] Anything less is unacceptable because in serving the court's writs and processes and in implementing the orders of the court, sheriffs cannot afford to err without affecting the efficiency of the process of the administration of justice.[2] In the case of Cachero v. United Overseas Bank,[3] Sheriff Cachero failed to exercise circumspection in the enforcement of the writ of execution , given the

"Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct grounds to dismiss a particular action. The former refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading, while the latter to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action. Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of the proceedings through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, while dismissal for lack of cause of action may be raised any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff."[1] A complaint states a cause of action if it  sufficiently  avers the existence of the three (3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (c) an

It bears to stress that power of the court to award attorney's fees demands factual, legal, and equitable justification , without which the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture.[1] As elucidated in the case of S.C. Megaworld Construction and Development Corporation v. Parada:[2] Article 2208 of the New Civil Code enumerates the instances where such may be awarded and, in all cases, it must be reasonable , just and equitable if the same were to be granted. Attorney's fees as part of damages are not meant to enrich the winning party at the expense of the losing litigant. They are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. The award of attorney's fees is the exception. rather than the general rule. As such, it is necessary for the trial court to make findings of facts and law that would bring the case within the exception an

Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment."[1] Paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court state the doctrine of res judicata: SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows: x x x x (b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and (c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a f

Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court lays down the definition of a real party in interest as follows: SEC. 2.  Parties in interest . - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. The rule on real parties in interest has two (2) requirements, namely: (a) to institute an action, the plaintiff must be the real party in interest; and (b) the action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved. One having no material interest cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff in an action . When the plaint

There are three kinds of estoppels, to wit: (1) estoppel in pais ; (2) estoppel by deed ; and (3) estoppel by laches .  Under the first kind, a person is considered in estoppel if by his conduct, representations, admissions or silence when he ought to speak out, whether intentionally or through culpable negligence, "causes another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, as a consequence of which he would be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts." Under estoppel by deed, a party to a deed and his privies are precluded from denying any material fact stated in the deed as against the other party and his privies . Under estoppel by laches, an equitable estoppel, a person who has failed or neglected to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time is presumed to have abandoned or otherwise declined to assert such right and cannot later on seek to enforce the same, to the p

The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines categorically prohibits the passing of any ex post facto law. Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 22 specifically states: "No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted." According to a Wikipedia page, the term "ex post facto"is a corrupted form of the Latin phrase "ex postfacto" which literally means "out of the aftermath." In a strict sense, an ex post facto law is a law that retroactively changes the legal consequences (or status) of actions that were committed, or relationships that existed, before the enactment of the law. However, in the Philippines, this legal term has been given an absolutely negative connotation because of the above-cited constitutional prohibition. In our legal system, an ex post facto law is one which: [1] Makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; [2] Aggravates a crime, or make

https://www.projectjurisprudence.com/2021/08/gr-no-241257-september-29-2020.html The third duty imposed on the trial court by the 2000 Revised Rules is to allow the accused to present exculpatory or mitigating evidence on his behalf in order to properly calibrate the correct imposable penalty. This duty, however, does not mean that the trial court can compel the accused to present evidence. Of course, the court cannot force the accused to present evidence when there is none. The accused is free to waive his right to present evidence if he so desires. Consistent with the policy of the law, the Court has issued guidelines regarding the waiver of the accused of his right to present evidence under this rule, thus: Henceforth, to protect the constitutional right to due process of every accused in a capital offense and to avoid any confusion about the proper steps to be taken when a trial court comes face to face with an accused or his counsel who wants to waive his client's right to pr

