THE CASE OF FRIAS V. ALCAYDE - 56 PJP 21

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This is the case of Frias v. Alcayde (2018).[1]

In the case of Frias v. Alcayde, the Supreme Court said: “Due process dictates that jurisdiction over the person of a defendant can only be acquired by the courts after a strict compliance with the rules on the proper service of summons.”

In the RTC, respondent filed a petition to annul the Metropolitan Trial Court’s (MeTC’s) July 26, 2006 decision which ordered him to vacate the premises of the subject property and to pay the petitioner the accrued rentals thereon, allegedly in violation of the parties’ lease contract.

Had the RTC granted the respondent’s petition, the MeTC’s July 26, 2006 judgment would have been declared a nullity. This would have resulted in the following consequences: as to the respondent, he would no longer be required to pay the rentals and vacate the subject property; and, as to the petitioner, she would be deprived of her right to demand the rentals and to legally eject the respondent. According to the RTC, only the parties’ interests, i.e., rights and obligation, would have been affected. Thus, a petition for annulment of judgment is one in personam. It is neither an action in rem nor an action quasi in rem.

The Court of Appeals, however, resolved that jurisdiction over the res was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the RTC and jurisdiction over the person of petitioner may be dispensed with. Citing the case of Villanueva v. Nite,[2] the Court of Appeals concluded that the petition should not be considered an action in personam since it can be filed by one who was not a party to the case.

However, in the Villanueva case, the Supreme Court did not give a categorical statement to the effect that a petition for annulment of judgment is not an action in personam. Neither was there any remark that said petition is either an action in rem or a quasi in rem. The issue in the Villanueva case was simply whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in annulling and setting aside the RTC’s decision on the ground of extrinsic fraud. Unlike in this case, there were no issues pertaining to the proper service of summons, to the nature of a petition for annulment of judgment, or to the denial of due process by reason of a defect in the service of summons. In short, the Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in classifying the action as one in rem.

The Supreme Court found that the return on summons revealed that no diligent efforts were exerted and no positive step was taken to locate and serve the summons personally on the petitioner. Upon having been satisfied that the petitioner was not present at her given address, Sheriff Tolentino immediately resorted to substituted service of summons by proceeding to the office of Atty. Frias, petitioner’s counsel.

Evidently, Sheriff Tolentino failed to show that she made several attempts to effect personal service for at least three times on at least two different dates. It is likewise evident that Sheriff Tolentino simply left the notice of raffle and summons with Ms. Gonzales, the alleged secretary of Atty. Frias. She did not even bother to ask her where the petitioner might be.

There were no details in the officer’s return that would suggest that Sheriff Tolentino inquired as to the identity of Ms. Gonzales. There was no showing that Ms. Gonzales was the one managing the office or business of the petitioner, such as the president or manager; and that she had sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the petitioner in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons.

Indeed, without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service of summons. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and, hence, may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute.

Sheriff Tolentino, however, fell short of these standards. For her failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of substituted service, the same was rendered ineffective. As such, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions, which is generally accorded to a sheriff’s return, did not apply in this case.[3]

Likewise, there was no voluntary appearance on the part of petitioner. The records show that the petitioner never received any copy of the respondent’s petition to annul the final and executory judgment of the MeTC in the unlawful detainer case. The copy of the said petition which was served to Ms. Gonzales was defective under the Rules of Court. Consequently, in order to question the trial court’s jurisdiction, petitioner filed pleadings and motions under a special appearance.

In all these pleadings and motions, petitioner never faltered in declaring that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person, due to invalid and improper service of summons. When petitioner filed said pleadings and motions, it was only in a “special” character, conveying the fact that her appearance before the trial court was with a qualification, i.e., to defy the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction over her person.

Owing to these, petitioner never abandoned her objections to the trial court’s jurisdiction even when she elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals through her petition for certiorari. The filing of her pleadings and motions, including that of her subsequent positions, were all in protest of the respondent’s insistence on holding her to answer the petition for annulment of judgment in the RTC, which she believed she was not subject to. Indeed, to continue the proceeding in such case would not only be useless and a waste of time but would also violate her right to due process.

To recapitulate, jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner was never vested with the RTC despite the mere filing of the petition for annulment of judgment, which is an action in personam, not an action in rem or quasi in rem. The manner of substituted service by the process server was apparently invalid and ineffective. As such, there was a violation of due process.

In its classic formulation, due process means that any person with interest to the thing in litigation, or the outcome of the judgment, as in this case, must be notified and given an opportunity to defend that interest.[4] Thus, as the essence of due process lies in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence the defendant may have in support of her defense, petitioner must be properly served the summons of the court. In other words, the service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process and compliance with the rules regarding the service of the summons is as much an issue of due process as it is of jurisdiction.[5] Regrettably, the constitutional right of petitioner to be properly served summons and to be notified has been utterly overlooked by the officers of the trial court.

[1] BOBIE ROSE D. V. FRIAS v. ROLANDO F. ALCAYDE, 826 Phil. 713 [ G.R. No. 194262. February 28, 2018 ].

[2] 528 Phil. 867 (2006).

[3] Nation Petroleum Gas, Inc., v. RCBC, 166 Phil. 696 [2015].

[4] Borlongan v. Banco De Oro, G.R. No. 217617, April 5, 2017.

[5] Express Padala v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 202505, September 6, 2017.