THE CASE OF DE JOYA V. JUDGE MARQUEZ - 55 PJP 21

  1. RECOMMENDED CITATION: DELA PEÑA, Mark Angelo S. (2024), “The Case of De Joya v. Judge Marquez,” 55 PJP 21, available at <insert link> (last accessed on <date>).
  2. PJP BLOG: Although this content has received a favorable recommendation for citation from the admin team of PJP, it is not yet considered a peer-reviewed journal entry.
  3. CONTACT US: For immediate action on requests, comments, concerns, suggestions, and other forms of feedback, please message us on Facebook at www.m.me/projectjurisprudence.

This is the case of De Joya v. Judge Marquez (2014).[1]

In the case of De Joya v. Judge Marquez, a warrant of arrest was issued by respondent judge against petitioner for alleged violation of Paragraph 2(a) of Article 315 of the RPC in relation to PD No. 1689. Petitioner asserted that respondent judge erred in finding the existence of probable cause that would justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him and his co-accused.

Under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, within ten days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. Immediately dismissal of the case may be made if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If probable cause is found, a warrant of arrest may be issued, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice and the issuance must be resolved by the court within 30 days from the filing of the complaint or information.

The Supreme Court found that the documents attached to the records of the case sufficiently established the existence of probable cause as required under Section 6 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest pertains to facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of technical rules on evidence with which such average man might be unfamiliar. Rather, reliance must be made on the calculus of common sense of which all reasonable men have an abundance. Thus, the standard used for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is less stringent than that used for establishing the guilt of the accused. If the evidence presented shows a prima facie case against the accused, the trial court judge has sufficient ground to issue a warrant of arrest against him/her.

For purposes of determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, there is no need to show that the accused are indeed guilty of the crime charged. That matter should be fully ventilated in trial. Before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of an accused. Hence, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They simply personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence.[2]

In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the Rules allow the judge to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence. In this case, the resolution issued by State Prosecutor Benny Nicdao thoroughly explained the bases for his findings that there was probable cause to charge all the accused with violation of the law.

Notice that the Supreme Court in the discussion above said that judicial determination of probable cause means a finding that the initial determination of probable cause by the prosecution is “supported by substantial evidence.” This appears to be a case of careless use of language because “probable cause” and “substantial evidence” are completely different levels or quanta of proof in the hierarchy of evidentiary values.

Probable cause is that level in the hierarchy of proof that is more than reasonable suspicion but less than substantial evidence. On the other hand, substantial evidence is more than probable cause but less than preponderance. In fact, substantial evidence has an oft-cited definition in jurisprudence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

On the other hand, a finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspect. Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.


[1] 516 Phil. 717 [ G.R. NO. 162416. January 31, 2006 ] CHESTER DE JOYA, PETITIONER, VS. JUDGE PLACIDO C. MARQUEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 40, MANILA-RTC, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

[2] Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1, pp. 7-9. This author humbly submits that there is some careless language in saying that “substantial evidence” should support the determination of issuance of a warrant of arrest because “substantial evidence” is a quantum of evidence different from “probable cause.”