On account of the amendment of the 1964 Rules of the Court, the second duty of the trial court, to require the prosecution to present evidence of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, has become mandatory. Hence, it is imperative that the trial court requires the presentation of evidence from the prosecution to enable itself to determine the precise participation and the degree of culpability of the accused in the perpetration of the capital offense charged.[74] The reason behind this requirement is that the plea of guilt alone can never be sufficient to produce guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It must be remembered that a plea of guilty is only a supporting evidence or secondary basis for a finding of culpability, the main proof being the evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Once an accused charged with a capital offense enters a plea of guilty, a regular trial shall be conducted just the same as if no such plea was

https://www.projectjurisprudence.com/2021/08/gr-no-241257-september-29-2020.html The searching inquiry requirement means more than informing cursorily the accused that he faces a jail term but also, the exact length of imprisonment under the law and the certainty that he will serve time at the national penitentiary or a penal colony.[65] The searching inquiry of the trial court must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea.[66] Not infrequently indeed, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of lenient treatment, or upon bad advice, or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to see to it that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions.''[67] A searching inquiry likewise compels the judge to content himself reasonably that the accused has not been coerced or placed under a state of duress — and

In U.S. v. Burlado,[48] this Court affirmed therein accused's conviction for the crime of qualified theft on the strength of his plea of guilty. The Court explained that "[a] plea of guilty, when formally entered on arraignment, is sufficient to sustain a conviction of any offense charged in the information without the introduction of further evidence, the defendant himself having supplied the necessary proof by his plea of guilty. (United States v. Dineros, 18 Phil. 566 (1911); United States v. Jamad, 37 Phil. 305 (1917).)  The defendant having admitted his guilt of the facts charged in the complaint, the only question left for decision is the penalty" [49] The 1940 Rules of Court, the earliest progenitor of the 2000 Revised Rules, extended the same level of protection. Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the 1940 Rules of Court reads: SECTION 5. Plea of Guilty — Determination of Punishment. — Where the defendant pleads guilty to a complaint or information

When the accused pleads guilty in a criminal trial, the following guidelines must be followed. It must be noted that these guidelines were promulgated in 1917. The present Rules on Criminal Procedure are more stringent, despite some of the Jamad guidelines remaining applicable.[1] (1) The essence of the plea of guilty in a criminal trial is that the accused, on arraignment, admits his guilt freely, voluntarily, and with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act , and with a clear understanding of the precise nature of the crime or crimes charged in the complaint or information. (2) Such a plea of guilty, when formally entered on arraignment, is sufficient to sustain a conviction of any offense charged in the information, even a capital offense, without the introduction of further evidence, the defendant having himself supplied the necessary proof. (3) There is nothing in the law in this jurisdiction which forbids the introduction of evi

Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules is relevant, viz.: SECTION 3.  Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and [shall] require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf. Interestingly, the rule encapsulated in Sec. 3, Rule 116 was not the rule prior to the advent of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. The evolution of the rule reveals a dichotomy which the Court now addresses. The development of the rule, as well as jurisprudence, dictates a just resolution of the case. Even prior to the adoption of the 1940 Rules of Court, jurisprudence has had to grapple with instances where an accused pleaded guilty to a capital offense. In such instances, the Court maintained a policy of restrai

Accused-appellant was charged with murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, making said crime a capital offense.[1] It must be noted that murder remains a capital offense despite the proscription against the imposition of death as a punishment.[2] In People v. Albert,[3] the Supreme Court ruled that "in case death was found to be the imposable penalty, the same would only have to be reduced to reclusion perpetua in view of the prohibition against the imposition of the capital punishment, but the nature of the offense of murder as a capital crime, and for that matter, of all crimes properly characterized as capital offenses under the Revised Penal Code, was never tempered to that of a non-capital offense."[4] Thus, when accused-appellant pleaded guilty during his arraignment, he pleaded to a capital offense. Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules is relev

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In the case of In Re: Enalbes, https://www.projectjurisprudence.com/2021/08/am-no-18-11-09-sc-january-22-2019.html While the 24-month period provided under the 1987 Constitution is persuasive, it does not summarily bind this Court to the disposition of cases brought before it. It is a mere directive to ensure this Court's prompt resolution of cases, and should not be interpreted as an inflexible rule.

In the case of Ampatuan v. De Lima,[1] the admission of accused Dalandag into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ in accordance with Republic Act No. 6981 (The Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act) as a state witness since August 13, 2010 was declared by the Supreme Court justified and warranted by the absolute necessity of his testimony to the successful prosecution of the criminal charges. Apparently, all the conditions prescribed by Republic Act No. 6981 were met in his case. The Supreme Court also said that his admission of his participation in the commission of the Maguindanao massacre was no hindrance to his admission into the Witness Protection Program as a state witness, for all that was necessary was for him to appear not the most guilty. Accordingly, he could not anymore be charged for his participation in the Maguindanao massacre, as to which his admission (into the Program) operated as an acquittal, unless he later on refuses or fail

The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the Government whose principal power and responsibility are to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of the power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the public prosecutors with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors that are best appreciated by the public prosecutors.[1] The public prosecutors are solely responsible for the determination of the amount of evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to justify the filing of appropriate criminal charges against a respondent. Theirs is also the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not criminal cases should be filed in court.[2] Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the Court deems it a sound judicial policy not

These are the words of Justice Cardozo: "The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant charged with crime whatever forms of procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of incriminating proof. But justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true."[1] This norm which is of the very essence of due process as the embodiment of justice requires that the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove that there is strong evidence of guilt. It is not enough that questions, even if characterized as "searching" ones, were asked by the judge before bail was granted. Such fact of conduct of searching q

In Briones v. Court of Appeals,[1] the Supreme Court succinctly discussed the rule on venue, including the import of restrictive stipulations on venue. Based on said case, the general rule is that the venue of real actions is the court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated; while the venue of personal actions is the court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff. As an exception, jurisprudence in Legaspi v. Rep. of the Phils.[2] instructs that the parties, thru a written instrument, may either introduce another venue where actions arising from such instrument may be filed, or restrict the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue, viz.: The parties, however, are not precluded from agreeing in writing on an exclusive venue, as qualified by Section 4 of the same rule.  Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictiv

In Non v. Ombudsman[1], the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the "Supreme Court has yet to promulgate the pertinent rules on RA No. 10660[2] and there are no implementing rules yet on this particular matter. [Therefore, the] default regime is found in Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, viz., the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the proper court of the municipality, city, or province where the offense was committed and where any of its essential ingredients took place." According to the Supreme Court, despite the absence of rules implementing RA No. 10660, the provision of the law on trial "in a judicial region other than where the official holds office" shall prevail. Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure says that, when a law specifically provides a venue , then the criminal action shall be instituted in such place. SEC. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. —

As a rule, a denial of a motion to quash filed by an accused is not appealable, since an appeal from an interlocutory order is not allowed under Section 1(b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Neither can it be a proper subject of a petition for certiorari, which is filed only in the absence of an appeal or any other adequate, plain, and speedy remedy. In a denial of a motion to quash information, the plain and speedy remedy is to proceed to trial.[1] In the usual course of procedure, a denial of a motion to quash filed by an accused results in the continuation of the trial and the determination of his guilt or innocence. If a judgment of conviction is rendered and the lower court's decision of conviction is appealed, the accused can raise the denial of his motion to quash, not only as an error committed by the trial court, but as an added ground to overturn the latter's ruling.[2] Thus, a direct resort to the Supreme Court via a special civil action for 

In ejectment cases, the only question that courts must resolve is who between the parties is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property in dispute. The main issue is possession de facto, independent of any claim of ownership or possession de jure.[1] Thus, courts should base their decision on who had prior physical possession of the premises under litigation.[2] As a rule, "possession" in forcible entry cases refers to nothing more than prior physical possession or possession de facto, not possession de jure or that arising from ownership. Title is not an issue. The Supreme Court has, however, consistently ruled that possession can be acquired not only by material, physical or actual occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right.[3] In Quizon v. Juan,[4] the Court explained: Possession can be acq